


INDONESIAN POLITICAL FINANCE INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT

Six Principles of Political Finance Integrity



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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Context	1
1. Political system and democracy	1
2. Corruption and rule of law	2
3. Gender equality in politics	3
Principle 1: Transparency	4
1.1. Bookkeeping	4
1.2. Comprehensive reporting	5
1.3. Publication of data	6
Recommendations	7
Principle 2: Clean Money	8
2.1. Illicit sources of income	9
2.2. Illicit types of expenditure	10
Recommendations	11
Principle 3: Fairness	12
3.1. Restrictions on self-funding candidates	12
3.2. Restriction on individual private donations	13
3.3. Restrictions on legal entities' donations	13
3.4. Restrictions on expenditure	14
3.5. Provision of public funding	14
3.6. Intraparty governance	16
Recommendations	17
Principle 4: Gender Equality	18
4.1. Gender disaggregated information	18
4.2. Gender targeted public funding	19
4.3. Non-financial gender targeted measures	19
Recommendations	20
Principle 5: State Neutrality	21
5.1. Abuse of state resources	21
5.2. Abuse of regulatory/rulemaking and allocation powers for electoral benefit (clientelism)	22
5.3. Access to state media	23
5.4. Abuse of security forces	23
Recommendations	24
Principle 6: Accountability	25
6.1. Effective agency	26
6.2. Investigation	27
6.3. Sanctions	28
6.4. Inter-agency cooperation	29
6.5. Gender-sensitive reporting systems	30
Recommendations	31
Reference	32



INTRODUCTION

The Political Finance Integrity Assessment (PFIA) is comprised of six principles that make up a comprehensive understanding of the integrity of political finance, namely: transparency, clean money, fairness, gender equality, state neutrality, and accountability. Each principle is broken down into a number of issues or attributes, adding to a total of 21 issues.

The tool builds on the pioneering Crinis methodology,¹ first developed and applied by Transparency International and the Carter Center in 2006. It further draws from handbooks that guide electoral observation of the European Union,² the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe,³ the Organisation of American States⁴ Research tools by International IDEA⁵ and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems⁶ have also informed the development of this assessment framework.

Context

1. Political system and democracy

Referring to the Democracy Index 2024 published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Indonesia's democracy is classified as a "flawed democracy" with an overall score of 6.44 (scale 0-10) and is ranked 59th out of 167 countries. Indonesia's scores for each of the five measurement categories are as follows:⁷

1. Electoral process and pluralism (7,92)
2. Functioning of government (6,79)
3. Political participation (7,22)
4. Political culture (5,00)
5. Civil liberties (5,29)

In its report, EIU highlighted the trend of dynastic politics that is strengthening in the region, including Indonesia. The 2024 presidential election won by Prabowo with the support of the incumbent President (Joko Widodo) is seen as a mutually beneficial cooperation between the two with the appointment of Gibran Rakabuming Raka – President Joko Widodo's son – as Vice President, which was made possible thanks to the

¹ Transparency International, 2007, *The Crinis Project: Money in Politics, Everyone's Concern*. Berlin, Transparency International and the Carter Center. p.81-98.

² European Union, 2016. *Handbook for European Union Electoral Observation*. Luxembourg, European Union External Action Service (3rd edition).

³ OSCE ODIHR, 2023, *Handbook on Observing and Promoting Women's Electoral Participation*. Warsaw, ODIHR; 2015, *Handbook for the Observation of Campaign Finance*. Warsaw, ODIHR.

⁴ Organisation of American States, 2012, *Observing Political-Electoral Financing Systems: A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions*. Available on https://www.oas.org/es/sap/deco/pubs/manuales/MOE_Manual_e.PDF (last accessed 1 May 2024); *Manual for Incorporating a Gender Perspective into Electoral Observation Missions (OAS/EOMs)*, available on https://www.oas.org/es/sap/deco/pubs/manuales/Manual_gender_e.pdf (last accessed 1 May 2024)

⁵ To cite Political Finance Database and Political System Design Tool.

⁶ IFES, 2018, *Abuse of State Resources Research and Assessment Framework: Guidelines for the Democracy and Governance Community of Practice*.

⁷ Economist Intelligence Unit, 2025, *Democracy Index 2024: What's wrong with representative democracy?*, p.17.

Constitutional Court's controversial ruling.⁸ Changes to the Constitutional Court Law itself have also been considered to undermine the independence of the judiciary.⁹

The 2024 election is the sixth election held by Indonesia since the fall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1998 or commonly called the Reform Era. The 2024 election will be held simultaneously on February 14, 2024 to directly elect the President and Vice President, members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) (with an open list proportional system), and members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) (with a single non-transferable vote (SNTV). Meanwhile, the direct election of regional heads will be held nine months later in November 27, 2024.

According to the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), the integrity of the 2024 election process still faces challenges related to problems with the legal framework, the independence of the General Election Commission (KPU), the mobilization and abuse of state resources to influence voter preferences, and the responsiveness of the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) in handling complaints and violations of the election law. These factors have led to concerns about the weakness of sufficient systems and processes to ensure accountability, transparency, inclusivity, and public confidence in the election process and results.¹⁰

2. Corruption and rule of law

Referring to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, in the 2024 measurement year Indonesia obtained a CPI score of 37 (scale of 0-100 from most corrupt to least) and is ranked 99th out of 180 countries.¹¹ Meanwhile, based on a domestic assessment, the National Integrity Index published by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for the same year recorded a score of 71.53 (on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 indicates no integrity and 100 indicates full integrity), indicating a situation that remains vulnerable to corrupt practices.¹²

According to the KPK, over the past 20 years (2004–April 2025), out of 1,694 cases handled, bribery and gratification cases were the most prevalent, totaling 1,064 cases. These were followed by corruption in goods and services procurement (423 cases), and other categories, which ranged from a dozen to several dozen cases. In terms of perpetrators, politicians (including members of parliament at the national and regional levels, as well as regional heads) topped the list, with a total of 564 cases recorded.¹³

The law enforcement sector has also not been immune to corruption, with the KPK recording 69 cases involving judges, prosecutors, police officers, and/or lawyers.¹⁴ In

⁸ The ruling in question is the Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XXI/2023, which altered the interpretation of the minimum age requirement for presidential and vice-presidential candidates (Article 169 letter q of the Election Law). The age requirement, which was previously set at a minimum of 40 years, was modified by the Constitutional Court by adding an alternative qualification, namely having previously held or currently holding an elected office through general elections, including regional head elections. https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_mkri_9332_1697427438.pdf.

⁹ Ibid., p.69.

¹⁰ Brizza Rosales, John Reiner Antiquerra, and Manjesh Rana, 2024, *Beyond Power: Upholding the Rule of Law amid Democratic Adversities – Final Report of the ANFREL International Expert Election Observation Mission (IEEOM) to the 2024 Indonesian General Elections*. Bangkok, ANFREL Foundation, p.11.

¹¹ <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/indonesia>.

¹² <https://www.kpk.go.id/id/ruang-informasi/berita/temuan-spi-2024-suap-dan-gratifikasi-masih-terjadi-di-lebih-dari-90-kementerianlembaga-pemerintah-daerah>.

¹³ <https://kpk.go.id/id/publikasi-data/statistik/penindakan-2>.

¹⁴ <https://kpk.go.id/id/publikasi-data/statistik/penindakan-2>.

response to this situation, Freedom House, in its 2024 assessment, gave Indonesia a score of 2 out of 4 for judicial independence, concluding that the judiciary remains plagued by corruption and various other weaknesses.¹⁵

3. Gender equality in politics

According to the Election Law,¹⁶ in order to participate in elections, political parties are required to place 30% women on the nomination list, with the provision that there is a minimum of 1 woman out of every 3 candidates (Articles 245 & 246).

In the 2024 election, the number of women candidates for members of the House of Representatives was recorded at 3,896 candidates or around 37.7%,¹⁷ and as many as 128 were elected as members of the House of Representatives (22.1% of the 580 seats contested). Women's representation in the House of Representatives is currently the highest since entering the Reform era, with the following increasing trends:¹⁸

1. 1999: 45/500 (9%)
2. 2004: 61/550 (11,1%)
3. 2009: 101/560 (18%)
4. 2014: 97/560 (17,3%)
5. 2019: 118/575 (20,5%)
6. 2024: 128/580 (22,1%)

A similar affirmation policy does not apply to the election of regional heads. In the 2024 Regional Elections, there are 308 women running for regional heads/deputy regional heads or around 10% of the total number of candidates for regional heads/deputy regional heads. Of these, as many as 110 women (35.71%) were successfully elected.¹⁹

Trends in Women's Candidacy and Electability in the 2015–2020 Regional Elections:²⁰

1. 2015: 124/1,654 candidates (7.5%); 23 elected (18.6%).
2. 2017: 45/620 candidates (7.3%); 10 elected (22.2%).
3. 2018: 94/1,044 candidates (9.0%); 15 elected (16.0%).
4. 2020: 159/1,482 candidates (10.7%); 27 elected (17.0%).

Although women's electability increased in the 2024 regional elections compared to the previous elections, women's participation in the regional elections is considered more difficult because it is not supported by affirmative policies. In general, women face layered challenges that hinder participation as candidates for regional heads, such as structural challenges, double burdens, and sexist campaigns.²¹

¹⁵ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2025>.

¹⁶ Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections.


¹⁷ <https://www.indonesiabaik.id/infografis/377-calon-legislatif-di-pemilu-2024-adalah-perempuan>.

¹⁸ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/tantangan-partisipasi-perempuan>.

¹⁹ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/potret-keterpilihan-perempuan-di-pilkada-2024>.

²⁰ Mia Novitasari, Roni, and Dirga Ardiansa, 2021, *Laporan Riset Kepemimpinan Politik Delapan Kepala Daerah Perempuan : Tarik Ulur Relasi dan Identitas*, Jakarta, Cakra Wikara Indonesia, p.2. https://cakrawikara.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Laporan-Riset-CWI_Kepala-Daerah.pdf.

²¹ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/perempuan-dalam-pilkada-2024-antara-hambatan-struktural-dan-politik-berbiaya-mahal>.



PRINCIPLE 1: TRANSPARENCY

The transparency of political funding in Indonesia, both in the electoral context (campaign funding) and outside the electoral context (political party operations and programmatic agendas) still has a number of obstacles so that interested parties cannot always access it in a comprehensive and timely version.

In terms of legal framework, the Political Party Law,²² for example, states that the financial management of political parties is carried out in a transparent and accountable manner, audited by a public accountant every year and announced periodically (Article 39), but the law does not regulate the enforcement of this provision. Meanwhile, although the transparency of campaign funding is regulated more fully in the Election Law and the Regional Election Law,²³ public does not have full access to detailed information.²⁴ Additionally, the information channels provided by the KPU often experience disruptions, making it difficult to access information in a timely manner.²⁵

Transparency International Indonesia (TII) (2023) also shows that the capacity and practice of financial disclosure of political parties tends to be suboptimal. The majority of political parties do not open the books, list of donors and the amount of donations received, do not upload comprehensive financial statements on websites, and are late in providing the requested information or even do not provide it at all.²⁶ Other research related to national and regional election campaign funding also highlights the lack of credibility in published campaign finance reports, which often fail to reflect actual revenues and expenditures. In addition, the campaign finance disclosure platform provided by the KPU has been found to be unreliable, with prolonged loading times, page load failures, and the absence of an open data format.²⁷

1.1. Bookkeeping

Bookkeeping for regular political party accounts

The Law on Political Parties mandates political parties to keep books, maintain a list of donors and the amount of donations received (Article 13 letter h); submit an accountability report on financial revenues and expenditures sourced from the state budget every year to the government after being audited by the Financial Audit Board (BPK) (Article 13 letter i); and make financial statements for audit purposes which include budget realization reports, balance sheet statements, and cash flow statements (Article 39 Paragraph (3)).

²² Law Number 2 of 2008 concerning Political Parties as amended through Law Number 2 of 2011.

²³ Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors becomes Law, as has been amended several times, most recently by Law Number 6 of 2020.

²⁴ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/publikasi-identitas-penyumbang-dana-kampanye-butuh-persetujuan>.

²⁵ <https://jejakfakta.com/read/4882/aplikasi-sikadeka-sering-down-sufirman-hambat-proses-pelaporan-ladk-parpol-peserta-pemilu-di-maros>.

²⁶ Transparency International Indonesia, 2023, Report on the Results of the Assessment of the Capacity and Practices of Financial Openness at the Central Management Level of the 9 Political Parties Holding Seats in the DPR RI. Jakarta, Transparency International Indonesia, p.39. <https://ti.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/New-Report-on-Capacity-Assessment-Results-and-Financial-Openness-Practices-at-Manage.pdf>.

²⁷ Transparency International Indonesia, 2024, Monitoring of Campaign Fund Reports of Elected House of Representatives (DPR RI) Candidates in the 2024 General Election. Jakarta, Transparency International Indonesia, p.27-33. https://ti.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/TII_MONITORING-OF-CAMPAIGN-FUND-REPORTS-OF-ELECTED-HOUSE-OF-REPRESENTATIVES-DPR-RI-CANDIDATES-IN-THE.pdf.

The law and regulations under it do not establish a specific standard template for the recording and bookkeeping of political parties' finances, except for finances sourced from the state budget.²⁸

Bookkeeping for election campaign financing

In the context of national and regional elections, the Law requires election participants to record campaign funds in the special books of campaign funds (Article 328, Article 329, and Article 332 of the Election Law) and requires regional election participants to submit reports of campaign fund donations and expenditures to the KPU before and after the campaign period (Article 75 of the Regional Election Law). Furthermore, bookkeeping obligations are also detailed in the KPU Regulation on Election²⁹ and Regional Election³⁰ Campaign Funds, which also contains a standard recording template.

Other laws and regulations do not prescribe certain qualifications for a person to act as the treasurer of a political party/campaign. Research conducted by TII on the capacity and practice of financial disclosure of political parties (2023) shows that in the dimension of structure and human resources, 7 out of 9 political parties occupying seats in the House of Representatives (2019-2024), are in conditions that tend to be suboptimal or suboptimal, where the position of treasurer/deputy treasurer is not always given to those who are educated or experienced.³¹

1.2. Comprehensive reporting

The Political Party Law does not mandate the submission of political party financial statements to supervisory institutions, except for finances sourced from the state budget. The financial accountability report sourced from the state budget must be submitted by political parties to the BPK no later than one month after the end of the fiscal year (Article 34A Paragraph (1)).

Separate from political party financial statements, the Election and Regional Elections Law mandates election and regional election participants to submit campaign fund reports to the KPU according to the stages of election and regional election campaign funds.

- The pair of presidential and vice presidential candidates and the campaign team submit the initial report of campaign funds no later than 14 days after being officially designated as candidates by the KPU; The report of receipts and expenditures is submitted to the public accounting firm appointed by the KPU no later than 15 days after the day of voting (Article 334 Paragraph (1) and 335 Paragraph (1) of the Election Law).
- Political Parties Participating in the Election and prospective members of the DPD submit the initial report of campaign funds no later than 14 days before the first day of the campaign in the form of a general meeting; The report of receipts and expenditures shall be submitted to the public accounting firm appointed by the KPU no later than 15 days after the voting day (Article 334 Paragraphs (2) and (3) and Article 335 Paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Election Law).

²⁸ Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Number 36 of 2018 concerning Procedures for Calculation, Budgeting in the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget, and Orderly Administration of Submission, Distribution, and Accountability Reports for the Use of Financial Assistance for Political Parties as amended through the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Number 78 of 2020.

²⁹ General Election Commission Regulation Number 18 of 2023 concerning General Election Campaign Funds.

³⁰ General Election Commission Regulation Number 14 of 2024 concerning Campaign Funds for Participants in the Election of Governor and Deputy Governor, Regent and Deputy Regent, as well as Mayor and Deputy Mayor.

³¹ Transparency International Indonesia, 2023, Report on the Results of the Assessment of the Capacity and Practices of Financial Openness at the Central Management Level of the 9 Political Parties Holding Seats in the DPR RI. p. 38-39.

- Candidates for regional heads submit reports of campaign funds donations and expenditures within 1 day before the campaign period begins and 1 day after the campaign period ends (Article 75 Paragraph (1) of the Regional Election Law).

Although deadlines have been established, in practice, there are still instances of delays or even non-compliance with the reporting mechanism. In the 2024 general election, for example, Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) and the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem) highlighted the large number of legislative candidates from various political parties who failed to submit their initial campaign finance reports. Even the reports that were submitted were considered not to reflect the actual reality of campaign transactions.³²

Election and regional election campaign fund reports generally include the source and amount of receipts and expenditures in the form of money, goods, and services (the value of goods and services is recorded after being converted into money value based on market prices). The identity of the donor and the amount of the donation are recorded, including the origin of the donated money/goods/services (from which the donor obtained them), and the identity of the majority shareholder for the donation coming from the company. A detailed recording format is provided by the KPU in the KPU Regulation on Election and Regional Election Campaign Funds. However, the KPU only publishes a summary of these detailed reports.³³

1.3. Publication of data

The Political Party Law contains a number of provisions that can be interpreted as an obligation for political parties to make financial statements accessible to the public. *First*, regarding the overall financial management of political parties, the law states that management must be carried out in a transparent and accountable manner, audited by a public accountant every year and announced periodically. It is explained that what is meant by "announced periodically" is published once a year through the mass media (Article 39). *Second*, regarding donations, it is stated that political parties are obliged to keep books, maintain a list of donors and the number of donations received, and be open to the public (Article 13 letter h). *Third*, the results of the examination of financial accountability reports sourced from the state budget are open to the public (Article 38).

In the context of elections and regional elections, the obligation to make campaign fund reports publicly accessible is placed on the KPU. The Election and Regional Elections Law states that the KPU announces the results of the audit of campaign funds no later than 10 days (in the election) and 3 days (in the regional elections) after the receipt of the audit report from the public accounting firm (Article 335 Paragraph (7) of the Election Law and Article 75 Paragraph (4) of the Regional Election Law). In addition, the KPU is also required to regularly publish daily pre-audit information on the receipt and expenditure of campaign funds by election and regional election participants through the KPU website (Article 109 of the KPU Regulation on Election Campaign Funds and Article 71 of the KPU Regulation on Regional Election Campaign Funds).

³² <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240116184324-617-1050355/perludem-ingatkan-sanksi-peserta-pemilu-telat-lapor-dana-kampanye>.

³³ To see the exact format of the initial campaign finance report, the campaign contribution receipt report, and the campaign income and expenditure report published by the KPU, access the report of one of the candidate pairs in the 2024 regional election through the following link: <https://kamubersihakupilih.id/data-pilgub/pramono-anung-wibowo-h-rano-karno>.

In practice, as shown in a study conducted by TII (2023), the majority of political parties do not open books, list of donors and the amount of donations received, do not upload comprehensive financial statements on the website, and are late in providing the requested information or even do not provide it at all.³⁴ In the context of elections and regional elections, the publication of campaign fund reports does not contain detailed information such as the list of donors and the amount of each donation. Campaign fund reports are uploaded through the KPU channel which often experiences responsiveness problems, such as long waiting times to failure to load pages. Campaign fund reports are also not provided in an open data format.³⁵

Recommendations

- Political party laws should require that political party financial statements and donation bookkeeping (detailed, in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Act) be uploaded annually on the political party's website in an open data format. This provision must be followed by provisions on grace period and sanctions for violations.
- The election law should require political party financial reports (covering the period from the last election to the upcoming one, or from the party's establishment in the case of newly formed parties) as a prerequisite for political parties to qualify as election participants, to be verified by the KPU.
- The KPU must publish all campaign finance reports in detail to the extent permitted by the Personal Data Protection Law, as close to real-time as possible, through a centralized and user-friendly platform that provides searchable and accessible information in an open data format, allowing voters to consider this information when casting their votes.



³⁴ Transparency International Indonesia, 2023, *Report on the Results of the Assessment of the Capacity and Practices of Financial Openness at the Central Management Level of the 9 Political Parties Holding Seats in the DPR RI*. p.39.

³⁵ Transparency International Indonesia, 2024, *Monitoring of Campaign Fund Reports of Elected House of Representatives (DPR RI) Candidates in the 2024 General Election*. p.27-33.

PRINCIPLE 2: CLEAN MONEY



Indications of illegal and illicit funds entering politics through campaign finance have emerged in both national and sub-national elections,³⁶ involving many political parties – if not all,³⁷ even in some cases including the President's name.³⁸ Even so, this indication is not always followed by legal proof and settlement.

Indications of the expectation of kickback for political donations also appeared, although only vaguely read by the public, because the KPU did not publish detailed donation reports (containing the identity of the donors and the amount of each donation). This indication can be seen in the filling of post-election government posts. In the Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka administration, for example, a successful team with a businessman background entered the government cabinet, including Rosan Roeslani (Minister of Investment and CEO of the Danantara Investment Management Agency), Erick Thohir (Minister of State-Owned Enterprises and Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Danantara Investment Management Agency), and many more.³⁹

Indications of kickback can also be seen in the trend of granting mining business licenses, which according to the records of the Mining Advocacy Network (JATAM) – a civil society organization on environmental issues – is increasing ahead of the regional elections or one year later. According to JATAM, what usually happens is that entrepreneurs offer funds in return for the convenience of business licenses when the candidate succeeds in occupying the position of regional head.⁴⁰

Both illegal and illicit funds in political campaigns and political donations followed by kickbacks allegedly arose due to high political costs. The funds are strongly suspected to be used for "political dowry" (the act of giving money to a political party to secure its

³⁶ The Financial Transaction Reporting and Analysis Center (PPATK) found suspicious transactions ahead of the 2024 election allegedly stemming from crimes in the fields of mining, the environment, and gambling, used for campaign costs and other election activities. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/12/20/en-transaksi-janggal-dana-kampanye-berasal-dari-tambang-ilegal-kejahatan-lingkungan-dan-perjudian>. In the regional elections, an example of a case occurred ahead of the 2024 Regional Elections, the incumbent Bengkulu governor candidate was designated by the KPK as a suspect for alleged extortion and gratuities to fund the campaign. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/11/25/kpk-names-bengkulu-governor-seeking-reelection-as-graft-suspect.html>.

³⁷ Throughout 2022-2023, PPATK found that hundreds of billions of rupiah in funds from abroad went to the treasurers of 21 political parties. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240111072551-12-1047953/temuan-ppatk-ungkap-bendahara-21-parpol-terima-uang-ratusan-miliar>.

³⁸ In the trial of a corruption case involving officials at the Ministry of Transportation, one of the testimonies said that a number of officials at the Ministry of Transportation received orders to collect billions of rupiah in order to support President Joko Widodo in the 2019 election. <https://www.tempo.co/hukum/pejabat-kemenhub-ditugasi-menteri-kumpulkan-uang-untuk-pemenangan-pilpres-2019--1194216>.

³⁹ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/jejak-pimpinan-danantara-tim-sukses-hingga-profesional>.

⁴⁰ <https://jatam.org/id/lengkap/bisnis-tambang-merebak-seiring-pilkada-serentak>.

endorsement or nomination in general or local elections)⁴¹ as well as buying voters' votes.⁴²

2.1. Illicit sources of income

A number of indications show that political income that carries the risk of corruption is significant or at least quite significant.

Not only because there are indications that illegal and illicit funds have been funding political campaigns or that kickback practices have occurred, but also because such indications lead to allegations that such transactions may have been the primary source of political financing and reflect a general pattern, rather than just irregularities or individual cases. The combination of expensive political costs⁴³ that can exceed the candidate's overall wealth,⁴⁴ minimal campaign fund reports,⁴⁵ and salaries in one term that are lower than political costs,⁴⁶ support this allegation.

⁴¹ One example is the corruption case involving Mustafa, the former Regent of Central Lampung. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) charged Mustafa with receiving Rp95 billion in illicit gratuities derived from project kickbacks. Part of the money was allegedly given to regional officials of the National Awakening Party (PKB) in Lampung as a political dowry to support Mustafa's candidacy for Governor of Lampung in the 2018 regional elections. <https://www.tempo.co/hukum/dugaan-mahar-politik-di-kasus-korupsi-bupati-lampung-tengah-681908>.

⁴² One example is the corruption case involving Bowo Sidik Pangarso, a member of the House of Representatives from the Golkar Party. He was suspected of receiving bribes in connection with a cooperation agreement between PT Pupuk Indonesia Logistik and PT Humpuss Transportasi Kimia (HTK). According to the KPK, the money—amounting to Rp8 billion—was intended to be used by Bowo to buy votes in the 2019 general election. <https://www.tempo.co/hukum/duit-rp-8-miliar-bowo-sidik-pangarso-diduga-untuk-serangan-fajar-758007>.

⁴³ Sandiaga Uno, the conglomerate who became Prabowo's vice presidential candidate in the 2019 election against Jokowi, admitted to spending personal funds of 1 trillion rupiah for his victory. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/04/29/07055271/blak-blakan-sandiaga-habis-hampir-rp-1-triliun-untuk-kampanye-dan-dilirik?page=all#google_vignette. In the legislative election, Habiburokhman, a member of the House of Representatives for the 2019-2024 period who was re-elected for the 2024-2029 period, admitted to hearing information that in the 2024 election, candidates for members of the House of Representatives generally spend around 20-25 billion rupiah. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/12/07/biaya-politik-caleg-hadapi-pemilu-2024-membengkak>. The Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem) and Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) even said that to become a member of the House of Representatives, a minimum of 80 billion rupiah is needed. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2024/10/03/agar-terpilih-butuh-rp-80-miliar-60-persen-anggota-dpr-terafiliasi-bisnis>. In the regional elections, a survey conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs after the 2015 regional elections found that the funds needed to become a Governor ranged from 20-100 billion rupiah, while to become a regent or mayor needed funds of around 30 billion rupiah. <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20191119113818-4-116257/jadi-gubernur-butuh-rp100-m-tapi-harta-cagub-cuma-rp-21-m>.

⁴⁴ A study conducted by The Indonesian Institute – a think tank in Indonesia – in 7 provinces in the 2018 Regional Elections found that the average wealth owned by the governor candidate was 21.1 billion, while the deputy governor candidate was 29.2 billion. <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20191119113818-4-116257/jadi-gubernur-butuh-rp100-m-tapi-harta-cagub-cuma-rp-21-m>.

⁴⁵ A study conducted by TII found that the average expenditure of elected members of the House of Representatives in the 2024 election was around 700 million rupiah. See: Transparency International Indonesia, 2024, Monitoring of Campaign Fund Reports of Elected House of Representatives (DPR RI) Candidates in the 2024 General Election. p.7. Meanwhile, in the 2024 Regional Elections, the average published expenditure of the pair of candidates for Governor and Deputy Governor is around 7 billion rupiah. Transparency International Indonesia, 2025, Ballot Heist: A Report on Financial Transparency Gaps in Indonesia's 2024 Gubernatorial Elections. Jakarta, Transparency International Indonesia, p.6. https://ti.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/TII-Ballot-Heist_-A-Report-2024.pdf.

⁴⁶ In 2019 in front of the Regional Representative Council, Tito Karnavian, the Minister of Home Affairs simulated that with a salary of 200 million rupiah per month received by the Regent, for 1 period (5 years) a regent was only able to earn 12 billion rupiah (with a record of salary not being used at all). With the cost of becoming a Regent reaching 30 billion rupiah, he doubted that anyone would be willing to lose, and called the possibility one in a thousand. <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20191119113818-4-116257/jadi-gubernur-butuh-rp100-m-tapi-harta-cagub-cuma-rp-21-m>.

Although there are a number of prohibitions contained in the Election and Regional Elections Law, their effectiveness in preventing or reducing the risk of illegal and prohibited political financing is still doubtful. The Election Law (Article 339) and the Regional Election Law (Article 76) prohibit election participants or regional elections from accepting donations from:

- Foreign parties;
- Unidentified contributors;
- The results of a criminal act that has been proven based on a court decision and/or intended to hide or disguise the results of a criminal act (only in the Election Law);
- Governments and local governments;
- Village government (only in the Election Law); and
- State/regional/village owned enterprises.

Election or regional election participants who receive donations from these parties are prohibited from using it, and must report to the KPU and submit it to the state treasury.

2.2. Illicit types of expenditure

Illegal expenditures in the form of buying candidacy tickets from political parties ("political dowry") and buying votes (vote buying) are allegedly a common phenomenon in the electoral process in Indonesia.

According to the KPK, the value of political dowry can reach 5-15 billion rupiah per person and can sometimes exceed the wealth owned by candidates.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the practice of vote buying, as shown in the Global Corruption Barometer (2020), reached a level of 26% of citizens having been offered a bribe or a special favour to vote a certain way - almost double the Asian average (14%).⁴⁸ The Kompas R&D poll (2023) even recorded a higher figure, where 36.5% of respondents admitted to having witnessed or experienced the practice of vote buying in elections themselves.⁴⁹

Even so, the purchase of fake news, disinformation campaign services, or coordinated inauthentic behavior online is not a common phenomenon in Indonesia. This does not mean that there are only a few buzzers on social media, black campaigns, or the spread of disinformation. However, this phenomenon is rarely associated with the expenditure of election and regional election participants as well as political dowry and vote buying.

Regarding political dowry and vote buying, the Election and Regional Elections Law has regulated sanctions for each violation.

⁴⁷ <https://aclc.kpk.go.id/aksi-informasi/Eksplorasi/20230227-mengenal-mahar-politik--uang-perahu--untuk-berlayar-di-pemilu>.

⁴⁸ Jon Vrushy, 2020, *Global Corruption Barometer Asia 2020: Indonesia*. Jakarta, Transparency International Indonesia, p.16. https://riset.ti.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Laporan-GCB-Indonesia-Final_web.pdf.

⁴⁹ <https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2023/02/01/jajak-pendapat-kompas-politik-uang-kian-membelenggu>.

Sanctions of "Political dowry"

- In elections, political parties that receive rewards in candidacy are subject to sanctions in the form of a ban on submitting candidates in the next period (Articles 228 and 242 of the Election Law).
- In the regional elections, the same sanctions are determined, plus a fine of 10 times the value of the reward received. In addition, the rewarder is also threatened with sanctions in the form of cancellation of his determination as a candidate, elected candidate, or as a regional head (Article 47 of the Regional Election Law). This sanction is also still followed by the threat of imprisonment and fines for the giver and recipient of rewards (Articles 187B and 187C of the Regional Election Law).

Vote Buying Sanctions

- Vote buying is subject to both administrative and criminal sanctions. The administrative sanction for vote buying is the cancellation of the status as a candidate in the election or regional elections (Article 286 of the Election Law/Article 73 of the Regional Election Law). Meanwhile, the criminal sanction for vote buying is a prison sentence with a maximum duration ranging from 2-4 years, and a fine with a maximum amount ranging from 24-48 million rupiah (Articles 515, 519, 523 of the Election Law).

In the regional elections, the vote buying sanctions are determined to be heavier, namely imprisonment for a minimum of 3 years and a maximum of 6 years, as well as a minimum fine of 200 million rupiah and a maximum of 1 billion rupiah. This threat even applies to voters who receive vote buying (Article 187A of the Regional Election Law).

Recommendations

- The election and regional elections law must expand the scope of supervision of campaign funding, not only to campaign fund accounts that are registered and only take place during the campaign period, but also to other accounts that are affiliated or indicated, even to cash transactions, both during the campaign period and outside the campaign period. For this reason, cooperation must be established between the KPU, Bawaslu, KPK, and PPATK, including but not limited to data sharing, joint investigations, and coordinated prevention strategies.
- The effectiveness of handling electoral and regional election violations must be improved through the restructuring of the legal framework. The Bawaslu must have a clear mandate to oversee campaign financing and take action against violations of campaign finance rules, both administratively and criminally.



PRINCIPLE 3: FAIRNESS

Studies show that the cost of politics in Indonesia is very high and can only be reached by those who have or are supported by excess financial resources. Research by the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), for example, shows that since the 1998 Reform, the trend of businessmen who are members of the House of Representatives has continued to increase. At the beginning of the 1998 Reform, only 33.6% of businessmen were members of the House of Representatives. However, in three legislative elections the figure has actually increased from 52.3% to 55.6%, and is now at the highest number, which is 60.6%.⁵⁰

This condition is influenced by various factors, especially the pattern of political relations that are transactional. The practice of buying and selling candidacy tickets or political dowries, to money politics (vote-buying), has become commonplace. On the other hand, the absence of a maximum limit on campaign spending within the legal framework gives money an advantage over ideas and programs. Even if there is an expenditure limit like in the regional elections, its effectiveness is still questionable: in addition to the limit being too loose, the campaign fund reports submitted by candidates are also indicated to be incomplete.

3.1. Restrictions on self-funding candidates

In the 2024 General Election and Regional Elections, campaign fund reports show that candidates' personal funding is the dominant source of campaign funding, except for presidential and vice presidential elections.⁵¹

Directly, there is no rule that limits the amount of personal funds that candidates can allocate to their own political campaigns, both in elections and regional elections. However, in the regional elections, a limit on campaign expenditure applies (Article 74 Paragraph (9) of the Regional Election Law), so it indirectly limits the use of candidates' personal funds.

⁵⁰ <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2024/10/03/agar-terpilih-butuh-rp-80-miliar-60-persen-anggota-dpr-terafiliasi-bisnis>.

⁵¹ Based on data processed from the Campaign Fund Income and Expenditure Reports published by the KPU, it was found that 12 out of 18 political parties participating in the 2024 Election reported that more than 50% of their expenditures were for campaign services of legislative candidates—indicating personal contributions from the candidates themselves. Meanwhile, the Campaign Fund Reports of presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs showed that the largest sources of income came from political parties (as reported by the Anies-Muhaimin pair and the Prabowo-Gibran pair) and from companies and/or non-governmental business entities (as reported by the Ganjar-Mahfud pair). See the data at <https://kamubersihakupilih.id/>. In the 2024 Provincial Head Elections, a study by TII found that 78% of candidate pairs reported contributions from the candidates themselves—the highest compared to other contribution categories: political parties (24%), individuals (38%), and private legal entities (13%). Transparency International Indonesia, 2025, *Ballot Heist: A Report on Financial Transparency Gaps in Indonesia's 2024 Gubernatorial Elections*. p.19.

3.2. Restriction on individual private donations

Given that detailed donation information is not available to the public, it is not known for sure to what extent large individual donors dominate political party funding and campaigns. Research by TII (2023) shows that the majority of political parties do not open books, lists of donors and the number of donations received.⁵² Meanwhile, in the context of elections and regional elections, the KPU also does not publish detailed donation information.

However, the maximum amount of donations that individuals can contribute is limited by the provisions of the law. The amount of donations from individuals to political parties, election participants, and regional election participants differs from one another.

- Individual donations to political parties are set at a maximum of Rp 1,000,000,000 for one budget year. This provision applies to individuals who are not members of a political party. For individual members of political parties, the provisions regarding donations are regulated in the party's articles of association and bylaws (Article 35 of the Political Party Law). Each political party may set different contribution limits for its members. In practice, however, the party's statutes and bylaws often do not include specific provisions on this matter, or merely state that it will be further regulated through internal party rules. Information on the exact contribution limits is also not disclosed to the public.⁵³
- Individual contributions for presidential and vice presidential candidates as well as political parties participating in the election (legislative elections) are set at a maximum of Rp 2,500,000,000 each (Articles 327 and 331 of the Election Law).
- Individual donations for prospective DPD members are set at a maximum of IDR 750,000,000 (Article 333 of the Election Law).
- Individual donations for pairs of regional head candidates are set at a maximum of Rp 75,000,000 (Article 74 of the Regional Election Law).

3.3. Restrictions on legal entities' donations

It is not definitively known to what extent legal entities (referred to by the law as groups, companies, and/or business entities) influence election outcomes through large donations, as detailed donation information is not publicly available. However, a study by Transparency International Indonesia (TII) on the 2024 Gubernatorial Election found that the percentage of elected candidate pairs receiving donations from legal entities was higher compared to non-elected candidate pairs (19% versus 9%). Furthermore, the average amount of donations received by elected candidate pairs from legal entities was also higher than that received by non-elected candidate pairs (1.6 billion IDR versus 1.4 billion IDR).⁵⁴

⁵² Transparency International Indonesia, 2023, *Report on the Results of the Assessment of the Capacity and Practices of Financial Openness at the Central Management Level of the 9 Political Parties Holding Seats in the DPR RI*. p.39.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.44-55.

⁵⁴ Transparency International Indonesia, 2025, *Ballot Heist: A Report on Financial Transparency Gaps in Indonesia's 2024 Gubernatorial Elections*. p.22-23.

Referring to the regulations, the maximum amount of donations that can be contributed by legal entities is as follows:

- Legal entity contributions to political parties are set at a maximum of IDR 7,500,000,000 for one fiscal year (Article 35 of the Political Party Law).
- Legal entity contributions for presidential and vice presidential candidates and political parties participating in the election (legislative elections) are set at a maximum of Rp 25,000,000,000 each (Articles 327 and 331 of the Election Law).
- The contribution of legal entities for prospective DPD members is set at a maximum of IDR 1,500,000,000 (Article 333 of the Election Law).
- The legal entity contribution for the pair of regional head candidates is set at a maximum of IDR 750,000,000 (Article 74 of the Regional Election Law).

There are no specific restrictions set by law to assess the eligibility of a legal entity to make a donation, such as involvement in government contracts or procurement.

3.4. Restrictions on expenditure

The use of money to outperform competitors in electoral contests has become a common pattern in Indonesia. In the 2024 election, 7 of the 8 political parties that managed to gain seats in the House of Representatives are the 7 political parties with the largest campaign funding (read from the report) among all political parties participating in the election (18 in total). In the 2024 Governor's Election, the TII study also found that the average expenditure of successful candidates who were elected was about 70% higher than that of unelected candidates.⁵⁵

Even so, there is no maximum limit on campaign spending except in the regional elections. In the regional elections, TII's study of the 2024 Governor Election concluded that the maximum limit of campaign expenditure set was unreasonable, as evidenced by the realization of candidate expenditure recorded in the report (on average) only around 4-6% of the expenditure limit. In addition, the spending limit is also higher than the realization of the expenditure of the Presidential candidate, who incidentally campaigns throughout the country. This indicates loosening restrictions on campaign spending in the regional elections or, in other possibilities, fraud in the reporting of campaign funds.⁵⁶

3.5. Provision of public funding

Public funding is provided both regularly for political parties and during the electoral cycle for election and regional election participants.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.8.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.37-39.

On a regular basis, public funding is given to political parties that obtain seats in the House of Representatives and the Regional House of Representatives, the amount of which is determined based on the acquisition of valid votes in elections. This funding is prioritized for the implementation of political education for members of political parties and the community (Article 34 of the Political Party Law).

Based on the Government Regulation on Financial Assistance to Political Parties, the ⁵⁷ amount of public funding is set at a minimum of Rp 1,000 for political parties at the central level, Rp 1,200 for political parties at the provincial level, and Rp 1,500 for political parties at the district/city level. The amount of public funding can be increased according to the financial capacity of the state/region (Article 5).

Every year, political parties that receive public funding are required to submit an accountability report for the use of public funds to the government after being audited by the BPK (Article 13 letter I of the Political Party Law).

Because it is considered insignificant, in 2019 the KPK and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (now called the National Research and Innovation Agency / BRIN) recommended that the amount of public funding for political parties be increased to around Rp 8,500 per valid vote or 50% of the needs of political parties.⁵⁸ However, until now the minimum amount has not been increased. In addition, TII's interaction with political parties found that there is an aspiration that public funding is also allocated to political parties that participate in elections, but have not succeeded in obtaining seats in the House of Representatives and the House of Representatives.⁵⁹

Despite the limited significance of public funding, the audit findings of the BPK (2024) also indicate several issues in the use of public funds by political parties. These include receiving funds outside of official party bank accounts, discrepancies between reported expenditures and the actual amounts disbursed, incomplete documentation in financial accountability reports, and instances of spending that do not fully align with the intended purposes.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Government Regulation Number 5 of 2009 concerning Financial Assistance to Political Parties, as amended several times, most recently by Government Regulation Number 1 of 2018.

⁵⁸ <https://www.kompas.id/baca/utama/2019/12/11/kpk-rekomendasikan-dana-bantuan-parpol-hingga-rp-8-461-per-suara>.

⁵⁹ This interaction took place during the event "Training and Education: Financial Transparency and Accountability—The Foundation of a Trusted Political Party," organized by TII and the KPK in Bogor, West Java, from July 29 to 31, 2024. The event was attended by 18 political parties that participated in the 2024 General Election, including both those that succeeded and those that failed to secure seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). It was specifically designed for members of political parties responsible for treasury affairs, information services, secretarial duties, and/or administration. <https://www.kabariku.com/2024/07/kolaborasi-kpk-tii-dorong-tata-kelola-keuangan-parpol-berintegritas/>.

⁶⁰ <https://warta.bpk.go.id/bpk-temukan-sejumlah-permasalahan-dalam-penggunaan-banparpol/>.

In the electoral cycle, public funding is given indirectly to all election and regional election participants (without any criteria) in the form of financing certain types of campaigns (Article 275 of the Election Law and Article 65 of the Regional Election Law), namely:

- installation of props in public places;
- advertisements for print, electronic mass media, and the internet ("internet" only in the Election Act – not social media);
- public debate (specifically between presidential candidate pairs and between regional head candidate pairs).
- dissemination of campaign materials to the public (only in the Regional Election Law).

However, the effectiveness of providing public funding to level the playing field in elections remains a topic of debate. During the deliberation of the Election Bill in 2017, for example, political factions in the DPR were divided over the proposal for the state to cover the costs of election witnesses stationed at polling stations. Factions that supported the proposal argued that it would help create a more equitable electoral process. On the other hand, those that opposed it viewed the measure as a wasteful use of public funds.⁶¹

To this day, related discourse continues to surface, reflecting an ongoing and unresolved debate. In 2024, for instance, Deputy Chair of DPR's Commission II, Zulfikar Arse Sadikin, publicly expressed his hope that the state would provide greater support for campaign financing in elections as well as for political party funding. According to him, such support is part of an effort to position political parties as public institutions, rather than as entities owned by individuals or private corporations.⁶²

3.6. Intraparty governance

A number of political parties – such as the Democratic Party and the Prosperous Justice Party referred to in the TII study (2023)⁶³ – are known to have codes of ethics and codes of conduct that apply internally. However, the cost of candidacy and the provision of financial support to candidates has never been the subject of such a document. Although there are studies that show the price of candidacy tickets from political parties, the cost of candidacy itself is actually something illegal under the Election and Regional Elections Law (see again in Principle 2: Clean Money). In addition, financial support to candidates also does not appear to be a written policy, or at least, a publicly known policy.

The TII (2023) study on political party financial regulations (including contributions, donations, fundraising, financial SOPs, SOPs for verifying financial irregularities, and whistleblowing systems) shows that most political parties are still in a condition that tends to be suboptimal or their financial regulations are classified as incomplete. In addition, none of the nine political parties were found to have an internal financial oversight unit. A common reason cited is that the function has been operating with the existing structure, and the establishment of a dedicated unit has not been deemed necessary. This indicates

⁶¹ <https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/polemik-dana-saksi-pemilu-dibiayai-negara-menguat-lt592bd249cf3fd/>.

⁶² <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4520380/komisi-ii-dpr-sebut-dana-kampanye-perlu-lebih-banyak-dibantu-negara>.

⁶³ Transparency International Indonesia, 2023, *Report on the Results of the Assessment of the Capacity and Practices of Financial Openness at the Central Management Level of the 9 Political Parties Holding Seats in the DPR RI*. p. 51-53.

that the internal accountability mechanism regarding political financial standards lacks an adequate framework and has not been institutionalized within the political parties.⁶⁴

Recommendations

- The lawmakers (the DPR and the government) must ensure that the election and regional election laws impose reasonable restrictions on campaign expenditures in both elections, taking into account the number of voters, the size of the area, and regional cost standards.
- The lawmakers (the DPR and the government) must ensure that the election and regional election laws impose reasonable restrictions on contributions from candidates for their own campaigns, as well as contributions from political parties or political party coalitions to supported candidates.
- The lawmakers (the DPR and the government) must ensure that the election and regional election laws prohibit, limit, or otherwise regulate donations from companies or legal entities to incumbent candidates who are also targeted by their lobbying, or from companies that provide services to public administrations, participate in public procurement tenders, or receive subsidies, permits, and/or concessions from the state.
- The lawmakers (the DPR and the government) must ensure that the law governing political parties imposes reasonable limits on contributions from party members or officials to political parties, in order to prevent political party financing from becoming dependent on a small number of individual members.



⁶⁴ Ibid., p.13-16, 39.

PRINCIPLE 4: GENDER EQUALITY



In Indonesia, female candidates face significant social, cultural, and political barriers in accessing and spending political funds. Female candidates are often labeled as incapable of holding public office, excluded from party cadre development agendas, and must compete with limited networks and financial resources compared to male candidates.⁶⁵ Referring to the findings of TII (2025), the disparity in political funding access is clearly evident in the 2024 Gubernatorial Election, where the campaign receipts of candidate pairs involving women were recorded to be 44% lower compared to the campaign receipts of all-male candidate pairs.⁶⁶

On the other hand, affirmative policies aimed at increasing women's political participation have not yet addressed the issue of disparity in political funding access. Affirmative policies are still limited to the 30% quota for women on the candidate lists submitted by political parties (Article 245 of the Election Law) and policies related to candidate numbering, where, for every three candidates submitted, at least one must be a woman (Article 246, Paragraph (2) of the Election Law)—intended to prevent women from being placed at the bottom of the list.

4.1. Gender disaggregated information

The disclosure of political income and expenditure through KPU channels is only disaggregated based on the type of election participants (by political party, individual candidate, or candidate pair). There is no disaggregation based on gender or other specific identity markers.

There is also no summary or follow-up information from either political parties or authorized institutions such as the KPU that provides gender-disaggregated data on political income and expenditure, nor any related analysis.

Gender-based disaggregation and analysis of political income and expenditure are mostly carried out by academic institutions and civil society organizations, and have not yet become a follow-up practice by political parties or authorized bodies such as the KPU.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ See, for example, the testimony of several female politicians in a report by Voice of America (VOA) Indonesia (2019). <https://www.vogaindonesia.com/a/perempuan-dalam-politik-dinomorduakan-dan-kalah-pendanaan/4933905.html>.

⁶⁶ Transparency International Indonesia, 2025, *Ballot Heist: A Report on Financial Transparency Gaps in Indonesia's 2024 Gubernatorial Elections*. p.7.

⁶⁷ An example is a study conducted by TII on the campaign finance reports of elected parliamentary candidates (DPR) in the 2024 Election and on the campaign finance reports from the 2024 Gubernatorial Election. From this study, TII found, for instance, that the income and expenditure of elected female candidates were higher than those of elected male candidates, with differences of 2.65% and 6.37%, respectively. (See, Transparency International Indonesia, 2024, *Monitoring of Campaign Fund Reports of Elected House of Representatives (DPR RI) Candidates in the 2024 General Election*. p.17). Meanwhile, in the 2024 Gubernatorial Election, a much more significant disparity disadvantaging women was found, where the campaign income of candidate pairs involving women was recorded to be approximately 44% lower than that of all-male candidate pairs. (See, Transparency International Indonesia, 2025, *Ballot Heist: A Report on Financial Transparency Gaps in Indonesia's 2024 Gubernatorial Elections*. p.7). Besides TII, another organization that has conducted analysis of political financing from a gender perspective is the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). One of WFD's key findings in the 2024 Election was the testimony of respondents—most of whom were female candidates—who stated that approximately 5 billion rupiah was needed to run as a candidate for the national parliament (DPR) in the 2024 Election. (See, Ella Syafputri Prihatini and Sri Budi Eko Wardani,

4.2. Gender targeted public funding

In accordance with Article 9 of the Government Regulation on Financial Assistance to Political Parties, public funding for political parties is prioritized for conducting political education for party members and the general public. In addition, public funding is also used for the operational costs of political party secretariats.

Still referring to the same regulation, Paragraph (3) of Article 10 states that political education activities must be carried out with attention to gender justice and equality in order to foster political ethics and culture in line with Pancasila.

Therefore, the provision of public funding to political parties is linked to gender equality among candidates, particularly in the context of the right to receive political education from political parties.

However, the use of public funding by political parties does not always align with its intended purpose. Through its audit, the Audit Board of Indonesia (2024) identified several issues in the use of public funds by political parties, including the receipt of funds through bank accounts not owned by the parties, discrepancies between reported expenditures and the amount of public funding provided, incomplete documentation of expenditure receipts, and use of funds that did not fully comply with the intended objectives of the public funding.⁶⁸

4.3. Non-financial gender targeted measures

A number of non-financial measures have been taken to ease the funding barriers faced by women politicians. These include the organization of training programs that help women develop more effective and affordable campaign strategies;⁶⁹ public campaigns and civic education initiatives that raise awareness about the importance of women's representation in government—thus making female candidates more accepted without having to resort to vote-buying;⁷⁰ and, as done by TII, the creation of dedicated online platforms to introduce female candidates more widely to the public.⁷¹ However, such

2024, *The Cost of Politics in Indonesia*, Jakarta, Westminster Foundation for Democracy Limited, p.11. https://costofpolitics.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/19937Cost-of-Politics_Indonesia_EN_FINAL_v2.pdf?x10009.)

⁶⁸ <https://warta.bpk.go.id/bpk-temukan-sejumlah-permasalahan-dalam-penggunaan-banparpol/>.

⁶⁹ For example, the “Training for Potential Female Legislative Candidates in the 2024 Elections: Beyond Numbers Toward Empowered Women” organized by Cakra Wikara Indonesia (CWI), with support from the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) under the ASEAN Women Political Leadership (ASEAN WPL) program in collaboration with Global Affairs Canada, implemented in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The training took place in three locations: Mataram, Jakarta, and Surabaya. Participants were prospective female legislative candidates from various political parties running in the 2024 elections at the national (DPR RI), provincial (DPRD Provinsi), and local (DPRD Kabupaten/Kota) levels. <https://cakrawikara.id/2023/05/pelatihan-perempuan-potensial-calon-legislatif-dalam-pemilu-2024-melampaui-angka-menuju-perempuan-berdaya/>. Additionally, there was the “Madrasah Politik Perempuan” (Women’s Political School), an online training program organized by the Research and Development Institute of Aisyiyah aimed at strengthening the capacity of female legislative candidates ahead of the 2024 elections. <https://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/read/madrasah-politik-perempuan-lppa-pa-aisyiyah-adakan-pelatihan-bagi-caleg-perempuan>.

⁷⁰ An example is the narrative promoted by the Congress of Indonesian Women Ulama (KUPI), which emphasizes that strengthening women’s roles in politics is essential, as it contributes to the creation of policies that empower and protect women. This includes, for instance, the enactment of the Law on Domestic Violence and the Law on Sexual Violence Crimes. https://www.kompas.id/artikel/menuju-pemilu-2024-pentingnya-penguatan-kepemimpinan-perempuan-disuarakan?open_from=Search_Result_Page.

⁷¹ For the 2024 elections, TII created a dedicated page on the Kamubersihakupilih.id platform featuring only the profiles of female legislative candidates from all political parties.

initiatives are mostly driven by civil society, rather than by political parties or formal policies issued by state or government institutions.

Regarding physical safety during campaigns and protection from online harassment, a precedent was set ahead of the 2024 Regional Elections through a joint declaration to ensure safe spaces and conditions for women participating in the regional elections. This declaration was initiated by the Bawaslu, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection, the KPU, the Criminal Investigation Department of the Indonesian National Police (Bareskrim Polri) through its Directorate of Crimes Against Women, Children, and Human Trafficking, UN Women, Koalisi Perempuan, and Kalyanamitra.⁷²

In several regions, Bawaslu has also paid attention to sexist campaign messages from candidates that demean their female political opponents. However, this attention has not yet translated into firm sanctions that would serve as a deterrent.⁷³

Recommendations

- The lawmakers (the DPR and government) must ensure that the legal framework makes gender equality in party membership and management, as well as in the candidate lists proposed by political parties, a key indicator for both direct and indirect public funding allocation to political parties. A significant portion of public funding should be allocated to political activities and campaigns that are most likely to have a positive impact on the representation of women in politics, particularly those from underrepresented communities. Indirect funding should include, when possible, subsidies for personal security services during campaigns, as well as resources for protection against online harassment.
- Political parties must record and report campaign income and expenditure with gender disaggregated information. The KPU and Bawaslu should publish this information, as well as further analysis and steps to address gender-specific barriers.

⁷² <https://www.bawaslu.go.id/id/berita/deklarasi-kampanye-pemilihan-damai-bawaslu-kementerian-pppa-kpu-jamin-ruang-aman-bagi>.

⁷³ For example, the Sleman Regency Bawaslu took action to remove a sexist campaign banner from candidate pair number 2, Harda Kiswaya and Danang Maharsa, who were running for regent and vice regent. The campaign material in question was a billboard with a slogan in Javanese: "Milih Imam Kok Wedok. Jangan Ya Dik Ya! Imam Kudu Lanang" (loosely translated: "Don't vote for a woman as leader; a leader must be a man"). The 2024 Sleman regional election featured a contest between two candidate pairs. In addition to Harda–Danang, the race also included Kustini Sri Purnomo—a woman running for regent—and Sukanto as her running mate. <https://www.detik.com/jogja/pilkada/d-7621974/bawaslu-sleman-soal-baliho-paslon-harda-danang-bernada-seksis-sudah-tidak-ada>.



PRINCIPLE 5: STATE NEUTRALITY

Indonesia's 2024 national and regional elections were marred by widespread and systemic abuse of power by incumbents seeking electoral advantage. From the national to local levels, officials exploited social assistance programs, rushed infrastructure inaugurations, mobilized state security forces, and co-opted public media—all while using official vehicles, civil servants, and law enforcement for covert campaigning.

Reports highlighted a sharp rise in welfare disbursements, biased coverage by state-owned media, and alleged intimidation of opposition figures. President Joko Widodo was accused of backing the Prabowo–Gibran ticket through selective aid distribution and use of state machinery. At the local level, similar misconduct included the politicized use of food subsidies and pressure on civil servants to align with incumbents' political agendas.

While laws such as Election Law and State Civil Apparatus Law⁷⁴ explicitly prohibit these practices, enforcement has been weak. Bawaslu recorded thousands of violations, yet sanctions were often inconsistent and lacked deterrent effect. State media's disproportionate coverage of incumbent-backed candidates further undermined electoral fairness.

This unequal access to state resources, coupled with poor oversight, severely compromised the integrity of the elections. Robust institutional reforms and stronger enforcement are urgently needed to restore electoral justice.

5.1. Abuse of state resources

Public officials are strictly prohibited from misusing state resources for political purposes.⁷⁵ This is clearly regulated under Election Law and Regional Election Law, which mandate that incumbents take unpaid campaign leave and refrain from using official facilities—such as government vehicles, offices, and housing—funded by state budgets.⁷⁶ These provisions aim to safeguard the neutrality and integrity of the electoral process.

Despite these regulations, the 2024 general and regional elections saw widespread violations. Former President Joko Widodo and other officials were accused of favoring the Prabowo–Gibran ticket by mobilizing state apparatus,⁷⁷ obstructing opposition activities, and using government social aid (bansos) for electoral gain.⁷⁸ In regional contests, similar abuses occurred; for instance, Central Kalimantan's governor was criticized for distributing subsidized food during the campaign,⁷⁹ while other incumbents pressured civil servants for political support.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ Law Number 5 of 2014 on State Civil Apparatus as amended by Law Number 20 of 2023.

⁷⁵ <https://sumbar.antaranews.com/berita/632083/bawasluterbukti-gunakan-fasilitas-negara-selama-cuti-kampanye-petahana-bisa-batal-sebagai-calon>.

⁷⁶ <https://www.detik.com/jatim/berita/d-7163103/uu-no-7-tahun-2017-soal-presiden-boleh-kampanye-ini-bunyi-pasalnya>.

⁷⁷ <https://asianews.network/2024-voting-day-marred-by-reports-of-violations/>.

⁷⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-leader-accused-bias-interference-presidential-election-2024-02-01/>.

⁷⁹ <https://voi.id/en/news/426156>.

⁸⁰ <https://voi.id/en/news/456492>.

These actions contravene both the Election Law and State Civil Apparatus Law, which demand neutrality from state officials and civil servants. While Bawaslu⁸¹ recorded over 1.200 violations—sanctioning 240 civil servants⁸²—enforcement remains inconsistent. Watchdog groups⁸³ have called for stronger action from Bawaslu and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to uphold electoral integrity.⁸⁴

5.2. Abuse of regulatory/rulemaking and allocation powers for electoral benefit (clientelism)

Article 282 of Election Law⁸⁵ prohibits public officials, including incumbents, from taking actions that benefit or disadvantage any election participant during the campaign. It also forbids displays of partisanship before, during, or after the campaign period⁸⁶—effectively barring the use of state policies or budgets for electoral purposes.

Despite this, the risk of manipulation remains high. Ahead of the 2024 elections, the government increased social spending to Rp 496 trillion⁸⁷—12% higher than in 2023 and nearly matching pandemic-era levels. New aid programs,⁸⁸ such as last-minute cash transfers⁸⁹ to 18.8 million families,⁹⁰ were announced just weeks before voting. The administration also authorized an 8% salary increase⁹¹ for civil servants, police, and military personnel. Simultaneously, incumbents hastily inaugurated infrastructure projects, drawing criticism for politicized timing.⁹²

BPK reported a 100–200% surge in regional social aid spending,⁹³ indicative of budget politicization. While Bawaslu pledged to monitor electoral misuse,⁹⁴ enforcement remained weak, often constrained by claims that the spending was routine.⁹⁵ KPK flagged these trends as forms of pork barrel politics,⁹⁶ warning that unchecked pre-election disbursements risk undermining democratic integrity. Stronger coordination between Bawaslu, KPK, and BPK is essential to curb electoral abuse and protect fair competition.

5.3. Access to state media

Ahead of Indonesia's 2024 elections, state media—particularly TVRI and RRI—faced scrutiny over their neutrality. An analysis of TVRI's special election program found

⁸¹ <https://antikorupsi.org/id/article/pengawasan-penyalahgunaan-fasilitas-negara>.

⁸² <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-7633443/isu-sentral-netralitas-birokrasi-dalam-pilkada>

⁸³ <https://antikorupsi.org/id/outlook-pemberantasan-korupsi-2024>.

⁸⁴ <https://sumbar.antaranews.com/berita/632083/bawasluterbukti-gunakan-fasilitas-negara-selama-cuti-kampanye-petahana-bisa-batal-sebagai-calon>

⁸⁵ <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-7633443/isu-sentral-netralitas-birokrasi-dalam-pilkada>.

⁸⁶ <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-7633443/isu-sentral-netralitas-birokrasi-dalam-pilkada>.

⁸⁷ <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/01/30/15255521/quyuran-bansos-jelang-pemilu-anggaran-beda-tipis-dari-masa-pandemi-covid-19?page=all>.

⁸⁸ <https://antikorupsi.org/id/outlook-pemberantasan-korupsi-2024>.

⁸⁹ <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/03/22/16115611/catatan-pemilu-2024-dari-komnas-ham-netralitas-aparat-negara-banyak>.

⁹⁰ <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/11/22/12131651/pentingnya-netralitas-polri-dalam-pemilu-2024?page=all>.

⁹¹ <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7129822/jokowi-sudah-teken-kenaikan-gaji-asn-hingga-tni-polri>.

⁹² <https://www.medcom.id/pemilu/news-pemilu/wkBBWwak-rajin-meresmikan-proyek-jokowi-dikhawatirkan-punya-motif-politik>.

⁹³ <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2398398/bpk-jelang-pilkada-belanja-bansos-naik-hingga-200-persen>.

⁹⁴ <https://bawaslu.go.id>.

⁹⁵ <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/03/22/16115611/catatan-pemilu-2024-dari-komnas-ham-netralitas-aparat-negara-banyak>.

⁹⁶ <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/03/22/16115611/catatan-pemilu-2024-dari-komnas-ham-netralitas-aparat-negara-banyak>.

disproportionately positive coverage of the Ganjar–Mahfud ticket (102 favorable reports), while opposition candidate Anies Baswedan received the most airtime but was often framed negatively.⁹⁷ Such imbalances risk violating Election Law and Broadcasting Law,⁹⁸ which mandate impartiality from public broadcasters and guarantee fair media access for all candidates.⁹⁹

While TVRI and RRI claimed neutrality and compliance with public broadcasting ethics,¹⁰⁰ observers remained concerned about implicit partisanship, particularly in the coverage of government programs. The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI),¹⁰¹ Press Council, Bawaslu,¹⁰² and KPU formed a joint task force to monitor media conduct.¹⁰³ KPI holds authority to sanction unbalanced broadcasts, while the Press Council addresses press ethics violations.

Although formal oversight recorded few violations during the campaign period, critics pointed to broader issues of media bias and selective enforcement. President Jokowi was accused of blending official functions with electoral campaigning, and opposition figures alleged state interference in their events.¹⁰⁴ These incidents underscore persistent concerns about enforcement gaps and the need for stronger safeguards to uphold media neutrality and ensure equitable access during elections.

5.4. Abuse of security forces

During Indonesia's 2024 elections, credible reports emerged of state security forces intimidating opposition figures and restricting their campaign activities, despite laws requiring political neutrality. Amnesty International documented at least 16 cases of harassment, including violence against activists and opposition supporters.¹⁰⁵ Local media reported that police and military personnel targeted opposition backers in multiple regions.¹⁰⁶ In one incident, presidential security officers allegedly assaulted residents displaying a banner for Ganjar Pranowo during a visit by President Jokowi.¹⁰⁷

These actions contravene Police Law,¹⁰⁸ which mandates police neutrality, and Election Law, which imposes sanctions—including imprisonment—on officers who misuse their authority to influence elections.¹⁰⁹ Bawaslu received thousands of complaints in 2024 related to neutrality violations,¹¹⁰ though enforcement was inconsistent. Komnas HAM also

⁹⁷ Shabrina Rahadatul Aisyi, Muhammad Adnan, and Wijayanto, "TVRI's Efforts in Maintaining Neutrality During the 2024 Presidential Election Campaign (Case Study: People's Choice Program)", *Journal of Politic and Government Studies*, 2024, 13 (4), p.496. <https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/jpgs/article/view/47402>.

⁹⁸ Law Number 32 of 2002 on Broadcasting.

⁹⁹ <https://www.detik.com/jatim/berita/d-7163103/uu-no-7-tahun-2017-soal-presiden-boleh-kampanye-ini-bunyi-pasalnya>.

¹⁰⁰ <https://www.rri.co.id/palu/daerah/406576/lpp-rri-dan-tvri-tetap-netral-dalam-penyajian-informasi-pemilu>.

¹⁰¹ <https://kalsel.antaranews.com/berita/364500/mass-media-should-verify-news-on-general-election-kpi>.

¹⁰² <https://en.antaranews.com/news/305982/bawaslu-records-1200-violations-during-elections>.

¹⁰³ <https://en.antaranews.com/news/336073/pilkada-minister-backs-bawaslu-to-penalize-biased-state-apparatus>.

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-leader-accused-bias-interference-presidential-election-2024-02-01/>.

¹⁰⁵ <https://asianews.network/threats-assault-against-critics-mar-2024-election-amnesty-indonesia/>.

¹⁰⁶ <https://asianews.network/senior-indonesian-minister-resigns-in-protest-over-alleged-partiality-ahead-of-2024-elections/>.

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/index.php/news/2024-03-26/240-civil-servants-violate-neutrality-rule-during-elections.html>.

¹⁰⁸ Law Number 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police.

¹⁰⁹ <https://jdih.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/52957/t/javascript>.

¹¹⁰ <https://jdih.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/52957/t/javascript>.

noted a growing pattern of intimidation and partisan behavior by officers, including pressure to support certain candidates.¹¹¹

To address this, the National Police formed an internal oversight unit in collaboration with Bawaslu and independent institutions.¹¹² Komnas HAM and the Ombudsman¹¹³ monitored for abuse, reminding law enforcement to respect political rights and avoid malpractice.¹¹⁴ Despite these measures, recurring violations revealed gaps in accountability. Ensuring law enforcement impartiality remains critical to safeguarding electoral integrity in Indonesia's democratic process.

Recommendations

- To eliminate the potential for abuse of power by incumbents, the provision allowing for unpaid campaign leave must be amended immediately to mandate, as much as possible, the permanent resignation of public officials running in elections or regional elections, and to ensure a clear separation between state duties and political ambitions.
- To prevent the misuse of the state or regional budget (APBN/APBD) for electoral or regional election purposes, whether directly or indirectly, the lawmakers (the DPR and the government) must ensure that the laws governing state/regional finances and their derivative regulations prohibit discretionary new spending or the expansion of existing expenditures—such as additional social assistance, infrastructure projects, or civil servant allowances—within six months prior to election day, unless such expenditures were approved in the previous fiscal year.
- To close enforcement gaps and limit the potential abuse of power by incumbents, the laws governing elections and regional elections must be revised before the start of the 2029 Election stages to grant Bawaslu direct authority to impose binding administrative sanctions for proven misuse of office or public resources during elections/regional elections—including disqualification of candidates—without relying on decisions from other state institutions.




¹¹¹ <https://asianews.network/2024-voting-day-marred-by-reports-of-violations/>.

¹¹² <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/11/22/12131651/pentingnya-netralitas-polri-dalam-pemilu-2024?page=all>.

¹¹³ <https://ombudsman.go.id/artikel/r/cegah-maladministrasi-dalam-pengamanan-pemilu-2024-ombudsman-berkoordinasi-dengan-tni-dan-polri>.

¹¹⁴ <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/03/22/16115611/catatan-pemilu-2024-dari-komnas-ham-netralitas-aparat-negara-banyak>.

PRINCIPLE 6: ACCOUNTABILITY



In the context of political party finances (non-electoral), monitoring, detection, and the imposition of sanctions for violations of political finance regulations remain very limited. Monitoring and detection of violations are only related to financial assistance sourced from the state or regional budgets, which is carried out through audits by the BPK (Article 34A, Paragraph (1) of the Political Party Law). Meanwhile, although various types of violations are subject to sanctions,¹¹⁵ there is no record indicating that sanctions have ever been imposed.

In the context of elections or regional elections, monitoring and detection of violations of political finance regulations are more frequently made public, but the imposition of sanctions is still questionable. For example, the PPATK detected suspicious transactions ahead of the 2024 Elections, which were suspected to originate from crimes in the mining, environmental, and gambling sectors, intended to finance campaigns and other electoral activities.¹¹⁶ However, to date, these findings have not been followed up by the KPU, the Bawaslu, or other law enforcement agencies. Another example is the 2024 Election, where reports of campaign funding from political parties were submitted late, lacked complete information, and/or were not prepared in accordance with the regulations. Referring to Articles 496 and 497 of the Election Law, such violations should have been subject to criminal sanctions. However, KPU granted political parties additional time to correct their reports, rather than imposing sanctions in accordance with the law.¹¹⁷

Another widespread violation of political finance regulations is the purchase of candidacy by political parties (political dowries) and vote buying. Both are prohibited and carry administrative and criminal sanctions (see again Section 2.2 Illicit types of expenditure). Regarding political dowries, it is noted that since the direct election of regional heads began in 2005 until 2018, neither the KPU nor Bawaslu have ever imposed sanctions for this violation, citing a lack of evidence and complainants.¹¹⁸ Meanwhile, several cases of vote buying violations have been followed up by Bawaslu,¹¹⁹ although the role of Bawaslu has yet to be fully considered optimal. In the 2024 regional elections, for example, the Constitutional Court ordered a re-vote in several regions due to widespread money politics, which also highlighted gaps in Bawaslu's performance.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ For example, a violation of the provision requiring political parties to submit a report on the use of public funds to the government after being audited by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) is subject to an administrative sanction in the form of suspension of public funding until the report is received by the government (Article 47, Paragraph (3) of the Political Party Law). Another example, a violation of the provision requiring political parties to maintain accounting records, keep a list of donors, and the amounts of donations received, is subject to an administrative sanction in the form of a warning by the government (Article 47, Paragraph (2) of the Political Party Law).

¹¹⁶ <https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/12/20/en-transaksi-janggal-dana-kampanye-berasal-dari-tambang-illegal-kejahatan-lingkungan-dan-perjudian>.

¹¹⁷ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/sanksi-laporan-dana-kampanye-tak-tegas-parpol-anggap-enteng>.

¹¹⁸ <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-42664437>.

¹¹⁹ <https://news.detik.com/pilkada/d-7660145/bawaslu-tindak-lanjuti-130-dugaan-politik-uang-di-masa-tenang-pilkada>.

¹²⁰ <https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/kpLCavyW-editorial-mi-jalan-terang-akhiri-politik-uang>.

6.1. Effective agency

Public or governmental institutions that have the legal authority and resources to ensure the implementation and enforcement of political finance laws and regulations include the BPK, KPU, and Bawaslu—with varying degrees of effectiveness.

1. KPU:

- **Legal Authority:** under the Elections Law: Authorized to appoint and replace public accounting firms to audit campaign funds (Article 13 point k, Article 337 paragraph (3)); to receive and announce campaign fund reports (Article 334; Article 335 paragraphs (6)–(7)); and to accept campaign fund bank account numbers from political parties (Article 173 paragraph (2) point i). KPU is also empowered to issue reprimands if a campaign account is not registered (Article 47 paragraph (4) of the Political Party Law); disqualify parties that fail to submit initial campaign fund reports (Article 338 paragraphs (1)–(2)); and refuse to confirm elected candidates if final fund reports are not submitted (Article 338 paragraphs (3)–(4)).

Under the Regional Election Law, the KPU is authorized to accept candidate campaign fund accounts (Article 74 paragraphs (3)–(4)); limit campaign expenditures (Article 74 paragraph (9)); receive, audit, and announce campaign fund reports (Article 75 paragraphs (1), (2), and (4)); and regulate further technical matters related to campaign funds (Article 75 paragraph (5)); as well as impose disqualification on incumbents misusing government programs (Article 71 paragraphs (3)–(4)); on candidates proven to have bribed voters (Article 73); or on those receiving campaign funds from prohibited sources (Article 76 paragraphs (3)–(5)).

- **Resources:** KPU's budget and its subordinate structure are financed from the APBN (Articles 451–452 of the Election Law). Institutionally, the national capital-based KPU oversees Provincial KPU and Regency/City KPU (Articles 6–9 of the Election Law).
- **Effectiveness:** The effectiveness of KPU's role is relatively low. A KPK survey during the 2015, 2017, and 2018 regional elections revealed that fewer than 50% of candidate pairs accurately reported campaign receipts and expenditures.¹²¹ There is also an almost complete lack of public knowledge regarding any follow-up on such findings.

2. Bawaslu:

- **Legal Authority:** under the Election Law: Bawaslu (at national, provincial, and city/regency levels) is tasked with supervising election stages, including campaigning and campaign funding (Article 93 point d number 5; Article 97 point b number 5; Article 101 point b number 4). Additionally, Bawaslu is responsible for preventing money politics (Article 93 point e; Article 97 point c; Article 101 point c). In the context of regional elections, Bawaslu's authority is grounded in provisions declaring the joint responsibility of Bawaslu, Provincial Bawaslu, and Regency/City Election Supervisory Committees in overseeing the Pilkada (Articles 22A–22D of the Regional Election Law).

¹²¹ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/anomali-laporan-dana-kampanye-yang-tak-berujung>.

- **Resources:** the Bawaslu and its structures are financed from the APBN (Articles 451–452 of the Election Law). Institutionally, the national capital-based Bawaslu oversees Provincial Bawaslu and Regency/City Bawaslu (Article 89 of the Election Law).
- **Effectiveness:** Bawaslu's effectiveness is relatively low, as openly acknowledged following the detection by PPATK of green financial crime money flows to political party members suspected of funding the 2024 elections. Bawaslu attributed this to campaign audits being conducted only post-election and only on funds recorded in official reports.¹²² Moreover, while there have been sanctions against money politics practices, the actual coverage of such crimes is far broader than what has been prosecuted. Bawaslu stated that difficulties in collecting evidence are the main obstacle.¹²³

3. BPK:

- **Legal Authority:** auditing the accountability reports of political parties concerning public fund receipts and expenditures from the state or regional budget (Article 13 point i and Article 34A of the Political Party Law).
- **Resources:** Institutionally, BPK is headquartered in the national capital with representatives in each province. Its budget is charged as a separate budget line in the APBN (Articles 3 and 35 of the BPK Law).¹²⁴
- **Effectiveness:** BPK audits have identified multiple issues in how political parties use public funds: accepting funds through bank accounts not owned by the parties; discrepancies between reported expenses and public funding received; incomplete documentation of expenditures; and misallocation of public funds.¹²⁵ However, a formal follow-up framework on these findings is not yet available.

Although several different institutions are mandated to ensure the implementation and enforcement of political finance laws and regulations, their work is often interrelated, making inter-agency coordination essential. In practice, however, such coordination does not always function effectively and can undermine the performance of each institution. The poor coordination between the KPU and the Bawaslu, for example, is among the most frequently criticized issues by the public. Bawaslu has even filed a complaint against the KPU with the Election Organizer Honorary Council (DKPP), accusing the KPU of denying access to candidate data necessary for oversight.¹²⁶ Similar issues have since reoccurred, with Bawaslu publicly stating that it has faced difficulties accessing SIKADEKA — a digital platform owned by the KPU for the submission of campaign activities and campaign finance reports by election participants.¹²⁷

6.2. Investigation

There are several notes indicating that oversight bodies or law enforcement agencies have conducted investigations into alleged violations of political finance regulations. The KPK, for example, was recently reported to be investigating the flow of funds from two suspects in a corruption case involving the misuse of CSR funds from Bank Indonesia and the Financial Services Authority (OJK) to political parties. The KPK is investigating the

¹²² <https://news.detik.com/pemilu/d-6531657/bawaslu-akui-pengawasan-dana-kampanye-ilegal-masih-lemah>.

¹²³ <https://www.tempo.co/pemilu/bawaslu-berharap-politik-uang-masuk-kategori-kejahatan-berat-ini-alasannya-427195>.

¹²⁴ Law Number 15 of 2006 concerning the Financial Audit Agency.

¹²⁵ <https://warta.bpk.go.id/bpk-temukan-sejumlah-permasalahan-dalam-penggunaan-banparpol/>.

¹²⁶ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/rivalitas-kpu-dan-bawaslu-berpotensi-turunkan-kepercayaan-publik>.

¹²⁷ <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/bawaslu-keluhkan-keterbatasan-akses-sikadeka>.

possibility that political parties instructed the suspects to transfer a portion of the illicit funds.¹²⁸ Another example is the Attorney General's Office, which in 2023 investigated a possible flow of corruption proceeds from the construction and provision of 4G BTS infrastructure under BAKTI at the Ministry of Communication and Informatics to political parties. This investigation followed the designation of Minister of Communication and Informatics Johnny G. Plate as a suspect.¹²⁹

Although both of the above examples are primarily investigations into corruption cases rather than direct violations of political finance rules, the two are inextricably linked. If prosecutors can prove the corruption charges, such proof would simultaneously confirm a violation of political finance regulations. In this context, provisions in the Political Party Law that may be referred to include, for example, the prohibition against political parties using their parliamentary factions in the DPR as sources of funding (Article 40 paragraph (3) letter e), or the more general provision prohibiting political parties from engaging in activities that contravene the Constitution and prevailing laws and regulations (Article 40 paragraph (2) letter a).

In the context of election and regional elections, investigations into political finance violations are more often related to vote buying practices—rarely, if ever, are they related to political dowry payments or irregularities in campaign finance reporting. A recent example is the sting operation in Muara Teweh, North Barito, on March 14, 2025. Ahead of the repeat local election vote, a joint team from Bawaslu and the police raided a house and arrested nine individuals suspected of vote buying. Evidence seized included IDR 270 million in cash and a list of 72 registered voters. In April 2025, the Muara Teweh District Court issued a verdict sentencing three individuals who gave money to 36 months in prison and a fine of IDR 200 million, with a one-month substitute jail term. Meanwhile, for those who received the money, the court handed down a sentence of five months in prison and a fine of IDR 200 million, also with a one-month substitute jail term.¹³⁰

6.3. Sanctions

In the Political Party Law, the Election Law, and the Regional Election Law, a range of administrative and criminal sanctions are stipulated for various forms of violations of political finance regulations.

Administrative sanctions include:

- Warnings (e.g., if a political party fails to maintain a designated bank account for campaign funds – Article 47(4) of the Political Party Law);
- Termination of public funding support if a political party fails to submit accountability reports on the use of public funds from the previous period (Article 47(3) of the Political Party Law);
- Revocation of electoral candidacy or political party's status as an election participant (e.g., sanctions for vote buying – Articles 284–286 of the Election Law / Article 73 of the Regional Election Law);

¹²⁸ <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/5023361/kpk-gali-aliran-dana-dua-tersangka-csr-bi-ojk-ke-partai-politik>.

¹²⁹ <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1100855/12/kejaung-telusuri-aliran-dana-korupsi-bakti-kominfo-ke-partai-politik-1684314357>.

¹³⁰ <https://marinews.mahkamahagung.go.id/berita/putusan-politik-uang-pilkada-barito-utara-0hh>.

- Disqualification from participating in the next election or regional election (e.g., sanctions for political dowry practices – Articles 228 and 242 of the Election Law / Article 47 of the Regional Election Law);
- Administrative fines (e.g., political parties that accept political dowries may be fined up to 10 times the value of the dowry received – Article 47 of the Regional Election Law).

Criminal sanctions include:

- Imprisonment (e.g., members of political party leadership who accept anonymous donations, donations exceeding the limit, or donations from state-, region-, or village-owned enterprises may be sentenced to up to one year in prison – Article 48(5) of the Political Party Law);
- Detention (e.g., election participants who submit false information in campaign finance reports may face detention of up to one year – Article 496 of the Election Law);
- Criminal fines (e.g., any individual who uses government, regional government, or village government budgets, or state-/region-/village-owned enterprises' funds to donate or contribute to campaign organizers may be fined up to IDR 1 billion – Article 548 of the Election Law).

Normatively, a single type of violation is often subject to multiple types of sanctions simultaneously. For example, vote buying is subject to imprisonment, criminal fines, and the administrative sanction of candidacy revocation at the same time (see also section 2.2. Illicit Types of Expenditure).

Despite the wide range of sanctions designed to support the enforcement of political finance regulations, a key evaluation point is that many of these sanctions have failed to prevent violations, create a deterrent effect, or even been enforced at all. For instance, the administrative sanction of a formal warning from the government (Article 47(2) of the Political Party Law) for political parties that fail to keep proper bookkeeping, maintain a list of donors and donation amounts, and be transparent to the public, is not only too weak but also has never been imposed. Yet, a study by TII found that most political parties do not disclose their financial records, donor lists, or donation amounts.¹³¹ The same applies to the criminal sanction of detention for election participants who provide false information in their campaign finance reports (Article 496 of the Election Law), despite the fact that these reports are demonstrably unreliable.¹³²

6.4. Inter-agency cooperation

Information exchange between institutions has occurred in various contexts. For instance, the BPK submits the audit results of political parties' accountability reports on the use of public funds sourced from the national or regional budget to the government. This occurs despite the fact that, under Article 13 letter i of the Political Party Law, the party responsible for submitting the BPK-audited accountability report to the government is the political party itself, not BPK.

¹³¹ Transparency International Indonesia, 2023, *Report on the Results of the Assessment of the Capacity and Practices of Financial Openness at the Central Management Level of the 9 Political Parties Holding Seats in the DPR RI*. p.39.

¹³² <https://www.kompas.id/artikel/ladk-18-parpol-belum-lengkap-psi-laporkan-pengeluaran-kampanye-rp-180000>.

In another context, regarding campaign finance information in election and regional election, Article 108 of the KPU Regulation on Election Campaign Funds and Article 70 of the KPU Regulation on Regional Election Campaign Funds state that the KPU must provide access to SIKADEKA — a digital platform owned by KPU for election participants to submit reports on campaign activities and campaign finance — to the following institutions:

- The Bawaslu;
- State agencies responsible for governing matters related to the prevention and eradication of money laundering crimes; and
- State agencies authorized to combat corruption crimes.

Information exchange from law enforcement agencies to election organizers has also occurred. For example, the PPATK has shared information with KPU and Bawaslu regarding a number of suspicious transactions in political party treasurers' bank accounts during the period of April to October 2023, as well as findings related to the use of cash withdrawn from hundreds of thousands of safe deposit boxes (SDBs) in both state-owned and private banks between January 2022 and September 30, 2023. These transactions were suspected to be linked to election-related activities, although no follow-up actions have been taken by KPU, Bawaslu, or law enforcement agencies.¹³³

Despite the occurrence of information exchange practices, they are not without shortcomings. For instance, the exchange of information between KPU and Bawaslu still faces obstacles. Reports indicate that KPU does not grant Bawaslu full access to the SIKADEKA platform.¹³⁴ Additionally, information exchange involving international bodies or institutions remains limited, and is only conducted through PPATK, whose mandate focuses on the prevention and/or eradication of money laundering crimes — not issues directly related to political finance.

6.5. Gender-sensitive reporting systems

Currently, there is no gender-sensitive reporting channel for violations of political finance regulations. Existing reporting mechanisms do not provide specific attention to gender aspects and are limited to reporting on campaign finance, rather than covering all forms of political finance violations.

According to Article 104 of the KPU Regulation on Election Campaign Funds and Article 66 of the KPU Regulation on Regional Election Campaign Funds, the public may participate in monitoring campaign finance reporting by submitting reports directly to the KPU and/or through the official KPU website. These reports must indicate potential violations in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations governing election or regional elections.

¹³³ <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/12/19/temuan-ppatk-soal-transaksi-mencurigakan-jadi-data-pembandingan-bawaslu>.

¹³⁴ <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2024/01/16/bawaslu-keluhkan-keterbatasan-akses-sikadeka>.

Reports must be submitted using a form provided by the KPU, before the public accounting firm submits the audit results of campaign finance reports to the KPU (in the case of national election), or from the time the special campaign fund bank account is opened until before the audit is conducted (in the case of regional elections).

It remains unclear to what extent this reporting channel is actually used in practice, or whether it has led to any investigations or enforcement actions.

Recommendations

- Lawmakers (the DPR and the government) must ensure that the legal framework provides each institution responsible for overseeing compliance with political finance regulations with a clear mandate and sufficient oversight scope, including clear procedures for detecting, investigating, and following up on violations of political finance rules.
- Lawmakers (the DPR and the government) must also ensure that the legal framework establishes sanctions that are proportionate and deterrent for every type of political finance violation.
- The KPU and Bawaslu must strengthen coordination and information exchange to safeguard the integrity of political financing in elections and regional elections. They must also take the initiative to effectively engage domestic institutions (including, but not limited to, the Police, the Attorney General's Office, the KPK, the PPATK, and the tax authority), international bodies, and the wider public (including the media and civil society organizations) to collectively ensure compliance with political finance regulations.

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