

Ballot Heist:

A Report on Financial Transparency Gaps in Indonesia's 2024 Gubernatorial Elections

Transparency International Indonesia



Background

The 2024 Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) mark a new milestone in the evolution of Indonesian democracy. Held simultaneously for the first time across **37 provinces, 415 regencies, and 93 cities** in November 2024, the 2024 Pilkada is now entering its final stages.

One of the key takeaways from this electoral cycle concerns the dynamics of campaign financing. Campaign funds should not be viewed solely as a determining factor of a candidate's victory, but also as a measure of the quality of electoral democracy. Several critical questions regarding campaign finance must be raised: Where do candidates obtain their funds? Are all campaign contributions and expenditures fully reported? Has campaign financing contributed to or exacerbated contestation inequality?

In an effort to address these questions, Transparency International Indonesia (TII) conducted a **monitoring of campaign finance reports** in the 2024 Pilkada, focusing specifically on candidates for Governor and Deputy Governor. Through this monitoring, TII aims to provide a comprehensive picture of campaign financing dynamics in the 2024 Pilkada, identify key issues, and offer targeted recommendations for improvement.



Objectives

- 1. To assess the implementation of the principles of transparency and accountability in campaign financing for the 2024 gubernatorial elections.
- 1. To elaborate on **the disparities in campaign financing**, particularly from a gender perspective, in the 2024 gubernatorial elections.
- 1. To produce recommendations for **strengthening the principles of transparency and accountability** in campaign financing, as well as for fostering a more equitable political system.



Scope of Monitoring

• 37 Provinces

• 103 candidate pairs:

- 1 independent candidate pair, 102 candidate pairs nominated by political parties
- 20 candidate pairs involving women, 83 candidate pairs consisting only of men
- 8 elected candidate pairs involving women, 29 elected candidate pairs consisting only of men

Data sources:

- Report on Contributions Received for Campaign Funds (LPSDK)
- Report on Campaign Fund Receipts and Expenditures (LPPDK)
- Provincial KPU Decisions on the Campaign Spending Limits in the Gubernatorial Election

• Data collection methods:


- Manual downloads from the KPU portal (Infopemilu/SIKADEKA and provincial KPU websites)
- Information requests submitted through the KPU's Public Information and Documentation Officer (PPID)






Average Revenue and Expenditure of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Aggregate)

• In aggregate, the expenditure-to-revenue ratio is 93.91%.






Average Revenue and Expenditure of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)



- Men-only candidate pairs recorded 79.5%
 higher revenue and 81% higher expenditure
 compared to candidate pairs involving women.
- Men-only candidate pairs also exhibited a higher expenditure rate, with an expenditure-to-revenue ratio of 94.01%, compared to 93.21% among candidate pairs involving women.
- This indicates that men-only candidate pairs have better access to funding sources than candidate pairs involving women.




Average Revenue and Expenditure of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Elected & Non-elected)



- Elected candidate pairs recorded 65,02%
 higher revenue and 70,56% higher expenditure compared to non-elected candidate pairs.
- Elected candidate pairs exhibited a higher level of expenditure than their non-elected counterparts, with an expenditure-to-revenue ratio of 95,5% compared to 92,4%.
- This indicates that greater campaign funding contributes to electability.




Average Revenue and Expenditure of Men-Only Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Elected & Non-elected)



- Elected men-only candidate pairs recorded 73,2% higher revenue and 80,9% higher expenditure compared to non-elected men-only candidate pairs.
- Elected men-only candidate pairs also had a higher expenditure-to-revenue ratio (96.1%) than their non-elected counterparts (92%).
- This indicates that larger campaign funds contribute to electoral success.




Average Revenue and Expenditure of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs Involving Women (Elected & Non-elected)



- Elected candidate pairs involving women recorded **33,3**% higher revenue and **27,2**% higher expenditure compared to non-elected candidate pairs involving women.
- Elected candidate pairs involving women had a lower level of spending than their non-elected counterparts, with an expenditure-to-revenue ratio of 90.9% compared to 95.3%.
- This indicates that greater campaign funding contributes to electoral success.




Average Revenue and Expenditure of Elected Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)



- Elected men-only candidate pairs recorded 110,5% higher revenue and 122,6% higher expenditure compared to elected candidate pairs involving women.
- Elected men-only candidate pairs exhibited a higher level of expenditure than their counterparts involving women, with an expenditure-to-revenue ratio of 96.1% versus 90.9%.
- This indicates that elected men-only candidate pairs had better access to funding sources compared to elected candidate pairs involving women.
- The disparity in access to campaign financing (based on gender segregation) is more pronounced among elected candidate pairs than in other candidate pair clusters.




Average Revenue and Expenditure of Non-elected Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)



- Non-elected men-only candidate pairs recorded 62,1% higher revenue and 56,5% higher expenditure compared to non-elected candidate pairs involving women.
- Non-elected men-only candidate pairs had a lower expenditure level compared to non-elected candidate pairs involving women, with an expenditure-to-revenue ratio of 92% versus 95,3%.
- This indicates that non-elected men-only candidate pairs had better access to funding sources compared to non-elected candidate pairs involving women.



Average Revenue and Expenditure of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Combined Graph)





Top 10 Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs by Highest Revenue

	Revenue			
No.	Name	Province	Revenue (IDR)	
1.	Pramono Anung Wibowo - H. Rano Karno	Jakarta	84.650.056.739	
2.	H. M. Ridwan Kamil - H. Suswono	Jakarta	67.012.104.158	
3.	Muhammad Bobby Afif Nasution - Surya	North Sumatra	38.399.943.232	
4.	Emanuel Melkiades Laka Lena - Johni Asadoma	East Nusa Tenggara	34.825.771.332	
5.	Ahmad H M. Ali - Abdul Karim Al Jufri	Central Sulawesi	28.274.807.000	
6.	Rudy Mas'ud - Seno Aji	East Kalimantan	25.331.662.649	
7.	Simon Petrus Kamlasi - Adrianus Garu	East Nusa Tenggara	25.312.280.000	
8.	Edy Rahmayadi - Hasan Basri Sagala	North Sumatra	19.537.082.848	
9.	Mawardi Yahya - R.A. Anita Noeringhati	South Sumatra	17.786.744.498	
10.	Matius Fakhiri - Aryoko Alberto Ferdinand Rumaropen	Papua	16.368.555.929	



Bottom 10 Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs with the Lowest Revenue

	Revenue			
No.	Name	Province	Revenue (IDR)	
1.	Sulaiman - Adri Patton	North Kalimantan	202.100.008	
2.	Dharma Pongrekun - R. Kun Wardana Abyoto	Jakarta	317.922.588	
3.	Muhammad Ali Baal Masdar - Arwan M Aras T	West Sulawesi	395.584.790	
4.	Hj. Raudatul Jannah - Akhmad Rozanie Himawan Nugraha	South Kalimantan	436.607.871	
5.	Nikolaus Kondomo - Baidin Kurita	South Papua	490.469.000	
6.	Muda Mahendrawan - Jakius Sinyor	West Kalimantan	656.629.870	
7.	Natalis Tabuni - Titus Natkime	Central Papua	658.135.687	
8.	H. Husain Alting Sjah - Asrul Rasyid Ichsan	North Maluku	790.500.000	
9.	Hamzah Isa - Abdurrahman Abubakar Bahmid	Gorontalo	830.950.000	
10.	Wempi Wetipo - Agustinus Anggaibak	Central Papua	843.450.292	



Top 10 Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs by Highest Expenditure

	Expenditure			
No.	Name	Province	Expenditure (IDR)	
1.	Pramono Anung Wibowo - H. Rano Karno	Jakarta	84.600.577.909	
2.	H. M. Ridwan Kamil - H. Suswono	Jakarta	66.998.945.832	
3.	Muhammad Bobby Afif Nasution - Surya	North Sumatra	38.399.853.606	
4.	Emanuel Melkiades Laka Lena - Johni Asadoma	East Nusa Tenggara	32.910.365.017	
5.	Ahmad H M. Ali - Abdul Karim Al Jufri	Central Sulawesi	29.454.094.550	
6.	Rudy Mas'ud - Seno Aji	East Kalimantan	25.331.662.629	
7.	Edy Rahmayadi - Hasan Basri Sagala	North Sumatra	19.537.022.756	
8.	Simon Petrus Kamlasi - Adrianus Garu	East Nusa Tenggara	19.010.100.000	
9.	Mawardi Yahya - R.A. Anita Noeringhati	South Sumatra	17.786.750.000	
10.	Matius Fakhiri - Aryoko Alberto Ferdinand Rumaropen	Papua	15.513.533.117	




Bottom 10 Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs with the Lowest Expenditure

	Expenditure			
No.	Name	Province	Expenditure (IDR)	
1.	Sulaiman - Adri Patton	North Kalimantan	184.170.001	
2.	Hidayat Arsani - Hellyana	Bangka Belitung Islands	225.007.502	
3.	Bernard Sagrim - Sirajudin Bauw	Southwest Papua	247.500.000	
4.	Jeffry A. Rahawarin - Abd. Mukti Keliobas	Maluku	308.140.000	
5.	Dharma Pongrekun - R. Kun Wardana Abyoto	Jakarta	318.270.373	
6.	Muda Mahendrawan - Jakius Sinyor	West Kalimantan	371.316.750	
7.	Gabriel Asem - Lukman Wugaje	Southwest Papua	381.400.000	
8.	Muhammad Ali Baal Masdar, - Arwan M Aras T	West Sulawesi	388.712.678	
9.	Hj. Raudatul Jannah - Akhmad Rozanie Himawan Nugraha	South Kalimantan	431.780.000	
10.	Nikolaus Kondomo - Baidin Kurita	South Papua	447.597.000	






Contributor Distribution of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Aggregate)



- The majority of candidate pairs reported contributions originating from their own personal funds.
- Political parties or party coalitions were relatively rare contributors compared to the candidates themselves and individual third parties. However, the average amount of contributions from political parties or coalitions was the highest.
- Contributions from individual third parties were the most common after self-financing by the candidates, but had the lowest average amount.
- Contributions from private legal entities were the least commonly reported.



Contributor Distribution of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)






#Highlight: Contributor Distribution of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)

- The majority of candidate pairs—both men-only and those involving women candidates—reported receiving contributions from **personal funds**.
- Proportionally, candidate pairs involving women were more likely to receive contributions from political parties/coalitions, individual third parties, and private legal entities. However, the average amount of these contributions was lower than those received by men-only candidate pairs.
- The largest average **contribution gaps** between men-only and involving women candidate pairs occurred in the categories of contributions from political parties/coalitions, private legal entities, individual third parties, and self-financing.
- This suggests the existence of favoritism by political elites and political financiers toward men-only candidate pairs.



Contributor Distribution of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Elected & Non-elected)






#Highlight: Contributor Distribution of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Elected & Non-elected)

- The majority of candidate pairs—both elected and non-elected—recorded contributions originating from their own personal funds.
- Proportionally, a greater number of non-elected candidate pairs received contributions from political parties or coalitions of political parties, with the average amount also significantly higher than that received by elected candidate pairs. In contrast, a larger proportion of elected candidate pairs received contributions from individual donors and private legal entities.
- The average amount of contributions received by elected candidate pairs from their own funds and from private legal entities was higher than that received by non-elected candidate pairs. Aside from contributions from political parties or coalitions, the only other type of contribution with a higher average amount going to non-elected candidate pairs came from individual donors.
- This indicates the ineffective allocation of campaign funds by political parties or coalitions. However, this pattern may also reflect a strategic decision by political parties or coalitions to boost the visibility of candidates who had a lower chance of winning from the outset.



Contributor Distribution of Men-Only Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Elected & Non-elected)






#Highlight: Contributor Distribution of Men-Only Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Elected & Non-elected)

- The majority of candidate pairs—both elected men-only candidate pairs and non-elected men-only candidate pairs—reported contributions from personal funds.
- Compared to non-elected men-only candidate pairs, elected men-only candidate pairs were more likely to receive contributions from political parties/coalitions, individual donors, and private legal entities.
- In contrast, non-elected men-only candidate pairs were more likely to report contributions coming from the candidates themselves than elected ones.
- In the categories of contributions from the candidates themselves and from private legal entities, elected menonly candidate pairs reported higher contribution amounts than their non-elected counterparts.
- However, in the categories of contributions from political parties/coalitions and individual donors, non-elected men-only candidate pairs reported higher contribution amounts than those who were elected.



Contributor Distribution of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs Involving Women (Elected & Non-elected)




#Highlight: Contributor Distribution of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs Involving Women (Elected & Non-elected)



- The majority of elected candidate pairs involving women reported contributions from personal funds and from individual contributors. Compared to non-elected candidate pairs involving women, the elected pairs were also more likely to receive contributions from these sources.
- In contrast, non-elected candidate pairs involving women were more likely to receive contributions from political parties/coalitions and from private legal entities than their elected counterparts.
- For contributions from candidates themselves, political parties/coalitions, and private legal entities, non-elected candidate pairs involving women recorded larger contribution amounts than elected candidate pairs involving women.
- However, for contributions from individual contributors, elected candidate pairs involving women recorded larger contribution amounts than non-elected pairs.
- It is important to highlight that some contributor categories saw very few contributions (only one elected candidate pair involving women reported contributions from political parties/coalitions and from private legal entities). This may result in unreliable average contribution values and an exaggerated appearance of disparity



Contributor Distribution of Elected Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)






#Highlight: Contributor Distribution of Elected Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)

- The majority of both elected men-only candidate pairs and elected candidate pairs involving women recorded contributions originating from their own personal funds.
- The majority of elected candidate pairs involving women also received contributions from other individual donors.
- Compared to elected candidate pairs involving women, elected men-only candidate pairs recorded a higher distribution of contributions from political parties/coalitions and private entities.
- Compared to elected men-only candidate pairs, elected candidate pairs involving women recorded a higher distribution of contributions in the categories of self-financing and individual donors.
- Across all donor categories, the average contribution amount received by elected men-only candidate pairs was higher than that received by elected candidate pairs involving women. The most significant disparities were found in contributions from private entities, self-financing, political parties/coalitions, and individual donors.
- These patterns are consistent with overall contribution trends to gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidate pairs (based on gender-disaggregated data), regardless of electoral outcome.



Contributor Distribution of Non-elected Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)





#Highlight: Contributor Distribution of Nonelected Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs (Gender Disaggregation)

- The majority of non-elected men-only pairs recorded contributions originating from the candidate pair themselves.
- Compared to non-elected pairs involving women, non-elected men-only pairs were more frequently funded by their own candidate pair.
- Compared to non-elected men-only pairs, non-elected pairs involving women more frequently received contributions from political parties/coalitions, individual third parties, and private legal entities.
- In the category of self-financing, non-elected pairs involving women recorded a higher average contribution amount than non-elected men-only pairs.
- In the categories of contributions from political parties/coalitions, individual third parties, and private legal entities, non-elected men-only pairs recorded higher average contribution amounts than non-elected pairs involving women.



Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs Reporting No Contributions at All

No.	Nama	Province	Revenue	Status
1.	H. Nadalsyah Koyem - Supian Hadi	Central Kalimantan	6.391.500.000	Non-elected
2.	Sherly Tjoanda - Sarbin Sehe	North Maluku	4.251.649.066	Elected
3.	Hendrik Lewerissa - Abdullah Vanath	Maluku	4.179.644.500	Elected
4.	Murad Ismail - Michael Wattimena	Maluku	4.142.713.891	Non-elected
5.	Yohanis Fransiskus Lema - Jane Natalia Suryanto	East Nusa Tenggara	3.289.400.000	Non-elected
6.	Yansen TP - Suratno	North Kalimantan	2.874.099.404	Non-elected
7.	Zainal A. Paliwang - Ingkong Ala	North Kalimantan	2.152.910.000	Elected
8.	Muzakir Manaf - Fadhlullah	Aceh	1.457.500.000	Elected
9.	Abdul Razak - Sri Suwanto	Central Kalimantan	1.379.080.000	Non-elected
10.	Hamzah Isa - Abdurrahman Abubakar Bahmid	Gorontalo	830.950.000	Non-elected





10 Provinces with the Highest and Lowest Spending Limits

No.	Province	Highest
1.	Banten	917.811.048.800
2.	East Java	492.224.640.500
3.	Aceh	394.135.180.000
4.	North Sumatra	365.144.800.000
5.	Jakarta	346.799.030.000
6.	North Maluku	343.238.820.000
7.	Lampung	342.907.274.000
8.	East Kalimantan	279.339.405.000
9.	West Sumatra	272.134.690.000
10.	Highland Papua	248.243.378.000

No.	Province	Highest
1.	South Papua	23.372.857.000
2.	Bangka Belitung Islands	25.561.669.600
3.	Bengkulu	29.996.420.000
4.	Gorontalo	30.819.878.200
5.	Riau	34.945.800.000
6.	Bali	42.129.277.400
7.	West Sulawesi	56.759.040.000
8.	Central Papua	77.420.425.000
9.	Maluku	78.278.775.200
10.	North Kalimantan	82.448.060.000



Top 10 Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs with the Highest Expenditures (as a Percentage of the Spending Limit)

Expenditure					
No.	Name	Province	Expenditure (IDR)	Percentage	
1.	Ahmad H M. Ali - Abdul Karim Al Jufri	Central Sulawesi	29.454.094.550	27,01%	
2.	Romanus Mbaraka - Albertus Muyak	South Papua	6.043.302.032	25,85%	
3.	Pramono Anung Wibowo - H. Rano Karno	Jakarta	84.600.577.909,5	24,39%	
4.	Syamsuar - Mawardi Muhammad Saleh	Riau	7.294.159.696	20,87%	
5.	H. M. Ridwan Kamil - H. Suswono	Jakarta	66.998.945.832	19,31%	
6.	Erzaldi Rosman - Yuri Kemal Fadlullah	Bangka Belitung Islands	4.331.492.746	16,94%	
7.	Emanuel Melkiades Laka Lena - Johni Asadoma	East Nusa Tenggara	32.910.365.017	15,97%	
8.	Made Muliawan Arya - Putu Agus Suradnyana	Bali	6.692.889.000	15,88%	
9.	Apolo Safanpo - Paskalis Imadawa	South Papua	3.382.574.367	14,47%	
10.	Steven Octavianus Estefanus Kandouw - Alfret Denny Djoike Tuejeh	North Sulawesi	13.435.086.780	11,23%	




10 Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs with the Lowest Expenditures (as a Percentage of the Spending Limit)

Expenditure					
No.	Name	Province	Expenditure (IDR)	Percentage	
1.	Dharma Pongrekun-R. Kun Wardana Abyoto	Jakarta	318.270.373,54	0,09%	
2.	Bernard Sagrim-Sirajudin Bauw	Southwest Papua	247.500.000	0,19%	
3.	Hj. Raudatul Jannah-Akhmad Rozanie Himawan Nugraha	South Kalimantan	431.780.000	0,2%	
4.	Sulaiman-Adri Patton	North Kalimantan	184.170.001,24	0,22%	
5.	H. Husain Alting Sjah-Asrul Rasyid Ichsan	North Maluku	797.613.300	0,23%	
6.	Gabriel Asem-Lukman Wugaje	Southwest Papua	381.400.000	0,30%	
7.	H. Muhammad Kasuba-Basri Salama	North Maluku	1.190.000.000	0,34%	
8.	Muzakir Manaf-Fadhlullah	Aceh	1.457.500.000	0,36%	
9.	Tri Rismaharini-Zahrul Azhar Asumta Gus Hans	East Java	1.796.165.747	0,36%	
10.	Jeffry A. Rahawarin-Abd. Mukti Keliobas	Maluku	308.140.000	0,39%	



Average Percentage of Gubernatorial Candidate Pairs' Expenditures Relative to the Maximum Spending Limit





Gubernatorial Spending Limits vs. Actual Presidential Campaign Expenditures

1.	Banten	917.811.048.800
	Ganjar-Mahfud	664.644.512.267,48
2.	East Java	492.224.640.500
9.	West Sumatra	272.134.690.000
	Prabowo-Gibran	269.008.800.470
10.	Highland Papua	248.243.378.000
31.	West Sulawesi	56.759.040.000
	Anies-Muhaimin	49.340.392.060
32.	Bali	42.129.277.400



#Highlight: Gubernatorial Spending Limits vs. Actual Presidential Campaign Expenditures

- The average real expenditure, which only ranges from **4-6%** of the campaign spending cap, indicates that **the spending limit is either ineffective** (far exceeding realistic expenditure) or that the reporting is incomplete.
- A cross-analysis of the gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial campaign spending caps with the actual campaign expenditures of presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs in the 2024 Election also shows anomalies, where the campaign spending cap for gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates in several provinces is still higher than the actual spending of presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs campaigning across all of Indonesia (38 Provinces). The details are as follows:
 - 1. The spending cap in one province > actual expenditure of the Ganjar-Mahfud pair.
 - 2. The spending cap in nine provinces (each) > actual expenditure of the Prabowo-Gibran pair.
 - 3. The spending cap in thirty-one provinces (each) > actual expenditure of the Anies-Muhaimin pair.





Conclusion

1. Public Accessibility to Campaign Finance Transparency Remains Suboptimal, Posing a Challenge for Public Oversight

- Monitoring conducted from November 2024 to February 2025 identified several issues related to accessibility.
 First, with regard to the Provincial General Elections Commission (KPU Provinsi) Decrees on Campaign Spending
 Limits for the Gubernatorial Election, these decrees were not always accessible through the official Legal
 Documentation and Information Network (JDIH) channels managed by the national KPU or Provincial KPUs.
 Second, with respect to the Reports on Campaign Fund Receipts and Expenditures (LPPDK), these reports were not
 consistently available through the infopemilu.kpu.go.id portal.
- All of the mentioned platforms also frequently encountered responsiveness issues, ranging from long loading times to repeated failures in displaying the requested pages.
- Efforts to overcome these obstacles were carried out in two ways: first, by submitting information requests via email to 11 Provincial KPUs for access to the Provincial KPU Decrees (on 12 November 2024). This request was only fulfilled by the North Sumatra Provincial KPU, while the remaining 10 Provincial KPUs did not respond. Second, by submitting a request through the Information and Documentation Management Officer (PPID) of the National KPU for 11 Provincial KPU Decrees and the LPPDK of 59 candidate pairs across 19 provinces (on 6 January 2025). This request was fulfilled in stages on 13 January 2025 and 17 January 2025.



Conclusion

2. The Credibility of Campaign Finance Reports and Campaign Spending Limits Is Questionable

- In a limited sense, the data analysis shows some rational tendencies—for example, larger campaign funds tend to contribute to electability, and elected candidate pairs recorded spending percentages closer to the spending limit compared to those who were not elected. However, the average actual expenditure, which only ranged between 4–6% of the official spending limit, indicates either an ineffective spending cap (set far above realistic expenses) or incomplete reporting.
- The possibility of incomplete reporting becomes more apparent when data in the reports is compared with information from other sources. In 2020, for instance, based on data from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) stated that the cost of running for regent or mayor was estimated at IDR 20–30 billion, while the cost of running for governor ranged from IDR 20–100 billion (detik.com). Moreover, several candidate pairs in the 2024 local elections also disclosed the actual capital they spent, which significantly differed from the amounts stated in their reports. Syamsuar, gubernatorial candidate in Riau Province, admitted to spending tens of billions of rupiah, while Mohammad Ramdhan Pomanto, gubernatorial candidate in South Sulawesi, stated that he spent around IDR 50 billion (TEMPO). In their official reports, however, their recorded expenditures were only IDR 7 billion and IDR 3 billion, respectively. Both candidates failed to win the elections in Riau and South Sulawesi.



Conclusion

3. Campaign Finance Reports Reveal Significant Disparities in Funding Access Between Men and Women Candidates in the 2024 Gubernatorial Elections

- Although there were no candidate pairs composed of both a woman gubernatorial and deputy gubernatorial candidate, the presence of a woman as either candidate appears to be associated with lower campaign funds. Contribution data indicates that candidate pairs involving women were more reliant on external funding sources (contributions from political parties/coalitions, individual third parties, and private legal entities), yet the amounts they were able to secure were significantly lower than those obtained by men-only candidate pairs.
- These findings reinforce the assumption that women bear multiple burdens in Indonesia's electoral contests. In the 2024 gubernatorial elections, women not only faced barriers to candidacy and stigmatization, but also struggled to compete due to significantly limited access to campaign funding.



Recommendations

1. Campaign Finance Transparency as a Genuine Commitment, Not Mere Formality

The General Elections Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) must ensure that campaign finance transparency reflects the full picture of campaign funding, rather than serving as a mere formality. Therefore, laws governing general and regional elections, as well as KPU regulations on campaign finance, must enable oversight mechanisms beyond simple compliance audits—such as embedded monitoring of campaign activities, financial transaction surveillance (in collaboration with the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center/PPATK), investigative audits, and effective legal enforcement in cases of fraud in campaign finance reporting.

2. Campaign Finance Transparency for Meaningful Public Participation

KPU must evaluate the use of the SIKADEKA platform in fulfilling the public's right to campaign finance transparency. It must also ensure that in upcoming general and regional elections, the public is granted full access to detailed campaign finance information—both revenues and expenditures—not just summaries, in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Law. Additionally, KPU's campaign finance transparency portal must meet reliability standards (i.e., be easily and quickly accessible, and provide up-to-date information).



Recommendations

3. Expanding the Path for Women's Political Leadership

Political parties must mainstream gender equality across all of their functions. Women's political leadership should be used as an indicator of success in party political education, recruitment, and cadre development. Affirmative policies, such as dedicated budget allocations for women's empowerment within parties, are also critical. This mandate can be enshrined in legislation governing political parties and supported by adequate monitoring mechanisms from relevant ministries or government agencies.

In the realm of public policy, political parties must also lead efforts to advance gender-equitable policies, including the reform of political finance governance, which has contributed to the high cost of politics and hindered women's participation..

4. Unpacking the Complexities of High Political Costs

High political costs are the root of corruption problems and, specifically, pose a barrier to women's political participation. This issue must be addressed by the Government and the Parliament within the framework of appropriate political laws and policies, while still upholding democratic principles. "Quick fixes," such as shifting from direct regional elections (pilkada) to elections via local legislative assemblies (DPRD), should be approached with caution, as they may only shift the transactions that drive up political costs without truly eliminating them.

Thank You!

