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Contributions: -

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACA Anti-Corruption Agency/ Lembaga Antikorupsi

ACLC Anti-Corruption Learning Center/ Pusat Edukasi Antikorupsi

APBN State Budget/ Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara

ASN State Civil Apparatus/ Aparatur Sipil Negara

BPS Central Bureau of Statistics/ Badan Pusat Statistik

CPI Corruption Perception Index/ Indeks Persepsi Korupsi

CPIB Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau/ Biro Investigasi Korupsi Singapura

DPR RI House of Representative of Indonesia/ Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

Republik Indonesia

ICAC Independent Commission Against Corruption/Komisi Independen

Antikorupsi Hongkong

ICW Indonesia Corruption Watch

Kemenkumham Ministry of Law and Human Rights/ Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi

Manusia

Kemendagri Ministry of Internal Affairs/ Kementerian Dalam Negeri

Korsupgah Coordination, Supervision and Prevention/ Koordinasi, Supervisi, dan

Pencegahan

Korsupdak Coordination, Supervision, and Enforcement/ Koordinasi, Supervisi, dan

Penindakan

KLOP Ministries/Institutions/Organizations/Local Governments/

Kementerian/Lembaga/Organisasi/Pemerintah Daerah

KPK Corruption Eradication Commission/ Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi

KSP Presidential Staff Office/ Kantor Staf Presiden

LHKPN State Administration Assets Report/ Laporan Harta Kekayaan

Penyelenggara Negara

LPSK Witness and Victim Protection Agency/ Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan

Korban

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Organisasi

untuk Kerja Sama dan Pembangunan Ekonomi

Pemda Local Government/ Pemerintah Daerah

Perpres Presidential Decree/ Peraturan Presiden

Perma Supreme Court Regulation/ Peraturan Mahkamah Agung

PSHK Center for Law and Policy Studies/ Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan

PBB United Nations/ Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa

Renstra Strategic Plan/ Rencana Strategis

RPJMN National Medium Term Development Plan/ Rencana Pembangunan

Jangka Menengah Nasional

RPP Draft Government Regulation/ Rancangan Peraturan Pemerintah

PDB Gross Domestic Product/ Produk Domestik Bruto

Polri National Police of Indonesia/ Kepolisian Republik Indonesia

PPN/Bappenas National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency /

Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan

Pembangunan Nasional

Stranas PK National Corruption of Prevention Strategy/ Strategi Nasional Pencegahan

Korupsi

SPDP Notice of Commencement of Investigation/ Surat Pemberitahuan

Dimulainya Penyidikan

TI Transparency International

TII Transparency International Indonesia

TPPU Money Laundering Crime/ Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang

TPK Corruption Crime/ Tindak Pidana Korupsi

UU Constitution/ Undang-Undang

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/Kantor PBB Urusan Narkoba

dan Kejahatan

UNCAC United Nations Convention Against Corruption/Konvensi PBB Antikorupsi

UPG Gratification Control Unit/ Unit Pengendalian Gratifikasi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 2013, Transparency International has a strong commitment to develop a practical and comprehensive tool that reviews the strengths and weaknesses of anti-corruption institutions. The "ACA Strengthening Initiative" is designed with reference to the Jakarta Principles. This study involves the collection of primary and secondary data, context analysis and assessment of predetermined indicators. Each indicator is assessed with three possible scores, namely high, medium or low. The field review was conducted from March 14 to April 12, 2019, followed by a series of consultations and validations.

Following the assessment of the first phase that has been carried out in the 2015-2017 period, this second phase assessment is divided into 6 measurement dimensions with a total of 50 indicators. The six dimensions include: a) independence and status (9 indicators); b) financial and human resources (9 indicators); c) accountability and integrity (9 indicators), d) detection, investigation and prosecution (9 indicators); e) education, prevention and outreach (8 indicators); and f) cooperation and external relations (6 indicators).

The journeys of Indonesian ACA, Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has become increasingly strategic considering the stability of Indonesia's economic growth in the past five years. Indonesia's ranking as the country with the highest economic growth has continued to rise since 2000 in Asia. In 2017, Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the first time broke the figure of US \$ 1.01 trillion even recorded a growth of 5.07% in the first quarter of 2019, where Indonesia rose to second in the list of G-20 countries.

Amid the still high climate of corruption shown by the stagnation of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in the past five years mainly due to political corruption, the role of KPK in accelerating economic growth through reducing the risk of corruption needs to be strengthened. The presence of KPK in the past 15 years is considered to have contributed positively through the strict enforcement of major corruption cases, arrested more than 1,000 public officials with a success rate of more than 75%, supervision of law enforcement efforts in corruption cases, and public awareness in instilling a spirit of integrity. High public expectations and management of economic growth need to be followed by efforts to improve the agendas of law enforcement and human rights.

Key findings

Based on a range of six dimensions, KPK obtained one dimension that had a percentage above 85 percent, namely the dimensions of Prevention, Education and Outreach (88 percent); four dimensions that have a percentage between 70-85 percent namely dimensions a) Independence and Status (83 percent), b) Accountability and Integrity (78 percent), c) Detection, Investigation and Prosecution (83 percent), and d) Cooperation and External Relations (83 percent. While the dimensions of the Financial and Human Resource dimensions get a percentage below 70% with a percentage of 67 percent. It should be noted that there are differences in composition between indicators per dimension so that it is not necessarily directly comparable.

Independence and Status dimension is considered to be moderate. There are three out of nine indicators that have a moderate score, those are vulnerability in security of tenure from KPK leadership, the lack of KPK in managing operational authority, and there are limited indications of the use of KPK as a political tool. Some of this is mainly reflected in KPK's lack of authority in managing

its human resources. There are various alleged cases of inhibition, especially those related to other law enforcement institutions.

The second dimension, **Financial and Human Resources** requires more attention from all stakeholders. There are four out of the nine indicators related to the budget that have a moderate score, namely the adequacy of the budget stability budget, prosecution and prevention expertises and low proportion of the budget to the APBN. Regarding human resources indicators, KPK is considered necessary to improve its resource management, which is characterized by a lack of internal human resource management at KPK. This indicator is also very closely related to some of KPK's operational authorities related to human resource management.




Table 1: Summary of Assessment of the Corruption Eradication Commission

In general, **Accountability and Integrity** dimension is considered to be moderate. As an organization that has been running for 15 years, KPK was considered successful in developing a system of meritocracy with control of the system that was adequately good. However, there are four out of nine indicators that are considered to have moderate scores, namely an internal review mechanism, compliance with the legal process (due process), handling employee reporting, and the results of employee reporting. The indicators closely related to the performance of the Deputy for Internal and Public Complaints Monitoring (PIPM) which is considered to still need improvement especially on enforcement of ethical violations. The KPK needs to pay attention to the alleged inhibition of the case so as not to harm public percepction on their institution's professionalism.

KPK's performance in the field of **Detection, Investigation and Prosecution** dimension was highlighted mostly when it came to uncovering cases that did not recognize any status/position. There are three out of nine indicators that have moderate scores, namely the dimensions of efficiency and professionalism related to the context of evidence and case administrative such as orderly search letters and information related to the investigation report (BAP) which has leaked several times, and efforts to recover state money losses have not been maximized.

In addition, KPK public prosecutor was also considered not consistent in the prosecuting terms. In some cases where the state loss is estimated to be very large, the indictments are actually quite low. Guidelines for case prosecution are needed so that the gap can be filled. The approach to hand catching (*Operasi Tangkap Tangan*) that is currently being carried out also needs to be considered again; especially to improve the verdicts at the trial. The lack of assets recovery is closely related to the lack of use of money laundering law (*Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang/TPPU*) in cases handled by KPK. TPPU's vision in the enforcement strategy must be the focus of KPK in the future.

In fifth dimension, **Education, Prevention and Outreach**, KPK performance is in good category. There are two out of nine indicators that have a moderate score. The moderate score is for the strategic planning for prevention activities that is not yet maximized, and the efforts to coordinate and supervise (*Koordinasi dan Supervisi/Korsup*) that still need to be increased, especially law enforcement agencies namely the police and prosecutors. Korsup needs to expand its focus so that it is able to implement prevention of corruption and reform the internal bureaucracy more effectively.

Meanwhile, the important notes on **Cooperation and External Relations** dimension include cooperation with law enforcement institutions (National Police and Prosecutors), and the lack of access to cooperate with marginalized groups. Strengthening its trigger mechanism strategy, which is encouraging or as a stimulus so that efforts to eradicate corruption by existing institutions become more effective and efficient are important, especially after the emergence of various conflicts involving internal investigators and investigators from the National Police. Building a public communication strategy for KPK leaders is also an important agenda. As law enforcers, KPK supposed to only necessarily communicate the legal findings that are already available, and not present matters that do not have permanent legal force, and are often noted to have delivered various controversial statements.

Conclusions and Key Recommendations

The final results of the assessment indicate the performance of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) gets a percentage of 80 percent. Strengthening KPK institutions in the future needs to be evaluated by looking at internal and external supporting factors that focus on improving human resource management. KPK relations with other law enforcement agencies, also need to be a prioritized agenda in the near future.

The assessment finds that KPK has a large modality that can be seen from supporting environmental factors that are very supportive, both internally and externally. The internal supporting factors of KPK accounted for 85.71%, where indicators that needed to be prioritized for performance improvement were indicators related to human resource management. While 78.13% of the external supporting factors of KPK are considered to still be obstacles to the work of KPK, especially those related to formal legal authority in accelerating operational and budgetary authority.

Based on the various findings above, Transparency International recommend that KPK needs immediately pay great attention to fixing organizational governance and using its independent authority with a focus on long-term human resource investment. Transparency International also encourages the KPK to more fully carry out the function of coordination and supervision of the National Police and the Attorney General's Office, which continues to carry out reform at the Regional Government level. Ensuring the establishment of KPK independence is the duty of all parties, especially for Presiden and DPR RI. In addition to improving the vision of HR and strengthening internal control, all parties must ensure that the KPK can prosecute cases independently and without intervention.

INTRODUCTION

The UN Convention against Corruption prescribes the existence of independent bodies established through national legal systems to enforce, implement and promote anti-corruption policies and principles. A well-functioning oversight mechanism with a focus on anti-corruption is absolutely vital for good governance in any country context. Meanwhile, the 2012 Jakarta Principles¹, developed in consultation with Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) heads, practitioners and experts from around the world, represent a widely accepted standard to which ACAs can be held accountable.

In practice, assessment against these standards is sporadic, due in part to the lack of political will by governments to scrutinise their own oversight mechanisms. Another reason is the absence of a coherent and practicable way in which to measure performance. Transparency International has responded to this opportunity by developing an initiative aimed at strengthening ACAs in the Asia Pacific Region. The proposed 'Anti-Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative' combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels.

Under this initiative, Transparency International has developed a practical and comprehensive comparison tool to see the strengths and weaknesses of anti-corruption institutions. The assessment tool has been developed and refined over a period of five years in consultation with experts and practitioners from around the world. The latest iteration of the assessment tool is based on the experience of conducting an initial pilot in Bhutan in 2015 and a first round of assessments in a further seven countries in the Asia Pacific region between 2016-2017². Between March 14 and April 12 2019, Transparency International Indonesia has conducted an assessment of the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Institution (ACA), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This assessment aims to provide Indonesian ACA with up-to-date information on performance and opportunities for improvement and provide a better understanding to all stakeholders about the supporting and inhibiting factors that affect ACA's progress in Indonesia. With this in mind, Transparency International has carried out an independent assessment of ACAs and has produced this report as a result. In addition to comprehensive performance evaluation through a series of strong indicators, this report provides recommendations for the main challenges of institutional reform. This report, therefore serves as a guide for the ACAs and other stakeholders to strengthen and expand the impact of anticorruption efforts in Indonesia.

ABOUT THE ASSESMENT

The assessment process was comprised of a document analysis, including review of laws and media pieces, followed by semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders—primarily within the government but also with non-state actors. Fieldwork took place from March 14 to April 12 in DKI Jakarta. A draft report outlining key findings and recommendations was produced which

¹The principles can be found in UN Office on Drug and Crime, *Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies*, 26–27 November 2012, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art 6 Preventive anti-corruption bodies/JAKARTA STATEMENT en.pdf.

² Between 2015-17, national level assessments of the following ACAs were finalised utilising the methodology: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Indonesia, Maldives, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Taiwan.

was first reviewed by the ACA for accuracy and completeness, before being presented to relevant stakeholders for feedback, and to initiate dialogue on key issues. Consultations and validation meetings took place from March 21 and June 29, 2019 in DKI Jakarta (see Annexes 2 and 3 for a list of people interviewed and consulted).

The assessment tool is designed to capture internal and external factors affecting the ACA as well getting a sense of the ACA's reputation and actual performance. With this in mind a comprehensive indicator framework, made up of a total of 50 indicators, has been developed in consultation with experts (see Annex 1 for more information). These indicators were formulated to develop a broad platform to assess the capacity and effectiveness of the ACA, and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity.

The indicators inquire into six different dimensions:

Table 2: Dimensions and Indicator of Assessment

DIMENSIONS OF ASSESSMENT	NUMBER OF INDICATORS
Independence and Status Dimension	9
2. Human Resources and Budget	9
3. Accountability and Integrity	9
4. Detection, Investigation and Prosecution Dimension	9
5. Education, Prevention and Outreach	8
6. Cooperation and External Relation	6
Total	50

Each indicator has three possible scores – high, moderate and low – and three defined levels of value for each indicator, depending on the condition assessed. To score each indicator the research team identified the specific source of information, where necessary, from the ACA's legal basis of support and reports, and further substantiated each score with in-depth interviews with the ACA's staff and management, as well as interviews with other government agencies, branches of government, media and civil society organisations.

This report is divided into four sections. Section 1 presentw Indonesia's basic economic, social and political characteristics, in addition to its perceived level of corruption. Section 2 explores the legal and institutional conditions in which the ACA operates, as well as its place in the Indonesia control and public management systems. Section 3 presents key findings and a detailed assessment of each indicator, with comments on key issues and specific gaps identified. Section 4 presents a brief set of conclusions, and Transparency International's recommendations for strengthening the ACA.

1. INDONESIA'S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION

Indonesia currently is the country with the strongest economy in Southeast Asia (Katadata, 2019). As a young and dynamic democratic country, Indonesia is experiencing rapid urbanization and modernization. In contrast to most OECD countries and many developing countries, about half of Indonesia's population is under 30 years old with a ratio of the number of working-age population that will continue to increase in the next decade (Central Statistics Agency, 2018).

Table 3: Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP/PDB)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GDP	4,9	5,0	5,1	5,2	5,3
household expenses	4,8	5,0	5,0	5,2	5,4
government expenditure	5,3	-0,1	2,1	4,7	3,6
gross fixed capital	5,0	4,5	6,2	6,5	5,9
formation stock buildup	-0,8	0,6	-0,2	0,7	0,0
export of goods and services	-2,1	-1,6	9,1	5,5	5,6
Import of goods and services	-6,2	-2,4	8,1	10,3	5,7
net exports	0,9	0,2	0,3	-0,8	0,1
OTHER INDICATORS					
PDB deflator	4,0	2,5	4,2	3,8	4,1
consumer price index	6,4	3,5	3,8	3,5	3,9
balance of trade	0,4	0,8	1,2	-0,5	-0,4
current account	-2,0	-1,8	-1,7	-2,5	-2,5
government fiscal terms	-2,8	-2,4	-2,5	-2,2	-2,0
three-month money market	8,3	7,2	6,5	6,1	6,8
interest rates					
10-year government bond yields,	8,2	7,6	7,0	7,5	8,6
on average					

Source: OECD Indonesia Economic Survey (OECD, 2018)

The prediction that Indonesia will become a giant economic country is increasingly clear. Currently, Indonesia is a country with the seventh largest economic purchasing power parity in the world (IMF, 2018). Consistently solid economic growth has made some analysts predict that Indonesia will become the fifth largest economy in the world by 2030 (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2017). Based on market exchange rates, Indonesia is ranked 16th in the world and is predicted to enter the top ten in 2030 (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2017).

In addition, even though the Government of President Joko Widodo estimates that Indonesia's economy will only grow by 5.3% in 2019, this prediction, which is set in the 2019 State Budget, is lower than the 2018 State Budget of 5.4% but this figure is still higher than World Bank estimation of 5.2% (Ministry of Finance, 2018). As a result of the US-China trade war, this country that rich in natural resources and cultural diversity is predicted to experience a deficit of 1.84% of GDP in 2019 with an estimated income of 2.142 trillion rupiahs and spending 2,439 trillion rupiahs, up from Rp2, 204 trillion in 2018. Tax revenue is estimated to reach 1.781 trillion rupiah compared to Rp1609 trillion in the previous year (Katadata, 2019).

In recent years, the level of equity has also improved. The Gini coefficient for consumption has continued to decline since 2015. Trust in the central government is higher than in any OECD country. Progress in macroeconomic policy strategies and structural reforms has been recognized by credit rating agencies, making Indonesia continue to rise in international rankings for indicators of competitiveness and business environment. Since 2015, Indonesia has surged 34 positions in the Ease of Doing Business ranking from the World Bank, becoming 72nd (Doing Business, 2019).

Table 4: Indonesian Policy Context

DIMENSI	DATA	SUMBER DATA
Land area (in sq km)	1.916.862,20	Indonesian Statistics 2018 (Central Statistics Agency, 2018)
Size of population	261.890,9	Indonesian Statistics 2018 (Central Statistics Agency, 2018)
GDP per capita (US\$)	51,9	Indonesian Statistics 2018 (Central Statistics Agency, 2018)
Type of government	Presidential based Pancasila	on Indonesian Statistics 2018 (Central Statistics Agency, 2018)
Voice and accountability	0,1 (scale -2,5 to 2,5)	The Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2018)
Political stability	-0,5 (scale -2,5 to 2,5)	The Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2018)
Government effectiveness	0,0 (scale -2,5 to 2,5)	The Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2018)
Rule of law	-0,3 (scale -2,5 to 2,5)	The Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2018)
Regulatory quality	-0,1 (scale -2,5 to 2,5)	The Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2018)

Sources: Indonesian Statistics (BPS, 2019) and The Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2018)

Amid this impressive performance, policy makers are still faced with a number of challenges as Indonesia's progress towards the status of a country with higher income. Many poor groups, especially amongst them are women and children, are trapped in jobs that do not provide guaranteed employment when compared to other developing countries. Regional disparities in terms of income and welfare are still wide (OECD, 2018). Infrastructure needs are still large, which is equivalent to 7% of GDP per year according to the 2015-2019 RPJMN. Besides that, there are still many things that need to be done to streamline the rules, improve regulatory certainty, and fight corruption.

In terms of governance, the 2016 Indonesia Governance Index (IGI) shows that national government governance performance on a scale of 1-10 only reaches 5.70 with bureaucratic effectiveness reaching only 5.38 (Kemitraan, 2016). This was reinforced by the publication of the Worldwide Governance Indicator of World Bank 2018, which showed that over the past five years the performance of Indonesian government tended to be stagnant, even deteriorating in indicators of political stability, law enforcement, and regulatory quality (World Bank, 2018).

Indonesia's biggest homework now is to improve its equality. Since the early 2000s, inequality has grown faster than in other countries in Southeast Asia. Such a sharp socio-economic gap has become a 'delicious meal' for populists in every political contest, including the 2019 presidential election where President Jokowi again ran for the office. Divisive political narratives, and often sectarian about inequality, contribute to the polarization of public opinion and the decline of democracy.

In 2017, Indonesia's democratic rankings experienced the largest decline according to the Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit (2018), and in risk of slipping from the flawed democracies category into hybrid regimes. The hybrid regime is a category of countries which generally have a government that places pressure on political opponents, non-independent justice, widespread corruption, lack of freedom of the press, and low levels of participation in politics, and malfunctions in government functions (The Economist, 2018).

In fact, in May 2018 it had marked 20 years since the end of the Suharto regime's autocrats. Afterwards, Indonesia's political landscape underwent a rapid and transformative change after the fall of the New Order: the political party system was liberalized; the media become independent; the function of civil society strengthened; military social and political functions were abolished; independent judiciary and law enforcement institutions were established; administrative and fiscal decentralization carried out; and direct voting for the president, governors, mayors and regents was introduced.

This social political gap is reinforced by data from the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR) which notes that President Joko Widodo is popular with the public because of the criminal populism approach (ICJR, 2019). The government uses repressive narratives and legal attributes to show that they have full power over the law, but often without considering human rights principles. The total war against drug dealers through the imposition of death sentences, and shootings at the scene of street criminals are examples of populist criminal policies carried out by the Government. In 2017, the 58-year-old President also issued a statement "Gebuk PKI" which actually legitimized the community to act repressively.

In this situation, populism politics finds its place. Populism promises an end to risks and uncertainties due to crime. Politicians and political parties compete with each other to become "the most resilient to crime", in order to get public support. Some time ago—especially seeing the post-election situation—the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security Wiranto has formed a Legal Assistance Team, which will be tasked with reviewing the statements and actions of figures if they are considered to threaten the integrity of the nation (Tirto, 2019). The formation of a team considered as the official investigator does not have a strong legal basis and has the potential to misuse their authority. This paranoid action is counterproductive in the spirit of respect for human rights and law enforcement.

LEVELS OF CORRUPTION

Behind the trend of economic growth as described, corruption is still Indonesia's main challenge. According to a survey conducted by Transparency International, the Indonesian CPI in 2018 was ranked 38 and ranked 89 of the 180 countries surveyed (Transparency International, 2019). This score increased by 1 point from last 2017. This shows that there are positive anti-corruption efforts that have been carried out by various parties, both the Government, the Corruption Eradication Commission, business people and also civil society—although not yet significant.

The upward trend in the CPI which can be said to be very slow reflects this. In the past four years, Indonesia has scored 36, 37, 37 and 38 respectively. This score is certainly still far from the 50 targets in 2019 initiated by the Government and KPK. Indonesia's position remains in thirty percent of the world's most corrupt countries. The main factor in this stagnation lies in the still rampant practices of bribery and corruption in the political system such as buying and selling votes, money politics, and kleptocracy.

Table 5: Perception of the ACA Performance in Three Global Indicators (2018)

INDICATORS	SCORE/RANKING
CPI (Transparency International)	38 (89/166)
Control of Corruption (World Bank)	-0,3
Irregular Payments & Bribes (World Economic Forum)	3,8 (75/137)

Other aspects that need to be considered, Indonesia Corruption Watch (2018) concluded that there was a significant increase in the number of state losses due to corruption from Rp1.4 trillion in 2016 to 6.5 trillion in 2017 (Tempo, 2017). The majority of corruption cases are related to politicians in various government institutions including the legislature and executive. This situation was triggered by post-reform political industrialization. In the pre-election period, politicians tend to invest in large amounts that can guarantee they will get positions in government institutions.

The results of the 2017 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) conducted in July 2015-January 2017 show that Indonesians still see the level of corruption continuing to increase by 65% (Transparency International, 2017). This research also shows that the police, Legislative, Regional Legislative and Bureaucratic institutions are still seen as very corrupt by the community - even though in percentage terms they are lower than the 2013 GBC. 32% of respondents said they had ever taken bribes.

The decline of Indonesia's Anti-Corruption Behaviour Index (IPAK) in 2018 of 3.66 also needs to be noted. This figure is lower than the 2017 achievement of 3.71. In two dimensions of experience and perception, in 2018, the perception index value was 3.86, increasing by 0.05 points compared to the perception index in 2017 (3.81). In contrast, the 2018 (3.57) experience index fell by 0.03 points compared to the 2017 experience index (3.60) (Central Statistics Agency, 2018).

In 2018, IPAK in urban communities was higher (3.81) than in rural communities (3.47). The higher the level of education, the people tend to be increasingly anti-corruption. In 2018, the IPAK in community with junior high school and under education is at 3.53; senior high school at 3.94; and

above senior high school at 4.02. People are 60 years old or more are most permissive than other age groups. In 2018, IPAK of people aged 40 years and under is 3.65; age of 40-59 years is 3.70; and age 60 years or more at 3.56.

The report on the Corruption Enforcement Trend released by ICW also shows that corruption is still prevalent in many sectors, from the political sector, law enforcement, to the bureaucracy. The report indicates that the prosecution of corruption in 2018 was lowest in terms of the number of cases and the number of suspects when compared from 2015 to 2017. In 2018 it also showed that the value of state losses decreased from the previous year - even though it was increased if it was viewed in terms of trends. In 2018, the most vulnerable sectors to be corrupted are the village budget which includes the Village Fund Budget (ADD), Village Dasa (DD), and Village Original Income (PA Des).

The integrity of the regional head is also remain very poor, with many actors being arrested by law enforcement as a result of corruption cases. Because the trend shows that more regional heads are involved in corruption cases. KPK data shows, during 2004-2018 there were 121 corruption cases involving regional heads with total state losses reaching Rp. 9.7 trillion, of which 32 cases occur in 2018 (ACCH KPK, 2019). There are 180 people from politicians who have been named as suspects due to corruption (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2018). Political party reforms need to be seriously evaluated and addressed. In addition to regional heads, many actors from the private sector are also handled by the KPK.

But in the midst of this situation, there are two big opportunities. First, the presence of Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018 concerning the National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption that has been ratified by the Government further strengthens the role of KPK in conducting prevention. According to this Perpres, the focus of the National Strategy for Preventing Corruption (Stranas PK) includes: a. licensing and trading system; b. finance; and c. law enforcement and bureaucratic reform, which is explained through PK Action (Setkab, 2018). The second factor, soon to be re-election of five KPK leaders for the 2019-2023 term. Until this research was written, the KPK leadership selection committee was opening the selection period. This condition is a decent opportunity for reflection and improvement efforts, both institutionally, authoritatively, and evaluating the focus of the more effective eradication of corruption. Hopefully candidates with integrity, competency and conflict of interest can participate in reviewing the work of the KPK.

2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF THE KPK

HISTORY AND I FGAL BASIS

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was formed based on Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission. KPK was given the mandate to eradicate corruption professionally, intensively and sustainably. KPK is an independent state institution, which in carrying out its duties and authority is free from any power.

KPK was formed not to take over the task of eradicating corruption from conventional law enforcement institutions. Explanation of the law states that KPK has a trigger mechanism role, which means encouraging or as a stimulus so that efforts to eradicate corruption by existing institutions become more effective and efficient. The task of KPK is coordination with agencies that authorized to eradicate criminal acts of corruption; supervising agencies that authorized to eradicate corruption; conduct preliminary full investigations, investigations, and prosecutions of criminal acts of corruption; take precautionary actions against corruption; and monitor the implementation of state governance.

In carrying out its duties, KPK is guided by five principles, which is: legal certainty, openness, accountability, public interest, and proportionality. KPK is responsible to the public and presents its reports openly and periodically to the President, DPR and BPK. KPK is led by the Head of KPK consisting of five people, a chairman concurrently a member and four deputy chairmen concurrently a member. The five KPK leaders are state officials, who come from government and community elements. The head of the KPK holds a position for four years and can be re-elected for only one term of office. In decision making, the KPK leaders are a collegial collective.

The leaders of KPK is responsible for four fields, namely the field of Prevention, Enforcement, Information and Data, and Internal Supervision and Public Complaints. Each of these fields is led by a deputy. KPK is also assisted by the Secretariat General led by a Secretary General who is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, but is responsible to KPK leaders. Provisions regarding the organizational structure of KPK are arranged in such a way as to enable the wider community to participate in the activities and steps taken by KPK. In its operational implementation, KPK appoints employees recruited in accordance with the required competencies.

Vision: Along with Nation Elements, Actualizing Indonesia that Clean from Corruption

Mission: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement and reduce the level of corruption in Indonesia through coordination, supervision, monitoring, prevention, and enforcement with the participation of all elements of the nation.

Figure 1: 2015-2019 KPK Strategic Map

TOGETHER WITH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE NATION, ACTUALIZE A CLEAN INDONESIA FROM CORRUPTION								
Stakeholders Perspectives	S.1 Decreased lev	S.1 Decreased level of corruption						
·	S.2 Effective law enforcement in the Corruption Court	S.3 Integrity of government, society, politics and the private sector	S.4 Effective partnerships are established					
Internal Process Perspectives	I.1 Integration of corruption enforcement efforts	I.2 Integration of efforts to prevent corruption	I.3 Integration of efforts to enforce and prevent corruption	I.4 The implementation of coordination, supervision and monitoring of corruption eradication				
Learning & Growth Perspectives	LG.1 The realization of an effective organization	LG.2 The formation of optimal performing human resources	LG.3 Establishment of an integrated and adaptive operational system	Financial: F.1. Financial management is accountable				

Source: 2015-2019 KPK Strategic Plan (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2016)

The Corruption Eradication Commission has these duties:

- Coordination with agencies authorized to eradicate corruption.
- Supervision of agencies authorized to eradicate corruption.
- Conducting investigations, investigations and prosecutions of criminal acts of corruption.
- Carry out preventive actions for corruption; and
- Monitor the implementation of state governance.

In carrying out coordination tasks, the Corruption Eradication Commission is authorized to:

- Coordinating investigations and prosecution of criminal acts of corruption;
- Establish a reporting system in eradicating corruption;
- Request information about eradicating corruption acts to the relevant agencies;
- Carry out hearings or meetings with agencies authorized to eradicate corruption; and
- Request reports from relevant agencies regarding the prevention of corruption.

RESOURCES

KPK's budgeting is taken from the government expense budget (APBN). Absorption of KPK's budget in 2015 to 2017 consecutively reached a realization rate of 81.05% (Rp. 898,908,900,000), 84.58% (991,887,988,000) and 92.67% (849,539,138,000). While for the realization of the 2018 budget, in the 2018 KPK Performance Report it was stated that the absorption of KPK's budget in 2018 reached IDR

744.7 billion or around 87.2%. For 2019, KPK has proposed a budget of Rp 1.9 trillion to target the number of 200 cases handled, but the DPR stated that the budget ceiling for KPK was Rp 813 billion.

Table 6: 2015-2017 KPK's budget


No	Work Unit	Bud	otion	Average	
		2015	2016	2017	Absorption Rate
1.	Deputy for Prevention	42.931.115.000/ 66,45%	104,149,376,000/ 71.08%	67.605,807,000/ 77.32%	71,67%
2.	Deputy for Enforcement	57.299.896.000/ 57,51%	63,737,986,000/ 65.67%	50,646,619,769/ 85.30%	69,49%
3.	Deputy of Information and Data	143.731.180.000/ 75,67%	232,598,860,000/87.38%	98,182,664,000/ 95.95%	86,33%
4	Deputy for Internal Oversight and Public Complaints	3.887.104.000/ 81,61%	4,825,734,000/ 72.97%	4,804,614,000/ 81,97%	78,85%
5.	Secretariat General	651.059.605.000/ 84,96%	586,556,032,000/ 88.01%	620,113,237,000/ 94.23%	89,06%
TOT	AL	898.908.900.000/ 80,83%	991,867,988,000/ 84.58%	849,539,138,000/ 92.40%	85,93%

Source: 2015-2017 KPK Budget Data (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2019)

STRUCTURE

Based on the Appendix of the Regulations of the Leaders of Corruption Eradication Commission No. PER 03 year 2018 dated 20 February 2018 Regarding the Organization and Work Procedure of the KPK, the Organizational Structure of the Corruption Eradication Commission is as follows:

Table 7: Organizational Structure of KPK



Source: KPK Organizational Structure (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2017)

FUNCTIONS AND MANDATE

1. DEPUTY OF ENFORCEMENT

The Deputy for Enforcement has the task of preparing policy formulations and implementing policies in the Corruption Enforcement Sector. The Deputy of Enforcement carries out these functions:

- A. Policy formulation for sub-fields of preliminary Investigation, full Investigation and Prosecution and Coordination and Supervision of TPK case handling by other law enforcers;
- B. The investigation of suspected TPK and cooperating in investigative activities carried out by other law enforcement officers;
- C. Implementation of TPK case investigations and cooperating in investigative activities carried out by other law enforcement officers;
- D. Implementation of prosecution, submission of legal efforts, implementation of judges' decisions & court decisions, implementation of other legal actions in handling TPK cases in accordance with applicable laws and regulations;
- E. Implementation of coordination and supervision activities for other law enforcement officers who carry out preliminary investigations, full investigations and prosecution of TPK cases;
- F. Implementation of secretarial activities, resource development and operational support within the Deputy for Enforcement;
- G. Coordination, synchronization, monitoring, evaluation and implementation of work relations in the field of Investigation, Investigation and Prosecution along with Coordination and Supervision of TPK cases handling by other law enforcers; and

H. Implementation of other tasks given by the leader in accordance with their fields.

The Deputy for Enforcement is led by the Deputy for Enforcement and is responsible for carry out its duties to the leaders of the KPK. Deputy for Enforcement is in charge of:

- A. Directorate of Preliminary Investigation;
- B. Directorate of Full Investigation;
- C. Directorate of Prosecution;
- D. Coordination and Supervision Work Unit; and
- E. Secretariat of the Deputy for Enforcement.

2. DEPUTY OF PREVENTION

The Deputy for Prevention has the task of preparing policy formulations and implementing policies in the Corruption Prevention Field. The Deputy for Prevention held a function of:

- A. Policy formulation for sub-fields of Registration and Investigation of State Organizer's Wealth Reports (PP LHKPN), Gratification, Education and Community Services as well as Research and Development;
- B. Implementation of corruption prevention through data collection, registration and inspection of LHKPN;
- C. Implementation of corruption prevention through reception of report and handling of gratification received by Civil Servants or State Administrators
- D. Implementation of corruption prevention through anti-corruption education, socialisation of corruption eradication and anti-corruption campaigns;
- E. Implementation of corruption prevention through research, study and development of eradicating corruption;
- F. Coordinating and supervising the corruption prevention in related institutions and agencies that carry out public services;
- G. Implementation of secretarial activities and resource development within the Deputy for Prevention.
- H. Coordination, synchronization, monitoring, evaluation and implementation of work relations in the sub-fields of Registration and Investigation of State Operator Assets Reports (PP LHKPN), Gratification, Education and Community Services as well as Research and Development;
- I. Implementation of other duties given by the Leader in accordance with respective fields.

3. DEPUTY OF INFORMATION AND DATA

The Deputy for Information and Data has the task of preparing policy formulations and implementing policies in the Information and Data Sector.

Deputy for Information and Data Fields carries out these functions:

- A. Policy formulation in the sub-fields of Information and Data Processing, Development of Inter-Commission Network and Institutions and Monitors;
- B. Provision of system, information and communication technology support within the KPK;
- C. Developing a network of work between commissions and agencies in eradicating corruption carried out by the KPK;

- D. Collection and analysis of information for the purpose of eradicating criminal acts of corruption, managerial interests and in the context of detecting the possibility of indications of corruption and vulnerability of corruption as well as potential problems causing corruption;
- E. Implementation of secretarial activities and resource development within the Deputy of Information and Data;
- F. Coordination, synchronization, monitoring, evaluation and implementation of work relations in the field of Information and Data Processing, Development of Inter-Commission Network and Institutions and Monitors; and
- G. Implementation of other duties given by the Leader in accordance with respective fields.

The Deputy for Information and Data is led by the Deputy of Information and Data and is responsible for carrying out its duties to the KPK Leaders. In carrying out its duties and functions, the Deputy for Information and Data can form a Work Group whose membership comes from one Directorate or cross Directorate on the Deputy of Information and Data as determined by the Decree of the Deputy for Information and Data.

4. DEPUTY OF THE INTERNAL SUPERVISION AND PUBLIC COMPLAINTS

The Deputy of Internal Supervision and Public Complaints has the task of preparing policies and implementing policies in the field of Internal Oversight and Public Complaints. Deputy for Internal Supervision and Public Complaints carries out these functions:

- A. Policy formulation in the sub-sector of Internal Supervision and Public Complaints;
- B. Implementation of internal supervision of the implementation of the duties and functions of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in accordance with the laws and regulations and policies determined by the Leaders;
- C. Acceptance and handling of reports / complaints from the public regarding allegations of corruption submitted to the KPK, both directly and indirectly;
- D. Implementation of secretarial activities and resource development within the Deputy of Internal Supervision and Public Complaints;
- E. Coordination, synchronization, monitoring, evaluation and implementation of work relations in the field of Internal Oversight and Public Complaints; and
- F. Implementation of other duties given by the Leader in accordance with respective fields.

The Deputy of Internal Monitoring and Public Complaints is led by the Deputy of Internal Monitoring and Public Complaints and is responsible for carrying out its duties to the KPK Leaders. In carrying out its duties and functions, the Deputy of Internal Monitoring and Public Complaints can form a Work Group whose membership comes from one Directorate or cross Directorate on the Deputy of Internal Monitoring and Public Complaints as determined by the Decree of the Deputy of Internal Monitoring and Public Complaints.

5. SECRETARY GENERAL

The Secretariat General has the duty of preparing policies and implementation of administrative policies, resources, public services, security and comfort, public relations and legal defense to all KPK organizational units. The Secretariat General organizes functions:

A. Policy formulation in the sub-sectors of administration, resources, public services, security and comfort, public relations and legal defense to all KPK organizational units;

- B. Implementation of medium and short terms planning, guidance and management of treasury, management of grant/donor funds and creating KPK financial reports and performance;
- C. Implementation of providing logistical support, internal affairs, asset management, procurement, auction of confiscated goods/spoils, along with management and security of buildings for the implementation of KPK's duties;
- D. Implementation of human resource management through organization of human resource management functions based on competency and performance;
- E. Implementation of regulation design, litigation, providing opinions and legal information and legal assistance;
- F. Fostering the relations with the community, communicating policies and the results of the implementation of corruption eradication to the public, the implementation of KPK protocols and the administration of KPK administration;
- G. Coordination, synchronization, monitoring, evaluation and implementation of work relations in the field of the Secretariat General; and
- H. Implementation of other duties given by the Leader in accordance with respective fields.

The Secretariat General is led by the Secretary General (Sekjen) and is responsible for carrying out its duties to the KPK Leaders. In carrying out its duties and functions, the Secretariat General can form a Work Group whose membership comes from one Bureau or cross Bureau stipulated by the Decree of the Secretary General. The Secretariat General in charge of:

- A. Planning and Finance Bureau;
- B. General Bureau;
- C. Bureau of Human Resources;
- D. Legal Bureau;
- E. Public Relations Bureau; and
- F. Chair Secretariat

Table 8: Scope of KPK Jurisdiction and Functions

	Jurisdictions								
Function/ mandate/		Public	Sector		N	Non-Government Sector			
powers	Legislatur e	Judiciar y	Police, military, etc	Other public services		Public contractor	Charities / NGOs	All businesse s / some businesse s	
1. Research, intelligence, risk assessment and detection	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
2. Corruption investigation s in response to reporting	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
3. Proactive corruption investigation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
4. Prosecution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
5. Recovery of assets / foreclosures / restitution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
6. Prevention	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
7. Education and outreach	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Source: UU No. 32 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2019)

3. KEY FINDINGS

Based on the six measurement dimensions involving 50 indicators, below are the details of the results of KPK's performance evaluation. Table 17 presents a summary of the assessment based on the dimensions and assessment indicators. Indicators that are considered good are given a green color, moderate indicators are colored yellow, while indicators with bad values are colored red. The elaboration of each indicator based on dimensions can be seen in table 18. The information presented in it is a reference detail that forms the basis of the choice of scores for each indicator.

1. INDEPENDENCE AND STATUS

In general, this dimension is considered to be moderate. There are three out of nine indicators that have a moderate score which is the vulnerability in security of tenure from KPK leaders, the lack of KPK in managing operational authority, and there are limited indications of the use of KPK as a political tool. Some of this is mainly reflected in KPK's lack of authority in managing its human resources. There are various alleged cases of inhibition, especially those related to other law enforcement institutions. The other six dimensions have been well implemented and need to be strengthened.

Several issues related to the dimensions of independence and status:

Inquiry rights

In 2017, DPR RI had wanted to make KPK as the object of the inquiry right where the institutions that was regulated actually are the executive institutions and the ranks below it. The KPK is clearly an independent institution and guaranteed by Article 24 paragraph (3) of the UUD 1945, free from interference from any institution. The purpose of the article is that other institutions within the scope of judicial authorities including KPK, the Prosecutor's Office cannot be controlled and interfered with by the DPR. This is because KPK in carrying out its duties and responsibilities works within the scope of judicial authority.

This debate was actually discussed at the Constitutional Court (MK) in 2006. At that time the judicial review was submitted by Mulyana W. Kusumah. In the order it was mentioned that KPK was an independent institution according to the consideration in the decision number 012-016-019 / PUU-IV / 2006 (Kontan, 2016). Regarding the independence of KPK, the Constitutional Court explained in further consideration. Article 3 of the UU KPK which reads "Corruption Eradication Commission is a state institution which in carrying out its duties and authority is independent and free from any influence of power".

The article is considered not multi-interpreted and is correct. The formulation in Article 3 of the UU KPK itself does not provide the possibility of other interpretations other than those formulated in the provisions of the article, namely that the independence and freedom of the KPK from the influence of any authority is in carrying out its duties and authorities. There are no issues of constitutionality in the formulation of Article 3 of the UU KPK.

In the last year of the current KPK leadership period, one of the focuses driven by KPK leaders was the revision of the UU Tipikor. According to KPK leader, Laode M. Syarif, the evaluation from UNODC shows that there are still many provisions for corruption that have not yet been included in the UU Tipikor, such as trading in influences, illicit enrichment, bribery in the private sector, bribery of foreign public officials, seizure of assets, and conditions for state losses (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2019).

• Integrity of the Post-Serving Commissioner

Another thing that needs attention is the leaders position after serving as KPK commissioner. This aspect needs to be taken into account so that the integrity of the institution where the next commissioners belong to can be maintained. In some cases, for example, there was a sale and purchase for position in the Ministry of Religion, where Mr. Mochammad Jasin who had been a commissioner of the KPK became an Inspectorate in the Ministry of Religion until 2016 ago (Republika, 2019). Or Bambang Widjojanto, Busyro Muqaddas, and Adnan Pandu Praja, who had not yet been released from office, then entered the political sphere. Mechanisms need to be implemented, including the former KPK commissioner so that the integrity of the institution can be maintained. The OECD report on the Managing Guide of the Conflict of Interest in the Public Service recommends that during post-employment, public officials have a cooling-off period, which is a time interval (proposed a year) so that the relevant public officials are not involved in forming policies that benefit other parties when they will have finished his tenure. In Japan, this approach is known as *amakudari*.

· Dynamics of the Formation of a Single Corruption Law Enforcer

Although KPK has a very strong mandate to eradicate corruption, the function of eradicating corruption in Indonesia up to now is also held by the Police and Attorney General's Office. In some contexts, potential conflicts of interest while investigating cases in the Police and Prosecutor's bodies make the legal process complicated. KPK leadership in a working meeting with the DPR has encouraged the KPK only to eradicate the function of corruption (IDN Times, 2018).

The presence of a Presidential Regulation concerning the National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption (Stranas PK)

The presence of Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018 concerning the National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption strengthens the role of KPK in implementing prevention strategies. The Government considers that Presidential Regulation Number 55 of 2012 concerning the National Strategy for the Prevention and Eradication of Long-Term Corruption in the Year 2012-2025 and the Medium-Term Year 2012-2014 is no longer in line with developments. According to this Perpres, the focus of the National Strategy for Preventing Corruption (Stranas PK) includes: a. licensing and trading system; b. finance; and c. law enforcement and bureaucratic reform, which is explained through PK Action (Setkab, 2018).

In order to carry out the Stranas PK, a National Corruption Prevention Team was formed, hereinafter referred to as the Timnas PK which is regulated in article 4 paragraph (1). Timnas PK, according to this Perpres, consists of ministers who carry out government affairs in the field of national development planning, ministers that carry out government affairs in the country, ministers who carry out government affairs in the field of state apparatus, heads of non-structural institutions that provide support to the President and Vice President in implementing control of national priority programs and

management of strategic issues, as well as elements of the leadership of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). KPK is the Timnas PK coordinator.

Limited Immunity Rights of KPK Leaders

In accordance with the mandate of article 6 of UU No. 30 of 2002, KPK has the freedom to conduct investigations and/or prosecutions. Even so, the level of security of tenure of KPK leaders can be said to be very vulnerable. In the process of law enforcement, it is not uncommon that there will be counter effort through the practice of criminalization. However, until now, the UU KPK does not regulate the existence of immunity rights for KPK Commissioners and employees to have legal immunity from criminal/civil prosecution for actions taken in carrying out their mandate.

The right to immunity of law or immunity for the leaders of the Corruption Eradication Commission previously became a serious discourse after two KPK leaders were reported to the National Police Headquarters Criminal Investigation Agency for alleged crime (CNN Indonesia, 2016). Some experts consider giving the right to immunity or impunity as if prioritizing the KPK. In fact, in the Ombudsman institution, for example, those who have a smaller risk than the KPK even have provisions regarding this limited immunity.

Authority of Appointment of Independent Employees

In accordance with its authority, KPK can continue to recruit investigators and prosecutors independently. But recently, the inauguration of 21 new investigators by the KPK has drawn protests inside KPK. Whereas there are two reasons for the importance of the KPK recruiting independent investigators. First is the problem in the period of duty. Although the performance of an investigator from the National Police has been good, they have been hampered by a ten-year term. Second, to avoid the potential for multiple loyalty. The presence of investigators from the National Police can cause a potential conflict of interest if the KPK is handling corruption cases within the police force itself.

The turmoil between investigators recruited internally by KPK and investigators employed from the police institution will be increasingly dangerous if taken seriously. In fact, it was delivered openly by the former Director of Investigation, Brigadier General (Pol) Aris Budiman when attending the inquiry rights meeting at the DPR in 2017 (CNN Indonesia, 2017). Appointment of an independent prosecutor is also difficult because KPK is still very dependent on personnel from the Prosecutor's Office.

The main strength of anti-corruption institutions is its independence. So that KPK should be independent in managing its human resources, especially in this case investigative resources that are free from the influence of any power, and free from all forms of intervention or political affiliation.

There are two legal grounds that strengthen KPK in order to recruit investigators who are not from law enforcement agencies, namely Article 45 paragraph (1) of the KPK Law which states that investigators are investigators of KPK who are appointed and dismissed by KPK. Secondly, the decision of the Constitutional Court in 2016 which reiterated the legality of KPK to appoint independent investigators. In this case, KPK has the freedom to choose and appoint its employees, but in practice it is also closely related to the politics of law enforcement with the National Police.

2. FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

In general, this dimension is considered bad. There are four out of the nine indicators related to the budget that have a moderate score, namely the adequacy of the budget stability budget, prosecution expertise and prevention expertise and poor scores in terms of the proportion of the budget to the APBN.

Several issues from the dimensions of financial and human resources are:

The proportion of the KPK's institutional budget to the state budget is very minimal

KPK's budget in the 2015-2019 period tends to fluctuate and its portion is very small in the APBN (less than 0,0004% annually) (Ministry of Finance, 2019). Budgeting planning with relevant agencies that have not been maximized and the realization of programs that are not full is also one of the factors that needs to be considered by the KPK in the future.

In 2019, KPK's budget request was only approved at around 67%. For 2019, KPK has proposed a budget of Rp 1.9 trillion to target the number of 200 cases handled, but DPR stated that the budget ceiling for KPK was Rp 813 billion. While the 2016 budget submissions amounted to Rp. 1.1 T. DPR RI then agreed on KPK's budget for that year to be Rp. 898,908,900,000 or 81.71% (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2018).

The funding figures for corruption eradication activities are considered very small compared to CPIB Singapore or Hong Kong ICAC. The 2017 Transparency International report on the Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA Assessment) found that KPK's budget was sufficient but the amount was less than 0.10% of the APBN (Transparency International Indonesia, 2017). In the report, the budget indicator is found to be the worst (score 58) among other assessment indicators. According to Former Commissioner at the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) Bertrand de Speville, the country that succeeded in eradicating corruption at least allocated 0.05% of the total state budget. Whereas an adequate budget allocation for KPK is an important reference for the Government's political will in combating corruption. Therefore, KPK needs to seriously communicate with the Government and the DPR RI regarding budget allocations.

Low absorption, the KPK has not been able to maximize the budget

Absorption of the KPK budget from 2015 to 2017 consecutively reached a realization rate of 81.05% (Rp. 898,908,900,000), 84.58% (991,887,988,000) and 92.67% (849,539,138,000) (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2019) While for the realization of the 2018 budget, KPK in the press conference of the 2018 KPK Performance Report stated that the absorption of the KPK budget in 2018 reached Rp. 744.7 billion or around 87.2%. For 2019, KPK has proposed a budget of Rp 1.9 trillion to target the number of 200 cases handled, but DPR stated that the budget ceiling for KPK was Rp 813 billion (IDN Times, 2018).

The need to evaluate the case handling budget system

The adequacy of this budget is mainly very related to case handling costs. Based on information obtained by hukumonline, the details of the costs allocated at each law enforcement agency are not the same (Online Law, 2018). In the Attorney General's Office, for example, the total cost of one corruption case is 200 million rupiahs. The details are 25 million rupiahs of preliminary investigation

stage; 50 million for full investigation stage; 100 million for prosecution stage. The remaining 25 million is used for the cost of executing the verdict. In the police the cost of investigating and investigating corruption cases is not much different, a total of Rp. 208 million per case.

In the KPK itself uses the ceiling system. The budget ceiling for the preliminary investigation phase is 11 billion rupiahs for projections of 90 cases. The full investigation phase has a budget ceiling of 12 billion for projections of 85 cases. Meanwhile, for the prosecution and execution phase, 14,329 billion were allocated for 85 cases. In addition, there are still costs that are used for the execution of a criminal body amounting to 45 billion rupiahs. This mechanism needs to be reevaluated considering the wasteful operational costs, and the minimum rate of return on assets from cases handled by KPK.

· Lack of human resource governance

Regarding the indicator of human resources, KPK is considered to have poor human resource management - behind the strong meritocracy system, modern organizational patterns, and attention to employees - which is characterized by the absence of HR blueprints, mechanisms for appointing internal employees that triggered protests because allegedly running exclusively, positions filling that have not run optimally, lack of planning related to employee security, as well as employee expertise that needs to be improved both in the field of enforcement and prevention given the wider dimensions of corruption crimes and the use of technology.

· Limited number of investigators

The KPK has a limited number of prosecutors to complete stalled cases, plus a large number of public complaints. The total number of KPK employees in 2018 was 1,652 employees. The composition of the largest employees was in the general secretary 509 employees or 30.81 percent followed by the deputy of enforcement of a total of 440 employees or 26.63 percent, including 119 preliminary investigators, 106 full investigators consisting of 48 KPK permanent employee investigators and 56 investigators from the National Police and 2 PNS Investigators and 78 public prosecutors. And the last one are the employee in the deputy of prevention for 310 employees or 18.77 percent (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2018).

In 2018, the comparison of KPK employees with Indonesia's population is 1558 people compared to \pm 265 million people. Meanwhile, as an illustration of the condition of the comparison of the number of employees with the population of the country in several other ACAs in 2005 alone is (1) the comparison of the number of ICAC employees with the population of Hong Kong is 1194 compared to 7 million; (2) the comparison of CPIB employees with Singapore's population is 81 compared to 4.3 million; (3) the comparison of KICAC employees with the population of South Korea is 205 compared to 47.8 million; (4) comparison between NCCC employees and Thailand's population is 924 people with 64.2 million people .

In the KPK's annual report, it was also found that the level of suspects' determination declined in the last two years, from 100% in 2017 to 78.51% in 2018 (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2019). With the increasing dimensions of corruption crimes and the use of technology, KPK investigators are required to adapt more quickly to the necessity. KPK losing several times in some pretrial also became an indicator of the need for expertise strengthening.

On another occasion, KPK spokesman Febri Diansyah said that currently the KPK is holding a selection of 19 prospective investigators from the National Police and six prospective public

prosecutors from the Attorney General's Office (Tirto, 2019). This series of tests also applies to all parties who wish to become KPK employees, either through the Indonesia Calling channel or PNYD (Employees who are employed). This selection process also rejected allegations that the KPK was conducting clean-up from investigators from the National Police.

Employee appointment mechanism

In 2018 people were shocked by the HR rotation system at the KPK which was considered problematic. Even KPK Employees Union protested as far as register a lawsuit to PTUN (Kompas, 2018). They consider that the rotation and transfer of employees is done unfairly and not transparently (Kompas, 2018). The policy of the KPK leaders in rotating 14 echelon II and III positions was considered to violate Regulation of KPK RI No. 7 of 2013 concerning Personal Basic Values, Code of Ethics, and KPK Code of Conduct. In the regulation it was explained that the KPK leaders must choose objectively based on clear criteria. Meanwhile, the KPK leaders considers rotations and mutations to have been carried out transparently and accountably (Kumparan, 2019).

Recently the process of appointing 21 internal investigators in 2019 has also received protests from the National Police (Tempo, 2019). A letter from the Indonesian National Police to the Chairman of the KPK Agus Rahardjo sent on May 3, 2019, was signed by the Director of the Criminal Investigation of Bareskrim Polri Brigadier General Erwanto Kurniadi and contained the names of 97 police investigators assigned to the KPK. The 97 police investigators who had been assigned to KPK called KPK is strong by cooperating with the National Police, the Attorney General's Office and the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), not because of the role of one element. They asked the KPK leaders not to apply exclusive policies, especially in terms of the appointment of investigators at the KPK. This cleaning effort was also questioned, because the internal investigator was appointed without a test, and was only educated for one month.


The need to implement change management

There are many different types of changes to manage change. Finding a suitable approach for organizations such as KPK is very important. Change usually involves three overlapping aspects: individual, process and culture (Manchester Metropolitan University, 2017).

Change management is an organizational process that aims to help stakeholders accept and embrace change in their environment. This includes implementing a set of tools, processes, skills and principles to manage the individual side of change to achieve the desired results from an activity or initiative (USAID, 2016).

This management must incorporate the principles of change management into all organizational initiatives to produce effective, sustainable change. Over the past 20 years, research has shown that 70 percent of attempts at change in organizations fail. The main threat to the success of this implementation is because it does not focus enough attention on the individual components of change. Ultimately, successful change management involves individuals to commit to making changes.

Figure 2: Change Management Cycle



Source: Change Management (USAID, 2016).

In general, change management can handle most business operations from planning to control; includes organizational structure and governance, product development, customer satisfaction, and others. Successful change management not only improves governance structures that need to be changed, but also increases productivity to the maximum level by modifying and completing the existing organizational system. Through this process, customer satisfaction (or in the context of KPK is the reporter) will be maximized.

To achieve the most optimal results through change management, it is very important that each member of the organization work collaboratively and maximize their capacity. From management level employees to entry level employees. They must speak based on the vision and goals of the organization. However, there are always various types of people in the organization for change problems: passive, active, stubborn, or apathetic. Because of this diversity, a leader must lead its members in one direction. In this way, the role of the 'change manager' is important for controlling variables within the organization.

3. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY

In general, this dimension is considered to be moderate. As an organization that has been running for 15 years, KPK has been considered to be successful in developing an open system with control of the system that is quite good. However, there are four out of nine indicators that are considered to have moderate scores, namely an internal review mechanism, compliance with the legal process (due process), handling employee reporting, and the results of employee reporting.

Several issues related to the dimensions of accountability and integrity:

· Turmoil of independent investigators and police investigators

On March 29, 2019, 84 KPK preliminary investigators and 30 full investigators sent a letter of petition entitled "Stop All Forms of Efforts to Hamper Case Handling" to KPK leaders in relation to the five causes of delays in handling corruption cases in KPK (Koran Tempo, 2019). All are from internal employees, there are no investigators from the police and prosecutors. These obstacles are considered to hinder the task of eradicating corruption, such as higher case development, corporate crime, and money laundering. Until April 12, petition supporters increased to nearly 500 people who extended to other Deputies, such as the Deputy for Prevention.

The obstacles that the investigator complained includes:

1. Barriers to handling cases when exposing deputies

There was a delay in the execution of cases with reasons that were unclear and tended to stall time.

2. Leaking hand capture operation

Nearly all task forces in the investigation department have had failed to carry out catch in the act operations due to information leakage. One operation that was suspected of being leaked before the arrest was a planned catch in the act operation at Borobudur Hotel, Central Jakarta, on February 2. The KPK task force team also failed to arrest someone who would bribe state officials in Banjarmasin on April 10 because of suspected information leakage. The data breach also occurred in the case of PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara's share investment gratification to the mass media, which allegedly involved the former NTB Governor, M. Zainul Majdi.

3. Special treatment of witnesses and summons of witnesses that are not approved

Some witnesses allegedly received special treatment when they were examined in a corruption case. For example, when about to be examined as a witness to the corruption case of regional balance funds last year, Vice Chairman of BPK Bahrullah Akbar was said to go to the Firli room on the 12th floor of the KPK building first. Bahrul went into Firli's room using the back door. After that, then he headed to the examination room on the 2nd floor.

4. Unapproved ban and searches

Investigators do not get permission when filing searches in certain cases. Investigators are also not permitted to ban someone by the Deputy of Enforcement without objective reasons and clear argumentation.

5. Abandonment of alleged serious violations

The case of alleged serious violations allegedly by the officers in the KPK Enforcement Section was not fully followed up by the KPK leaders. Case handling by the Internal Supervisor is also allegedly not transparent. An example is in the destruction of evidence in the form of a financial notebook owned by Basuki Hariman, a convicted person in a bribery case of the former judge of the Constitutional Court Patrialis Akbar. Adjunct Commissioner Roland Ronaldy and Commissioner Harun as KPK

investigators then only returned to the police because they were involved in this case, and were not subject to the article about had prevented the investigation.

Cases that are suspected of being hampered are thought to involve power for various reasons, including (1) alleged bribery of position sale in the Ministry of Religion involving M. Romahurmuziy (former General Chair of the United Development Party), (2) corruption of KONI grant funds at the Ministry of Youth and Sports involving the Secretary General of KONI, Ending Fuad Hamidy, (3) allegations of bribery and gratification from PT Humpuss Kimia Transportation involving members of the DPR from the Golongan Karya Party Bowo Sidik, and (4) alleged corruption related to PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara's divestment allegedly involving the former Governor West Nusa Tenggara, M. Zainul Majdi.

KPK needs to improve case handling management. The existence of the petition further strengthened the indications of systematic efforts to weaken the performance of KPK law enforcement from the internal. KPK needs to pay more attention because simultaneously this will have an impact on the process of eradicating corruption in the future.

Ethical enforcement is not maximal

In the 2016-2018 period there were at least 7 alleged ethical violations committed by the KPK internal. However, it is very unfortunate that the majority of the ethical decisions cannot be explained by the KPK Leaders.

Table 9: List of Ethics Violations in KPK

No	Name	Position	Case	Development	Year
1	Saut Situmorang	KPK Commissioner	Statement regarding the Islamic Student Association (HMI) organization	Proven to commit a medium violation	2016
2	Aris Budiman	Director of Investigation	Visiting the KPK Inquiry Committee meeting in the DPR	The Employee Advisory Council (DPP) of the KPK has delegated recommendations for alleged violations of ethics by those concerned. Of the 10 DPP members, eight people stating guilty and the other two stating not guilty.	2017

				The KPK leaders did not announce directly regarding this alleged violation of ethics, until the relevant person was returned to the Police	
3	Novel Baswedan	Investigator	Sending e-mails containing protests over Aris Budiman's plans to recruit the head of the task force for investigation from the National Police Headquarters	The latest information in April 2018 said the KPK leaders had prepared sanctions against Aris Budiman and the Baswedan novel	2017
4	Rolan Ronaldy	Investigator	There are allegations of damaging the evidence in the bribery case of former MK Judge Patrialis Akbar	It is unclear how to resolve the ethics until the related person is returned to the Police	2017
5	Harun	Investigator	There are allegations of damaging the evidence in the bribery case of former MK Judge Patrialis Akbar	The ethical resolve is unclear until the related person is returned to the Police	2017
6	Firli	Deputy of Enforcement	Meeting between him with Tuan Guru Bajang (TGB) while playing tennis. TGB is the party examined by the KPK in the case	The ethical resolve is unclear until the related person is returned to the Police	2018

				of Newmont's divestment		
7	Pahala Nainggolan	Deputy Prevention	of	Sending mail to a company that is in an arbitration dispute	=	2018

Source: Processed from various sources

The internal review mechanism indicator, employee reporting along with the results of the reporting handling, is closely related to the performance of the Deputy for Internal Audit and Public Complaints (PIPM) which is considered to still need be improved. For example, it is suspected that there were many cases of violations of the ethics of KPK employees such as cases of violations of the ethics of the Deputy of Enforcement Inspector General Firli and the Deputy of Prevention Pahala Nainggolan (Tempo, 2019), or cases of ethics violations by Inspector General. Pol. Dr. Aris Budiman who is currently getting the position of Chairperson of the National Police Training Center. The leaders are considered need to be more assertive in giving sanctions and transparency to the process.

Firli allegedly committed an ethical violation because he met former West Nusa Tenggara Governor Muhammad Zainul Majdi or Tuan Guru Bajang (TGB) amid the KPK's investigation in a case of alleged corruption related to PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara's divestment. Firli considered violating the KPK Regulation Number 7 of 2013 concerning Personal Basic Values, Code of Ethics, and Code of Conduct. At the integrity point, it is stated that KPK employees are prohibited from having direct or indirect relations with suspects, defendants, convicts or other parties whose cases are being handled by the KPK, except in carrying out their duties. Pahala allegedly sent a reply letter regarding checking accounts at one of the private banks. This is considered odd because the KPK is not investigating a case involving the company that sent the letter to the KPK, so it does not have any significance.

The Coalition of Anti-Corruption Civil Society from the beginning has urged the KPK leaders to take this alleged violation seriously. Because if it is not completed as soon as possible, this condition has the potential to hinder KPK's work in law enforcement (Tempo, 2019).

· Employee security is under siege

Repeated threats and criminalization were received by KPK employees. ICW noted that at least in the past 10 years there have been 18 threats. Seven of them were carried out by establishment as suspect without a strong foundation and the remainder carried out by means of violence. In the fourth period of leadership, there were 8 attacks, including attacks on KPK investigators, Novel Baswedan (IDN Times, 2019). With this note, it should be a fundamental evaluation for KPK to strengthen internal security rules for each KPK employee.

Table 10: List of Criminalization/Threats to KPK Employees

No	Name	Position	Criminalization type	Year
1	Bibid Samad Rianto	KPK Commissioner	The suspect was appointed for allegedly issuing a preventive letter to Joko Soegiarto Tjandra, PT Era Giat Prima's Chairman	2009
2	Chandra M Hamzah	KPK Commissioner	The suspect was appointed for allegedly issuing a preventive letter to Anggoro Widjojo, Head of PT Masaro	2009
3	Dwi Samayo	KPK Employee	Hit by an unidetified person	2011
4	Novel Baswedan	KPK Employee	Hit when arresting the Buol Regent, Amran Batalipu	2012
5	Novel Baswedan	KPK Employee	Arrests carried out by the Police on charges of shooting at swiftlet nest thieves when Novel served as Head of Bengkulu Resort Police Criminal Investigation Unit	2012
6	Abraham Samad	KPK Commissioner	Established as suspect because of suspected document forgery case	2015
7	Bambang Widjojanto	KPK Commissioner	Established as a suspect and then arrested for alleged case of giving false information in the Constitutional Court	2015
8	Adnan Pandu Praja	KPK Commissioner	Reported to Bareskrim for alleged forgery of a notary letter and the removal of shares of PT Desy Timber in Berau, East Kalimantan	2015
9	Zulkarnaen	KPK Commissioner	About to be reported to Bareskrim regarding the alleged corruption case in the grant funds of the East Java Community Social Economic Management Program	2015
10	Endang Tarsa	KPK Employee	Threatened to be killed by someone	2015
11	Afif Julian Miftah	KPK Employee	Experienced bomb terror and splashed with acid	2015
12	Novel Baswedan	KPK Employee	The motorbike carrying Novel was hit by an unknown car while heading to the KPK	2016

13	Novel Baswedan	KPK Employee	Novel was splashed with acid by two unknown people shortly after doing the morning prayers near his residence	2017
14	ST	KPK Employee	Experienced theft of case handling documents	2019
15	X	KPK Employee	Got beaten up while investigating a case at Borobudur Hotel Jakarta	2019
16	X	KPK Employee	Got beaten up while investigating a case at Borobudur Hotel Jakarta	2019
17	Laode M Syarif	KPK Commissioner	His residence was terrorized with molotov bomb	2019
18	Agus Rahardjo	KPK Commissioner	His residence was terrorized with molotov bomb	2019

Source: processed from various sources

From the results of information searching, various attacks on KPK leaders and employees were considered due to the lack of security management efforts within the KPK itself. There are three main things that need to be considered, which is the grand design and security SOP that have not been maximally carried out, the low level of the security unit, and the lack of security management efforts at KPK.

Met by researchers last April, security expert and criminologist Dadang Sudiadi said that reforming security management needs to be a priority aspect to be addressed by KPK. Dadang said that a situational security management approach could be carried out. This is preceded by the need to conduct a security survey which primarily needs to look at aspects of risk analysis. This risk measurement is crucial given the potential danger to KPK employees in all units without exception, from the leadership to the employees. For this reason, KPK even needs to prepare a different security mechanism and approach in each individual and unit, according to their respective risk levels. So that KPK in this case needs to consider raising a unit that takes care of security in a higher structure.

Some of the situational security engineering efforts actually have been carried out by the KPK, for example in terms of technology utilization in the form of a panic button or installing security detection on each employee's equipment. However, it is acknowledged that it has not been implemented maximally. The KPK needs to review the extent to which forms of organic security or outsourcing are more relevant and effective right now.

Legal protection for whistle-blowers must be maximized

TII's research regarding the system of protection of reporters, witnesses and victims in corruption cases up to 2017 shows that there are at least 100 cases of threats of attacks on corruption revealers since 2004. This number continues to increase in line with the LPSK report data (Transparency International Indonesia, 2017).

In the study, the main problem experienced by corruption revealers was weak legal protection (Tempo, 2017). Even a dilemma arises when the reporter is a government employee who reports to his own agency's whistle-blowing system. Because, usually he will deal with a corrupt bureaucratic culture. So that it is not impossible that systematic efforts will emerge leading to career inhibition, exclusion, mutation, and even dismissal.

In terms of protecting witnesses from corruption cases, the situation is even worse. This is at least reflected in the case of a lawsuit against an expert witness at the trial. For example, a lawsuit by Nur Alam, the former Governor of Southeast Sulawesi who was sentenced to 15 years in prison at the appeal level in a corruption case. Nur Alam filed a lawsuit against Basuki Wasis, an expert witness from the Bogor Agricultural Institute proposed by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Kompas, 2018).

This situation is actually the same as the case of criminalization that often occurs against reporters of corruption. Law enforcers (police, prosecutors, and courts) seem to have the discretion to continue processing the criminal reports even if the law explicitly and clearly guarantees legal protection to the reporter. KPK needs to encourage the President to at least be able to make limited revisions to Government Regulation Number 43 of 2018 or make new regulations specifically regulating the protection of the public.

4. DETECTION, EDUCATION, AND PROSECUTION

Generally, this dimension is considered to get a moderate score. KPK's performance in the field of prosecution was well highlighted, especially in the good works that did not know the status / position, so that KPK was seen as working professionally. However, there are three out of nine indicators that have moderate scores, namely the dimensions of efficiency and professionalism related to the context of evidence and case administrative, such as orderly search letters and information related to the investigation report (BAP) which has leaked several times, and the lack of vision of asset recovery.

The two main indications of this aspect of professionalism are the declining conviction rate from 100 percent in 2017 to 79.10 percent in 2018, and the success rate in the pretrial hearing that has declined. From various information extractions, management of case management at the Task Force level needs to be addressed.

The KPK prosecution sector is regulated in Article 6 letter C of UU No. 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission. In the Article, it is explained that KPK has the duty to carry out preliminary investigations, full investigations and prosecutions of criminal acts of corruption.

Table 11: Trends in Enforcement by KPK 2016-2018

Action	2016	2017	2018	Amount
Preliminary investigations	96	123	164	383
Full investigations	99	121	199	419
Prosecutions	76	103	151	330

Incracht	71	84	104	259

Source: Statistics of Enforcement by KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2019)

It seems that the trend of KPK prosecution during the period of 2015-2018 is always increases. This should be appreciated, amid the issue of lack of human resources that always happen to KPK, but it still can be maximized.

Some issues related to the enforcement dimension:

Trial

a. Money laundering charges

KPK in the era of Agus Rahardjo's leadership still lacked the use of TPPU rules in every case handling. Data compiled from t KPK stated that throughout 2016 until 2018 the KPK only 15 cases that imposed with TPPU charges. Whereas if it is calculated, the last three years KPK has handled 313 cases. This shows that KPK does not yet have a vision for asset recovery, and only focuses on punishing the body.

Table 12: TPK Trends Based on Case Types 2016-2018

Case	2016	2017	2018
Procurement of goods / services	14	15	9
Permission	1	2	0
Bribery	79	93	78
Collection	1	0	0
Budget misuse	1	1	0
TPPU	3	8	4
Hindering the Legal Process	0	2	2
Total	99	121	93

Source: TPK Based on Case Type (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2019)

The relationship between TPPU and corruption is basically very close, both in terms of juridical and reality. For the juridical itself, corruption is specifically mentioned as one of the predicate crimes in Article 2 of UU No. 8 of 2010. This means that TPPU can be initiated by corruption. In addition, today's reality shows that the perpetrators of corruption will try to hide the assets obtained from corrupt practices. With the hidden assets, TPPU rules should be able to be imposed on every perpetrator of corruption.

At least there are 3 (three) advantages for KPK if they apply TPPU to the perpetrators of corruption. First, using the follow the money approach. Second, facilitate the prosecution field because it accommodates the principle of the burden of proof reversal. Third, maximize the asset recovery.

b. Determination of Corporate Suspects

At the end of 2016 the Supreme Court issued a regulation that answered legal issues so far related to corporate punishment. This is stated in the Supreme Court Regulation No. 13 of 2016 concerning Procedures for Criminal Cases by Corporations Handling. This rule simultaneously answers the impasse of law enforcers regarding the procedures for handling corporate criminal acts (procedural law), as well as defining mistakes made by individuals and / or corporations.

The regulation becomes new ammunition for the KPK. Evidently from 2016 to 2019 the KPK has set five corporations as corruption suspects. This should also be appreciated, because by setting the corporation as the subject of a crime it will narrow the possibility of the private sector to do corrupt practices. It is hoped that the enforcement towards corporate corruption needs to be more massive in the future. This is because corporations can be asked for criminal liability in the event that the corporation receives the benefits of the crime.

Table 13: List of Corrupt Corporations

No	Corporations	Case	Tahun
1	PT Duta Graha Indah	Corruption case at the auction of construction projects of the Special Hospital for Infection and Tourism of Udayana University in the 2009 and 2010 Budget Years.	2017
2	PT Tuah Sejati dengan kontraktor Nindya Karya	Corruption case for the construction of the Unloading Pier in the Sabang Free Trade Zone and free port which was funded by the 2006-2011 National Budget.	2018
3	PT Nindya Karya	Corruption case for the construction of the Unloading Pier in the Sabang Free Trade Zone and free port which was funded by the 2006-2011 National Budget.	2018
4	PT Putra Ramadhan	In 2016-2017, PT Tradha allegedly used the identities of five other companies to win eight projects in Kebumen Regency with a total project value of Rp. 51 billion allegedly receiving money from contractors which was a project fee in the Kebumen Regency around Rp 3 billion. The money is considered as debt.	2018
5	PT Merial Esa	Case of alleged bribery in the management of the Sea Security Agency (Bakamla) for the project of monitoring satellites and drone procurement in the 2016 Revised State Budget.	2019

Source: processed from various sources

c. Indictment

· Average Indictments

Basically, the Judge will decide on a case based on the conviction and completeness of the evidence as stated in Article 183 of the KUHP. In addition to dropping a verdict the Judge was also bound to the indictment which was used as a juridical basis in implementing the rules and everything that was proven during the trial.

Table 14: Average Trends in Indictments

Туре	2016	2017	2018			
Number of Defendants	75	81	113			
Average indictments	66 months	67 months	67 months			
Overall average	67 months/s	67 months/5 years 7 months				

Source: processed from various sources

During the period of 2016 to 2018 the KPK has presented 269 defendants at the trial. If viewed from the average prosecutions, the anti-bribery institution prosecute corruptors for 5 years 7 months in prison or in the medium category. Whereas many Articles in the UU Corruption Eradication allow penalties of up to 20 years in prison, even for life.

The overall verdict as a whole is increasing, but not as significant as we expected, as you can see for yourself in 2016, the average verdict in 2017 is not even different. ICW noted that the verdict in the District Court was on average of 2 years 3 months, a high court average of 2 years 8 months, while the Supreme Court was 5 years 9 months. If it is carried out on average in all three courts, the average Corruption sentence for corruptors in 2018 is around 2 years 5 months. The average corruption verdict in 2018 alone rises by 3 months compared to 2017. In 2017 the average corruption sentence was 2 years 2 months with details of 2 years 1 month at the district court level, 2 years 2 months at the high court level, and 5 years at the MA level. In 2016 the average corruption sentence was 2 years 2 months with details of 1 year 11 months in the district court, 2 years 6 months at the high court level, and 4 years 1 month at the MA level. Even though there is an increase, the verdict is still considered low.

Disparity in lawsuits

The issue of disparity almost always arises when monitoring judges' decisions or law enforcer indictments. This issue must be made an important note, because after all it will have an impact on the sense of justice, both from the side of the defendant and the community as a side that affected by corruption.

For example, the bribery case of Anang Basuki, the aide of the former head of the East Java Agriculture Service involved in the bribery case, was only charged with 1.5 years in prison by the KPK. While Kasman Sangaji, the Lawyer of Saipul Jamil who was also involved in bribery cases was prosecuted a maximum of 5 years in prison. Even though the two defendants were simultaneously charged with Article 5 paragraph (1) of the UU on the Eradication of Corruption Crimes.

In addition, the disparity in indictments also occurred when the KPK charged with articles relating to state losses. Budi Rachmat Kurniawan, former GM of PT Hutama Karya, was only sued for 5 years in prison. In fact, the concerned party has caused financial losses of Rp. 40 billion. Whereas Irvanto Hendra Pambudi, Former Director of PT Murakabi Sejahtera was sued for 12 years in the case of the EI KTP procurement. Both were charged with similar rules, namely Article 2 and Article 3 of the Law on the Eradication of Corruption Crimes.

In addition, KPK public prosecutor was also considered not consistent in prosecuting. In some cases where the state loss is estimated to be very large, the indictments are actually quite light. Guidelines are needed in the context of prosecution so that the gap can be filled. The catching at act approach that is currently being carried out also needs to be considered again. Because in some cases, as reported in the case of buying and selling of positions in the Ministry of Religion involving politicians from the United Development Party, Romahurmuziy, KPK allegedly violated legal procedures because it was not preceded by legal preliminary investigation, full investigation and acquisition of sufficient evidence.

· Revocation of political rights

Revocation of political rights is one of the additional types of penalization stipulated in a number of laws and regulations. Article 10 jo Article 35 of the Criminal Code (KUHP) regulates this matter. For cases of corruption, revocation of political rights is regulated in Article 18 paragraph (1) letter d of the Eradication of Corruption Crimes UU.

From ICW monitoring from 2016-2018 KPK has at least prosecuted 88 defendants from the political dimension. However, which was quite disappointing, KPK only demanded that 42 defendants to be deprived of their political rights.

The thing that should be regretted was when KPK did not demand the revocation of political rights over the defendant Sri Hartini, the Regent of Klaten. The reason stated by the Prosecutor at the time was that the indictment of imprisonment was high enough that there was no need to revoke political rights. Whereas the purpose of both is clearly different. Prison sentences are intended so that the person can feel the deterrent effect of the crime committed. While the revocation of political rights is intended so that the person cannot occupy a certain position.

Case arrears

ICW noted that there were at least 18 corruption cases that were quite huge which were still in arrears by KPK. These cases can be seen in the table below:

Table 15: List of Arrears of Large Corruption Cases

two suspects but has not Based on the decision of d, Innospec has proven for General of Oil and Gas and former Processing
1

		Director of Pertamina Suroso Atmomartoyo. A total of 5 people were banned abroad. Suroso finally got the court's verdict.
2.	Bailout Bank Century	It only apprehended two perpetrators, namely the former Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia, Budi Mulya and Siti Fajriah. The main actor behind the Century scandal has yet to be revealed.
3.	Construction Project in Hambalang	For the gratification case, KPK established one actor, namely the former Democratic Party Chairman, Anas Urbaningrum. Meanwhile, in the case of alleged abuse of authority, four people were named suspects, namely Andi Mallarangeng (former Minister of Youth and Sports), Teuku Bagus Muhammad Noor (former head of PT Adhi Karya), Head of Kemenpora Finance and Household Bureau Deddy Kusdinar, and Director of PT Dutasari Citralaras Machfud Suroso. In the results of the BPK audit, many parties were involved in the Hambalang project corruption case.
4.	Kemenpora Athletes Guesthouse Project in South Sumatra	Mindo, Wafid, Anggelina, Nazaruddin have been processed. PDIP party politicians, namely IWK, which are said to receive money, have not yet been processed.
5.	Bribery in selection of Bank Indonesia Deputy Governor (Flight Check)	Only apprehend the recipients (DPR members) and bribery intermediaries (Nunung Nurbeti), and beneficiaries (Miranda Goeltom) but have not apprehended the porter / giver of the traveler's check
6.	Ministry of Forestry SKRT Project	Just apprehend Director of PT Masaro Radiokom, Putranefo and Owner of PT Masara Radiokom, Anggoro Widjojo. The names of other actors such as DA who along with Anggoro bribed and 2 Ministry of Forestry officials who received bribes were not yet named as suspects. Likewise with MS Kaban, the former Minister of Forestry that said to be accepting bribes from Anggoro Widjojo
7.	Train Grants from Japan at the Ministry of Transportation	Only Soemino, the former Director General of Railways, was processed. A number of other actors in the ranks of the Ministry of Transportation have not been clearly processed legally yet. The state loss / proceeds of corruption amounting to Rp. 20 billion is allegedly not seized by KPK.
		Whereas the indictment stated that Soemino was together with Asriel Syafei as Director of Safety and Facilities Engineering at the Directorate General of Railways. He was also charged with corruption along with three Japanese businessmen, Hiroshi Karashima, Hideyuki Nishio and Daiki Ohkubo.
8.	Project of Medical Devices Procurement at the Ministry of Health	Apprehend the former Minister Achmad Sujudi, the Corruption Proceeds amounting to Rp. 41.9 billion was allegedly not confiscated by KPK and deposited into the state treasury. A

		number of bribe recipients (from the Ministry and the private sector) have not been processed into investigations yet.
9.	SIM Simulators Procurement at the National Police Dirlantas	Only Djoko Susilo that was sentenced to prison yet. Brigjen Didik is still in the trial process. Recipients of money laundering funds owned by Djoko Susilo and members of DPR suspected of receiving bribes have not been detained by KPK
10.	Construction of the Tarahan power plant project in 2004	Only Emir Moeis was named a suspect and sentenced to 3 years in prison (April 13, 2014). PT Alstom and Marubeni Incorporate through the intermediary of Pacific Resources Inc. President Pirooz Muhammad Sarafi who gave a bribe to Emir in the amount of USD 357,000 has not been legally processed.
11.	"Fat Account" of a Police General	Investigation efforts against Komjen Budi Gunawan failed to take place after the existence of a Pre-Judicial decision from Judge Sarpin Rizaldi. The case was then forwarded to the Prosecutor's Office and then to the Police. The fact is that there is no explicit explanation from KPK regarding the coordination and supervision of this case.
12.	Bakamla bribery case	Fahmi Al-Habsy, who is said to be the brain behind the Bakamla case, and has been named at the hearing, has not yet been successfully presented as a witness for questioning.
13.	Bribery for the Clerk of the Central Jakarta District Court	Nurhadi Abdurachman has not been detained by KPK since being named a suspect in alleged corruption in the form of bribery to the Central Jakarta District Court clerk regarding a lawsuit involving the Lippo Group Likewise with his aides who came from the Police, and have not succeeded in being presented as witnesses in the same case
14.	PT Garuda Indonesia Airways Rolls Royce Bribery	Soetikno Soedardjo and Emirsyah Satar have been named as suspects, but have not yet been detained by the KPK
15.	BLBI Corruption	After the verdict of Syafruddin Arsyad Temenggung, KPK has not followed up on the verdict at the trial, which included, among other things, the involvement of Sjamsul Nursalim, Itjih Nursalim, and Dorodjatun. This case caused a state financial loss of Rp.4.5 trillion
16.	Bank Century Corruption	After the verdict against Budi Mulya, KPK has not followed up on the results of the decision. The latest development, KPK is still exploring the roles of other parties suspected of being involved in the case and mentioned in the KPK Prosecutor's indictment
17.	Pelindo II Corruption	Former Director of PT. Pelindo II, RJ Lino, which has been determined by the KPK as a suspect in alleged corruption in the procurement of the quay container crane (QCC), has not yet

		been detained, and there has been no significant development in the case.
18.	Corruption of E-ID	In the charges of Irman and Sugiharto, dozens of politicians participated in receiving funds from the E-ID procurement project

Source: processed from various sources

In this point it is important to remember that every criminal case will be limited to expiration date. In criminal acts of corruption regarding the expiration of the criminal period refer to Article 78 paragraph (1) number 4 of the KUHP which states that regarding crimes that are threatened with capital punishment or life imprisonment, the expiration date is eighteen years.

In the case of Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance, in the verdict of Syafruddin Arsyad Tumenggun, Head of the National Bank Refinement Agency (BPPN), it has clearly stated the involvement of other parties that harmed the state's finances in the amount of Rp 4.58 trillion. The names mentioned include: Sjamsul Nursalim, Itjih Nursalim, and Dorodjatun. Having already mentioned those names should be the capital for the KPK to follow up on this case. Because if we look at the temporal delays of this case, then in 2022 it will potentially become expired.

• Catch in the Act Operations (Operasi Tangkap Tangan)

In the context of case handling, according to criminal law experts there are differences in the current method of the KPK and the previous period. The weakness of the KPK case handling is currently mainly reflected in the context of evidence and case administrative. In law enforcement administration needs to be addressed, such as search or investigation order. The leaders seem to prioritize certain case solving models, where there are still quite a lot of investigation order debt in the previous year.

The level of effectiveness of KPK's success must be determined from case building cases. Indeed, proofing the OTT case is more difficult because it has to be tapped, but after being caught, handling the case will be much faster—not even one year certainly have been sentenced, because both the perpetrators and the evidence have been obtained. Unlike case building, this approach requires expertise in calculating state losses. In this case KPK cooperates with the BPK and KAP.

State losses in e-KTP cases, for example, have been resolved for almost 2 years because they have to check in four state jurisdictions. In terms of case handling, the operational capital is far greater. Whereas bribery is less risky because the regional head is arrested, so there is no counterattack for the KPK.

5. EDUCATION, PREVENTION, AND OUTREACH

In general, this dimension is considered to be good. There are two out of nine indicators in prevention that have a moderate score. The moderate score is the absence of strategic planning for prevention activities, and the lack of coordination and supervision efforts that are mainly regarding to other law enforcement institutions, namely the National Police and the Attorney General's Office.

The lack of structured planning in KPK prevention programs can also be seen from the presence of ACLC, as well as target-group-based programs (young people, women, and vulnerable groups), which

still do not have a long-term roadmap and strategy. On the other hand, the presence of Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018 concerning the National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption can help the KPK focus more on targeted prevention dimensions. KPK is considered to necessary to more massively carry out socialization, dissemination and public campaigns related to the initiative of the Stranas for PK. In addition, the Korsupgah program, especially in 9 regions, is considered have not been focused especially in the context of regional governments assistance in the framework of the Stranas PK.

Some issues related to the dimensions of prevention:

The level of compliance of the Regional Government to the prevention proposals offered by the KPK only reached 58%

In the KPK's Korsupgah report as of 8 February 2019, the level of achievement of the National Korsupgah Action Plan was only 58% in 8 intervention areas in 542 Local Government entities.³ Out of the 8 intervention areas, the ASN management component (45%) and optimization of regional income (38%) were found to be the lowest (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2018). Although there has been a fundamental change in the Korsupgah mechanism where there is integration with the law enforcement sector, in fact the KPK has not gotten maximum results.

In the context of preventing political corruption, coordination and capacity building of local governments need to be highlighted by KPK. This is based on the fact that many regional officials have recently become suspects/netted by OTT. Civil society encouraged KPK to accelerate the implementation of the Korsupgah's recommendations. KPK needs to encourage regional governments to immediately prepare technicians to carry out e-planning, e-budgeting, and e-licensing as action plans.

• During 2015-2017, the level of compliance of state administrators to report LHKPN was still low with an average of 67.97%. Compliance with legislators is only around 30%.

One of the corruption prevention function carried out by the KPK is to narrow the potential for corruption by tracking the fairness of state administrators' assets. These efforts are carried out through a mechanism of examining the State Administrators Assets Report (LHKPN) with a compliance scheme that can be seen in the following table:

Table 16: LHKPN Compliance Trends

No.	Mandatory Reporter	2015	2016	2017	2018	Average per Mandatory Reporter
1.	Executive	76,78%	71,14%	78,70%	66,01%	73,15%
2.	Legislative	27,22%	30,19%	31,09%	39,41%	31,97%
3.	Judiciary	88,03%	90,59%	94,65%	48,03%	80,32%

³ The development of the National Korsupgah Action Plan is in 8 areas; namely: Regional Budget Planning and Budgeting, Procurement of goods and services, PTSP, APIP Capability, ASN Management, Village Funds, Regional Income Optimization, Regional Asset Management. It is planned to add one new component by 2019.

4.	BUMN/BUMD	79,60%	82,04%	82,43%	84,31%	82,09%
Aver	Average per year		68,49%	71,72%	63,78%	67,97%

Source: KPK Annual Report (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2019)

The level of compliance with LHKPN of state administrators during 2015-2017 is still not maximal, where each year the level of reporter is less than 80%. For the 2018 period, the level of compliance with national state assets reporting until August 3, 2018 amounts to around 52%. Regarding compliance with LHKPN, the required number of LHKPN as of August 3, 2018 is around 320 thousand people. Of this number, there have been around 165,000 reporter, so the level of compliance with LHKPN nationally is around 52% (Antara News, 2018).

From that trend, KPK's biggest homework is to encourage the level of compliance of legislative members with an average compliance rate of 29.50%. From KPK release regarding the level of compliance of provincial level legislators in 2018, all members of the DPRD DKI Jakarta with the total 106 people have never reported at all throughout 2018. Following DKI Jakarta, three other regions which is the DPRD of Lampung, Central Sulawesi and North Sulawesi also recorded zero percent in reporting its LHKPN (Tribun News, 2018). KPK needs to be strict with the mandatory reporter because the fact that the corruption practices found by KPK are also mostly coming from legislative members, both at the national and local levels. KPK needs to develop specific strategies to encourage compliance within legislative members.

Behind the note to accelerates the level of compliance, efforts to encourage the convenience of the LHKPN registration process itself have also been carried out by KPK by using technology assistance through the e-LHKPN application to facilitate reporting while increasing the level of compliance. In 2016, KPK also made a breakthrough in reporting the State Operator Assets Report (LHPKN), which is through e-LHKPN. Breakthroughs are carried out, related to the obligation of state administrators to report assets. This included in 2016 by launching the e-LHKPN application. Through this application, state administrators do not need to come to Jakarta to report their assets. In addition, it is also efficient in terms of time, because state administrators only have to access it through the internet.

• The level of compliance of KLOPD to form the Gratification Control Unit (UPG) is still far from expected, only 64% (362 out of 654 KLOPD)

In 2018, KPK has received reports of gratification for officials and regional heads of around Rp. 8.6 billion. KPK said that currently there are many officials who sternly reject gratification (Detik, 2018). This can be seen from the number of KLOPD that have implemented the SPG (Gratification Implementation System) at various stages. Some of the agencies that more advanced in implementing the SPG have even formed an UPG (Gratification Control Unit) as a room for forwarding gratification reports to the KPK and the dissemination of information about gratification to all employees.

However, out of a total of 654 institutions that are required to have an UPG, up to 2018 only 362 institutions have UPG. Even KPK acknowledged that from 362 UPGs that had been formed, it is likely that almost half of them have not been effective. The main obstacle is the lack of support from the highest leadership such as no funding support from the Regional Officials or the Minister.

Evaluating this, KPK needs to develop a strategy to accelerate the formation of UPG in the institution as well as assist the implementation process. It is also important for KPK to encourage the

strengthening of UPG institutions based on typical problems in each institution. KPK also needs to encourage the acceleration of the Government Regulation Draft (RPP) on Gratification Control so that the Ministry of Law and Human Rights will soon finalize it. This is expected to create more systematic gratification control, including for companies, because it not only prevents officials from receiving but also ensures that companies that come into contact with government agencies do not provide gratuities. Another thing that needs to be considered is the threshold of gratification that is in accordance with the Indonesian context.

Another thing that needs to be appreciated is the desire of KPK to facilitate access to gratification learning. KPK has launched Gratification e-learning at the celebration of the Anti-Corruption Festival in Bandung, December 10 2015 which can be accessed through the website http://www.kpk.go.id/gratifikasi. On this site, 12 learning modules are available to be studied independently by users. In addition, the KPK also launched a means of reporting gratification through the KPK GOL application. Through this KPK GOL, the recipients of the goods allegedly indicated as gratification goods, can immediately report through the application on the three platforms.

 KPK does not yet have an education strategy roadmap for target groups, especially for vulnerable groups.

KPK can be said to have made many innovations to provide anti-corruption related public education through several target groups. Initiatives that target groups of young people, children, women, teachers, and others should be appreciated. The presence of ACLC also plays a role as a center of excellence, a learning center, and a coordinator for pool of trainers.

Activities that target various target groups are certainly very good where anti-corruption knowledge and capacity continues to increase. However, these activities should not only be programmatic, and do not have long-term planning. For example, alumni from the Teacher Super Camp and Anti-Corruption Youth Camp were not accompanied or their activities were not followed up. For this reason, KPK needs to develop a roadmap for education strategies in each target group because of their specificity. In addition, the substance of human rights and gender needs to be strengthened so that these groups can have sensitivity to these issues. KPK also needs to encourage the focus of education on disability groups and indigenous groups.

• Stranas PK under the coordination of the Corruption Eradication Commission has not maximally carried out socialization to the public.

The Presidential Decree for the 2018 Stranas PK that just passed by President Jokowi shows the synergy between state institutions. KPK as the coordinator of the National Corruption Prevention Team needs to oversee and ensure that the 11 action plans that have been prepared are implemented properly. The involvement of KPK in the institutionalization of the National Team for the Prevention of Corruption as stated in the Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018 regarding the National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption can be a trigger mechanism in terms of preventing corruption in the bureaucratic body (Setkab, 2018).

Regarding this condition, KPK as the coordinator of the Stranas PK has not given any special attention to develope a model for institutionalizing public participation in the Stranas PK (Transparency International Indonesia, 2018). So far, the involvement of civil society in the regions has not been optimal. Local governments still consider the role of civil society as a mere formality and therefore tend to only involve limited social organizations that are actually irrelevant and incompetent.

Based on the experience of implementing the previous Stranas PPK, it is important to look for models of political participation of civil society in all stages of management of the Stranas PK. In principle, the model of civil society participation that ready to be developed: i) is still able to place them with a variety of issues and approaches. The diversity of issues and approaches in combating corruption will actually enrich existing strategies; ii) maintain and respect independence as a civil society. Equal relations between the National Team and civil society need to be safeguarded to ensure that there are genuine responses from the community as part of the stakeholders in combating corruption.

Socialization to the public, civil society and parties involved in the existence of the Stranas PK and its action programs in the regions is still lacking. The absence of this information has become an important factor which has resulted in a low level of community participation in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Stranas PPK and RAD PK. Therefore, both at the national level and in a number of regions, KPK as the coordinator of the Stranas PK National Team needs to encourage the socialization of the existence of the Stranas PK at the regional level, especially to stakeholders related to the Stranas PK priority program (local government, community organizations civil society, business community members, DPRD members).

Utilizing Behavioural Insights (BI)

Corruption prevention strategies also need to understand the complexity of human behavior which is very closely related to the process of decision making. The development of social psychology and behavioral economics research shows that decision making is influenced by human dependence on faulty intuition and mental shortcuts (Rusch, 2016), as well as social pressure. Rusch considers that the definition of advantages and disadvantages of the decision-making process is actually more based on emotion, rather than logic.

The need to use an approach that focuses on human behavior in anti-corruption policies has actually been pioneered by the OECD through public integrity systems since 2017 (OECD, 2017). The OECD considers that the anti-corruption approach needs to shift the focus from the previous entrapment and enforcement, to the promotion of value-based decisions in the public sector and society.

Efforts to deconstruct the process of human behavior in corrupt practices have also been studied for a long time by scientists, especially in the field of behavioral economics. One of the biggest contributors is Richard Thaler, a 2017 Nobel Prize winner in economics with Cass Sustein who initiated "nudge theory" - subtly directing individuals to make better decisions without limiting decision-makers' choices (Thaler & Sustein, 2008). This approach is different from classical economics schools which assume that human behavior is actually predictable.

In behavioral economics study, there are three fundamental views which are that 1) humans make 95% of their decisions based on mental shortcuts or rules of thumb (prioritizing moral and mental / heuristics); 2) humans filter out something (framing); and 3) basically, the market situation is inefficient because of scattered information that is imperfect (market inefficiencies).

From those three points of view, Thaler and Sustein argue that perhaps humans are indeed rational, but not always rational. There are several things that make them act irrationally. Because in reality, humans are often inconsistent in their ethical decisions than they admit to themselves. This is because we are susceptible to various cognitive biases (at least 200) that influence our ethical judgment.

It is this human irrationality that can ultimately help policy makers to make relevant and appropriate policies, such as those carried out by Barack Obama with The Social and Behavioral Science Team (SBST), or David Cameron with the Nudge Unit. In the last nine years, there have been more than 200 government agencies worldwide that apply behavioral insights to policies (World Bank, 2018). The purpose of this behavioral perspective on public integrity itself is to make things easier by removing barriers to ethical choices.

The application of behavioral insights (BI) in anti-corruption policies can at least be seen in two major dimensions. First as a reflective tool for existing policies and systems. BI can identify behavioral traps in the integrity system, such as a fat organizational structure, or a recruitment process that is not transparent, can cause certain integrity risks. This reflection on ethics has become the main strength of BI, especially in sectors prone to corruption.

The second dimension can be applied specifically and limited to encourage certain behaviors that are expected through the form of nudge. This is because BI is based on knowledge of human behavior bias, cognitive limitations, and social preferences. Some examples that can be done are declaring potential conflicts of interest, or informing the development of LHKPN that KPK has done. BI in this case seeks to raise moral references by using "moral reminders", creating commitments, and promoting trust-based rules.

The inclusive nature of BI implementation can also be used for many specific interventions, such as information campaigns, collective discussions, promotion of intrinsic motivation and civil involvement. This approach can help the National Team for National Corruption Prevention Strategy that led by KPK to determine campaign strategies and what socialization is suitable for a particular target group. BI is able to encourage how information is formed and presented, and with the encouragement of certain information, can encourage target groups to be involved.

Ultimately an important element that needs to be considered is leadership: leadership inspires behavior, and without leadership it is impossible to build a culture of integrity (Heywood et al. 2017). The importance of having leaders and authorities that represent high standards of integrity is crucial. President Joko Widodo and KPK need to explicitly lead the fight against corruption. Consistency applies 'walk the talk' to be an important reference for the public in this transition from 'corrupt' identity. The President can even recommend KPK to form a nudge unit in order to design a relevant and comprehensive corruption prevention strategy with the help of BI.

6. COOPERATION AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS

In general, the dimensions of cooperation between institutions are considered to be moderate. Aspects that have a moderate score include cooperation with law enforcement institutions (National Police and Prosecutors), as well as lack of access to cooperation with marginalized groups.

• Strengthening the coordination and supervision with the National Police and Attorney General's Office

KPK is considered has to improve cooperation and supervision patterns with other law enforcement agencies, especially the National Police—even if viewed from other parameters such as SPDP reporting from the Police and the Attorney General's Office, which reaches an average of 921 SPDP per year is quite good (Eradication Commission Corruption, 2019). This increase was especially

important after the emergence of various conflicts involving internal investigators and investigators from the National Police.

In addition, due to limited human resources, in the follow-up process of the complaint, KPK also collaborated with other institutions such as the Government Internal Supervision Apparatus (APIP), the Supervisory Body (Bawas), and the Judicial Commission.

· The intervention of marginalized groups needs to be improved

KPK has several outreach programs to certain groups, such as women's groups through the SPAK (*I Am Anti-Corruption Woman*) program and a group of young people through the Youth Camp program. But other than that, KPK does not yet have a specific intervention strategy and data sorting for marginalized groups, such as groups of people with disabilities and indigenous groups.

· Strategies and patterns of public communication need to be addressed

Another important thing to note is that KPK's public communication pattern is quite bad, especially with other state institutions. As law enforcers, KPK feels that it is only appropriate to say the legal findings that are available, and not present matters that do not have permanent legal force, and are often noted to have presented various controversial statements, such as the following:

1. Saut Situmorang related to HMI/Islamic Student Association (5 May 2016)

"The character and integrity of this nation is very fragile. Good people in this country become evil when they are in office. Just look at those political figures who are all smart people. These people are intelligent people. I always say that at HMI at least they will join LK-1. Yes, they are graduated, smart. But once they are in the office they became an evil, greedy cheat. This is because of what, the system is not working "(Beritagar, 2016)

2. Laode M Syarif related to the Bribery Case for Reclamation in Jakarta (April 5, 2016)

"So, don't look at the Rp. 1 billion bribes, but this is really grand corruption because there are lots of tentacles" (Detik, 2016)

3. Agus Rahardjo related to E-ID Corruption Case (March 3, 2017)

"If you listen to the indictments that are read, you will be very surprised. Many people (big-red) whose names will be mentioned there "(JPNN, 2017)

4. Agus Rahardjo related to Regional Head Candidates will become Suspects (March 6, 2018)

"90 percent of it will be suspected for some. Not 90 percent of participants [Pilkada]" (Tirto, 2018)

5. Agus Rahardjo related to the DPR's Inquiry Rights Committee (31 August 2017)

"We are considering, for example, if this continues (article), we can apply the obstruction of justice" (CNN Indonesia, 2017)

6. Agus Rahardjo regarding the rotation of KPK employees (August 16, 2018)

"I don't want to comment on that. It's internal affairs, don't resolve it and invite outsiders please," he said at the Parliament Complex, Senayan, Jakarta, Thursday, August 16, 2018. (Tempo, 2018)

7. Alexander Marwata related to alleged violations of ethics of the Deputy for Enforcement (September 24, 2018)

"I think it is very reasonable when a (former) Kapolda meets with the head of the region, there is also a Danrem in the occasion of separation. There is nothing to discuss regarding the meeting and Mr. Firli, Deputy of Enforcement, has conveyed to the leaders," said KPK Deputy Chair Alexander Marwata in his office, Jalan Kuningan Persada, South Jakarta, Monday (9/24/2018). (Seconds, 2018)

8. Alexander Marwata related to the role of women in preventing corruption (March 6, 2019)

"Our hope when we have a family they can also be a bodyguard for the husbands, because many husbands who fall into the crime of corruption are among others encouraged by their wives," Alex said at the KPK Red and White Building when he received a visit by 39 Putri Indonesia finalists. This statement is considered sexist and very gender biased.

Table 17: Assessment Summary – Indicators by Dimension

DIMENSIONS	INDICATORS								
Independence & Status	Institutional independence	Appointment and removal of commissioners	Mandate	Jurisdiction	Investigative & prosecutorial powers	Powers to report & enforce recommendations	Legal autonomy	Operational autonomy	Political use of powers
Human Resources & Budget	Proportion of budget	Sufficiency of budget	Security & stability of budget	Staff salary & benefits	Staff selection	Investigation & prosecution expertise	Prevention & education expertise	Staff training	Stability of staff
Accountability & Integrity	Annual reporting	Responsiveness to information requests	External oversight mechanisms	Internal review mechanisms	Adherence to due process	Willingness of complainants to identify themselves	Complaints handling	Outcome of complaints	Internal intgerity mechanisms
Detection, Investigation & Prosecution	Accessibility to complainants/ informants	Responsiveness to corruption complaints	Proactive investigation	Efficiency & professionalism	Prosecution rate	Conviction rate	Investigation of influential persons	Restitution & asset recovery	Perception of performance
Education, Prevention & Outreach	Allocated budget	Strategic planning	Anticorruption learning & development	Organizational reviews	Prevention recommendations	Research	Dissemination & campaigns	Online communication	
Cooperation & External Relations	Confidence in government support to ACA	Cooperation with other integrity agencies	Cooperation with non- governmental organizations	International networks	Cooperation with other countries	Accessibility to marginalized groups			

Table 18: Detail Indicator Scores, with Sources and Comments

INDICATOR		INDICATOR VALUE	S	JUSTIFICATION OF SCORE AND DATA SOURCES
	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	
A. Independent	ce and Status (9 ind			
1. Institutional independenc e	Within the police or ministry	Separate agency accountable to a ministry	Statutory or constitutional agency accountable to the legislature	Based on article 3 of Law No. 30/2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission, stated that the Corruption Eradication Commission is a state institution that carries out its duties and authorities independently and free from the influence of any power. Sources: UU Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi KPK Lembaga Eksekutif atau Independen? (Kontan, 2017) (https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/kpk-lembaga-eksekutif-atau-independen) KPK usul jadi satu-satunya lembaga tangani kasus korupsi (IDN Times, 2019) (https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/santi-dewi/kpk-usul-jadi-satu-satunya-lembaga-tangani-kasus-korupsi/full)

2. Appointment and removal of Commission er(s)	Prime Minister/ President/ Head of State makes the appointment decision with no safeguards for ensuring impartiality	A ministerial committee makes the appointment decision with some safeguards in place to ensur
	transparent procedure) AND Commissioners do not have a fixed term and can easily be replaced	(such as a transparent procedure) AND/OR Commissioner have a fixed term (without tenure) but it is not difficult to remove them

An independent committee makes the appointment decision with strona safeguards in place to ensure impartiality (including a transparent procedure) AND Commissioners have a fixed term (with tenure) and cannot be removed without proven cause (e.g. incompetence or misconduct)

The mechanism for the appointment of KPK Commissioners is regulated in Article 30 of Law No. 30/2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission stated that the Chairperson of the Corruption Eradication Commission as referred to in Article 21 paragraph (1) letter a is chosen by the Republic of Indonesia People's Representative Council based on prospective members proposed by the President of the Republic of Indonesia. The selection mechanism is regulated in paragraph (2), namely that the Government establishes a selection committee tasked with implementing the provisions stipulated in this Law. Then the People's Legislative Assembly is obliged to select and determine the 5 (five) candidates needed as referred to in paragraph (9), within no later than 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of the proposal from the President of the Republic of Indonesia. All these mechanisms are carried out transparently.

The mechanism of the KPK Commissioner's removal is regulated in Article 32 of Law No. 30/2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission that the dismissal of the Commissioner can only be carried out because: pass away, ended his/her term of office, became a defendant for a crime; unable to remain or continuously for 3 months unable to carry out their duties, resign, or be subject to sanctions under this Act. When he becomes a suspect, the relevant Commissioner is suspended from his position.

If seen from the practice, the KPK leadership's security of tenure is very weak. This is due to three things, firstly the requirement to terminate the leadership only if he/she becomes a suspect so that the potential for abuse of power by other institutions is very large. This can be seen from the number of leaders of this institution who were forced to be dismissed as a result of the Polri's involvement in the "Cicak vs Buaya". The second factor is there is no immunity rights to KPK leaders during their tenure so that they are very vulnerable to being criminalized---even for limited impunity. The third factor speaks of a long-term composition where the structure of direct leadership changes totally in one period, there is no staggering mechanism (eg involving two leaders

				automatically for the next period) so that work and evaluation must be rebuilt from the start. Sources: UU Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi
3. Mandate	Education and prevention without investigation	Primary focus on investigation	Focus on investigation and as well as education and prevention	Based on Article 6 of Law No. 30/2002, the Corruption Eradication Commission has five functions, namely: 1. Coordination with agencies authorized to eradicate corruption; 2. Supervision of agencies authorized to eradicate corruption; 3. Conducting investigations, investigations and prosecutions of criminal acts; 4. Conduct preventive actions for corruption; 5. Monitor the implementation of state governance. Issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018 concerning the National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption strengthens the role of the KPK in implementing prevention strategies. The Government considers that Presidential Regulation Number 55 of 2012 concerning the National Strategy for the Prevention and Eradication of Long-Term Corruption in the Year 2012-2025 and the Medium-Term Year 2012-2014 is no longer in line with developments. According to this Perpres, the focus of the National Strategy for Preventing Corruption (National Strategy for PK) includes: a. licensing and trading system; b. finance; and c. law enforcement and bureaucratic reform, which is elaborated through PK Action.

				In order to implement the National Strategy for PK, a National Team for the Prevention of Corruption was formed, hereinafter referred to as the National Team PK, which is regulated in article 4 paragraph (1). PK National Team, according to this Perpres, consists of ministers who carry out government affairs in the field of national development planning, ministers that carry out government affairs in the country, ministers who carry out government affairs in the field of state apparatus, heads of non-structural institutions that provide support to the President and Vice President in implementing control of national priority programs and management of strategic issues, as well as elements of the leadership of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Sources: UU Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Perpres Nomor 54 Tahun 2018 tentang Strategi Nasional Pencegahan Korupsi Pemerintah Bentuk Tim Nasional Pencegahan Korupsi (Setkab, 2018) (https://setkab.go.id/perpres-no-542018-pemerintah-bentuk-tim-nasional-
4.	Only public	Both public and	Both public and	pencegahan-korupsi/) Based on article 11 of Law No. 30/2002, in carrying out the tasks referred to in
Jurisdiction	sector at the national level	private sector but only at the national level OR only public sector but at both national and sub- national levels	private AND at both national and sub- national level	Article 6 letter c, the Corruption Eradication Commission has the authority to carry out investigations, investigations and prosecution of corruption that: 1. involving law enforcement officials, state administrators, and other people related to criminal acts of corruption committed by law enforcement officials or state administrators; 2. get attention that is troubling the community; and / or 3. concerning state losses of at least Rp. 1,000,000,000.00 (one billion rupiah).

Article 20 Paragraph (1) and Paragraph (2) of the Law a quo explicitly states: (1) "In the case of a criminal act of corruption carried out by or on behalf of a corporation, then the demands and imposition of criminal acts can be carried out against the corporation and / or its management" (2) "The criminal act of corruption is carried out by the corporation if the criminal act is carried out by people whether based on work relations or based on other relationships, acting in the corporate environment both alone and together". Article 20 Paragraph (1) Corruption Law can be applied to management, while Article 20 Paragraph (2) Corruption Law can be applied to corporations.

In accordance with the law's mandate, the KPK was not given direct authority to investigate private sector corruption cases. The authority of private sector corruption investigations will be included in the revised KUHP (bribery in the private sector). But getting around this legal impasse, the KPK has used Regulation No. MA. 13 of 2006 concerning Procedures for Handling Corporate Criminal Acts. As per the regulation, the KPK can not only reduce individual, but also corporate responsibility.

In addition, the KPK has also formed a Regional Advocacy Committee (KAD) which serves as a means of dialogue between employers and regulators to discuss strategic issues of corruption prevention. The formation of KAD is expected to form good communication so that there are no frauds, especially in the procurement of goods and services.

Sources:

UU Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi

Peraturan MA No. 13 Tahun 2006 tentang Tata Cara Penanganan Tindak Pidana Korporasi

				Perkuat pencegahan korupsi sektor swasta, KPK bentuk KAD Sulawesi Selatan (KPK, 2018) https://www.kpk.go.id/id/berita/berita-kpk/649-perkuat-pencegahan-korupsi-sektor-swasta-kpk-bentuk-kad-sulawesi-selatan)
5. Investigative & prosecutorial powers	Few or no powers	Some powers	Extensive powers including the power to initiate investigations and/or prosecutions	Based on Article 12 paragraph 1 of Law No. 30/2002, in carrying out the tasks of investigation, investigation and prosecution as referred to in Article 6 letter c, the Corruption Eradication Commission is authorized: 1. tapping and recording conversations; 2. ordered the relevant agencies to prohibit someone from traveling abroad; 3. requesting information from a bank or other financial institution about the financial condition of a suspect or defendant being examined; 4. instruct banks or other financial institutions to block accounts suspected of being the result of corruption belonging to the suspect, defendant or other related party; 5. instructs the leader or superior of the suspect to temporarily dismiss the suspect from his position; 6. requesting the suspect or defendant's wealth data and tax data to the relevant agencies; 7. pause a financial transaction, trade transaction, and other agreements or temporary revocation of licenses, licenses and concessions that are carried out or owned by a suspect or defendant allegedly based on sufficient initial evidence relating to criminal acts of corruption being examined; 8. request assistance from Interpol Indonesia or other state law enforcement agencies to conduct searches, arrests, and confiscation of evidence abroad

				9. ask for help from the police or other relevant agencies to carry out arrests, detention, searches and seizures in cases of corruption that are being handled. Sources: UU Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi UU No. 8 Tahun 2010 tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang Respons KPK Soal Rilis ICW Tentang Vonis Tren Korupsi 2018 (Tirto id, 2018) https://tirto.id/respons-kpk-soal-rilis-icw-tentang-vonis-tren-korupsi-2018-dniG.
6. Powers to report & enforce recommend ations	Few or no powers	Some powers	Extensive powers	In Law No. 30 of 2002 explained that the KPK has the authority to carry out monitoring tasks. In article 14, it is stated that the KPK in the context of monitoring has three authorities which include: a) conducting an assessment of the administrative management system in all state institutions and the government; b) advise the leaders of state institutions and the government to make changes if based on the results of the assessment, the administration management system has the potential for corruption; and c) report to the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Supreme Audit Agency, if the suggestion of the Corruption Eradication Commission regarding the proposed changes is not heeded. After conducting a study, the KPK can advise the leaders of state institutions and the government to make changes. This change will be recommended if based on the results of the assessment, the administration management system has the potential for corruption. With the emergence of Presidential Decree Number 54 of 2018 concerning the National Strategy for Preventing Corruption,

				the authority of the KPK, which is also the KPK, has the role of conducting the trigger mechanism, in carrying out its monitoring function the stronger. The KPK, which is a member of the PK National Team, can provide recommendations on the results of evaluating the implementation of the National Strategy for PK both for Ministries, Institutions, Regional Governments and other Stakeholders in accordance with Article 7 which covers 11 dimensions of action in accordance with the 2019-2020 Corruption Prevention Action. Sources: UU Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Perpres Nomor 54 Tahun 2018 tentang Strategi Nasional Pencegahan Korupsi
7. Legal	No legal	Some legal	Full legal	Based on article 3 of Law No. 30/2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication
autonomy	autonomy	autonomy	autonomy	Commission, stated that the Corruption Eradication Commission is a state institution that carries out its duties and authorities independently and free from the influence of any power.
				In accordance with the mandate of article 6 of Law No. 30 of 2002, the KPK has
				the freedom to conduct investigations and / or prosecutions. However, until now, the KPK Law does not regulate the existence of immunity rights for KPK Commissioners and employees to have legal immunity from criminal / civil prosecution for actions taken in carrying out their mandate.
				Sources:
				UU Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi
				Komisioner KPK Minta Hak Imunitas (CNN Indonesia, 2016)

				https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160929194138-12- 162218/komisioner-kpk-minta-hak-imunitas
8. Operational autonomy	Low degree of operational autonomy	Limited degree of operational autonomy	High degree of operational autonomy	Based on article 3 of KPK Regulation No. 3 of 2018, regarding the Organization and Work Procedure of the KPK, the Chairperson of the Corruption Eradication Commission has full authority to carry out functions that regulate the appointment and dismissal of someone to become an employee and advisor to the KPK. The mechanism is regulated in article 16 concerning the administration of the appointment, placement, transfer and dismissal of employees. In the field of prosecution, the KPK Law provides flexibility for the KPK to regulate its human resources. The KPK can recruit public prosecutors from the Attorney General's Office, while investigators can come from the National Police, investigating Civil Servants, or being appointed internally from the KPK. The KPK itself has appointed several investigators from internal status as permanent employees. On the other hand, civil servant investigators are also needed because they have various special skills taught by their respective agencies. Eradication of corruption needs to be multidisciplinary and diverse experiences.
				There are two problematic issues when the KPK wants involve law enforcer from other institutions: human resource management and conflict of interest issues. It should be noted that the Corruption Eradication Commission Law is considered to have shackled KPK's freedom in implementing independent human resource governance. This is due to the inclusion of structures that have been stated in the Act, making it difficult for the KPK to adapt to current and future needs. The main power of the anti-corruption institution was also assessed when the KPK could appoint its employees independently. Although the KPK can request assistance from the National Police and the Prosecutor's Office, Government Regulation (PP) Number 14 of 2017 concerning the Second Amendment to PP

No. 63 of 2005 concerning the Human Resource Management System the Corruption Eradication Commission only regulates a 10-year term of assistance, thus potentially creating multiple loyalties. In this case the KPK has become very dependent on the National Police and the Attorney General's Office in managing its human resources.

The turmoil between investigators appointed from the internal KPK and investigators from the National Police continued to risen over the past year, as protests sent by 42 KPK investigators from the National Police proved this. In a letter entitled "Responding to the Process of Transferring Employees in the Deputy Deputy of Allegedly Enforcing Enforcement in the Field of Procedure", they assessed that the appointment of independent investigators was not in accordance with existing regulations.

Sources:

Peraturan KPK No. 3 Tahun 2018, tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja KPK

KPK akui masih butuh penyidik dari Polri (Tempo, 2019) (https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1202126/kpk-akui-masih-butuh-penyidik-dari-polri)

Pengangkatan 21 penyidik independen KPK dinilai sesuai konstitusi (Jawapos, 2019) (https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/hukum-kriminal/01/05/2019/pengangkatan-21-penyidik-independen-kpk-dinilai-sesuai-konstitusi/)

KPK pastikan tetap solid walau ada konflik internal penyidik (IDN Times, 2019) (https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/santi-dewi/kpk-pastikan-tetap-solid-walau-ada-konflik-internal-penyidik/full)

9. Political	Evidence of	Some evidence	Government	Based on article 3 of Law No. 30/2002 states that the Corruption Eradication
use of	widespread use	of limited	has not used	Commission is a state institution that carries out its duties and authority
powers	of ACA by	manipulation of	ACA as a tool	independently and free from the influence of any power.
	government as	ACA by	against political	
	a tool against	government for	opponents or	In carrying out its duties, the KPK firmly does not do politics in law enforcement.
	political	political motives	for political	Various cases of arrests of public officials, even from the Minister or political
	opponents		motives	parties that supporting the government, are still being carried out. President
				Jokowi repeatedly emphasized that all corruption cases were submitted to the KPK.
				However, there are limited indications of the potential for inhibition and selective cutting of cases - although of course they cannot be verified. These cases are
				mainly related to allegations of corruption in the National Police. This can be seen in a limited way in the stagnant handling of cases raised by IndonesiaLeaks which allegedly involved police officials. A few months later, the KPK's
				independent investigators also made a petition asking the KPK leadership to firmly not hinder the handling of cases.
				Sources:
				Soal pemberantasan korupsi, Jokowi bakal terus dukung KPK (Tribunnews, 2019)
				(http://www.tribunnews.com/pilpres-2019/2019/01/17/soal-pemberantasan-korupsi-jokowi-bakal-terus-dukung-kpk)
				Jokowi serahkan kasus dirut PLN Sofyan Basir ke KPK (CNN Indonesia, 2019)
				(https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190424114410-12-389144/jokowi- serahkan-kasus-dirut-pln-sofyan-basir-ke-kpk)

B. Financial a	and Human Resou	rces (9 indicators		Jokowi serahkan kasus dugaan korupsi di Kemenag ke KPK (VOA Indonesia, 2019) (https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/jokowi-serahkan-kasus-dugaan-korupsi-di-kemenag-ke-kpk/4839002.html) KPK tangkap Romi, TKN bukti Jokowi dukung penegakan hukum (Liputan 6, 2019) (https://www.liputan6.com/pilpres/read/3917957/kpk-tangkap-romi-tkn-bukti-jokowi-dukung-penegakan-hukum) Dukung KPK berantas korupsi, Jokowi bicara Timnas Cegah Korupsi (Detik, 2019) (https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4168914/dukung-kpk-berantas-korupsi-jokowi-bicara-timnas-cegah-korupsi) KPK Tebang Pilih (Indopos, 2018) (https://indopos.co.id/read/2018/10/10/151906/kpk-tebang-pilih)
10. Proportion of budget	Below 0.10% of government's total budget	Between 0.10% to 0.20% of government's total budget	Above 0.20% of government's total budget	In the last five years, the total proportion of the KPK budget to the APBN is estimated to be around 0,0003% - 0,0004% of the total APBN: a 2015 Budget: Rp. 624,180,262,000 (allocation of 0,0003% from Rp. 2,039.5 T APBN) b 2016 Budget: Rp. 898,908,900,000 (allocation of 0,0004% from Rp. 2,095.7 T APBN) c Budget 2017: Rp. 991,867,988,000 (allocation of 0,0004% from Rp. 2,080.5 T APBN) d Budget 2018: Rp. 849,539,138,000 (allocation of 0,0003% from Rp. 2,220.7 T APBN) e Budget 2019: Rp. 813,449,265,000 (allocation of 0,0003% from Rp. 2,461.1 T APBN)

11. Sufficiency of budget	Inadequate (less than 66% of budget request is approved) and relies on funding by CSOs and donor agencies	Adequate (66% to 79% of budget request is approved)	More than adequate (80% to 100% of budget request is approved)	Daftar Data APBN https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/dataapbn Daftar Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan In trend, the KPK budget request was approved in the range of 67%. As in the 2019 budget year, the KPK submitted a budget of Rp 1.9 trillion to target the number of 200 cases handled, but the DPR stated that the budget ceiling for the KPK was Rp 813 billion. While the 2016 budget submissions amounted to Rp. 1.1 T. The Indonesian House of Representatives then agreed on the KPK's budget for that year to be Rp. 898,908,900,000 or 81.71%. The adequacy of this budget is mainly very related to case handling costs. Based on information obtained by hukumonline, the details of the costs allocated at each law enforcement agency are not the same. In the Attorney General's Office, for example, the total cost of one corruption case is 200 million rupiah. The details are 25 million stages of investigation; 50 million stages of investigation; 100 million prosecution stages. The remaining 25 million is used for the cost of executing the verdict. In the police the cost of investigating and investigating corruption cases is not much different, a total of Rp.208 million per case. At the KPK until now it uses the ceiling system. The budget ceiling for the investigation phase is 11 billion rupiahs for projections of 90 cases. The investigation phase has a budget ceiling of 12 billion for projections of 85 cases. Meanwhile, for the prosecution and execution phase, 14,329 billion were allocated for 85 cases. In addition, there are still costs that are used for the execution of a criminal body amounting to 45 billion rupiahs.
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The lack of budget support for the KPK, especially for the establishment of regional offices, also needs attention. Until now, the Government and the Parliament have not agreed on the relevant budget allocation, even though the need for implementation and monitoring at the regional level is very important. Sources: Daftar KPK Laporan Tahunan https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Capain dan Kinerja KPK di tahun 2018 (KPK, 2019) (https://www.kpk.go.id/id/berita/siaran-pers/717-capaian-dan-kinerja-kpk-ditahun-2018 https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/teatrika/kpk-ajukan-anggaransebesar-rp-12-triliun-untuk/full) KPK ajukan pagu anggaran 2016 Rp 1,1 Triliun (CNN Indonesia, 2015) (https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20150915193013-12-78980/kpkajukan-pagu-anggaran-2016-rp-11-triliun) Mau tahu biaya penanganan perkara korupsi? Simak angka dan masalahnya Online. (Hukum 2016) (https://m.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5733f0ea01aea/mau-tahu-biayapenanganan-perkara-korupsi-sim ak-angka-dan-masalahnya) Rincian biaya penanganan perkara oleh KPK (Okezone, 2016) (https://news.okezone.com/read/2016/09/19/337/1492864/rincian-biayapenanganan-perkara-oleh-kpk) DPR bandingkan anggaran penanganan kasus KPK dengan Kejagung (Detik, (https://news.detik.com/berita/3650543/dpr-bandingkan-anggaran-2016) penanganan-kasus-kpk-dengan-kejagung)

12. Security & stability of budget	ACA budget has been reduced during past 3-5 years and/or the budget is not dispersed in a timely manner	ACA budget has not been reduced during past 3-5 years	ACA budget is guaranteed based on previous year's allocation and has not been reduced	Since 2015, the KPK budget can be said to be experiencing a volatile trend. The KPK's budget continues to increase, but has declined in the past two years. The decline was caused by the absorption of the KPK's budget which was not optimal. While distributing the budget through DIPA on time. The details of the budget can be seen as follows: • 2015 budget: Rp. 624,180,262,000 • 2016 budget: Rp. 898,908,900,000 • 2017 budget: Rp. 991,867,988,000 • 2018 budget: Rp. 849,539,138,000
13. Staff salary & benefits	Low salary and limited benefits (compared to similar public sector agencies)	Adequate salary and benefits (comparable with similar public sector agencies)	Competitive salary and benefits (comparable with private sector entities)	Ources: Daftar Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan The salary of KPK employees refers to Law 5 of 2014 concerning State Civil Apparatus in article 79 paragraph 2, where salaries are paid in accordance with the burden of responsibility, and the risk of work. Salary arrangements are also regulated in Government Regulation Number 53 of 2005 concerning the KPK Human Resource Management System. Article 14 states that: 1. Performance management includes setting goals, aligning competencies towards achieving goals and evaluating and measuring performance.

	education and training, employee development and employee compensation.
In F	PP 63 of 2005, article 15 states that:
	1. Compensation is given to employees as an award for positive contributions and / or services, including: a. salary; b. allowances; and c. incentives based on certain work performance.
	2. The salary of the Commission's employees as referred to in paragraph (1) letter a shall be determined based on competence and performance in accordance with employee contributions to the Commission.
	3. Salaries of Civil Servants employed on the Commission are calculated by reducing the amount of salary and allowances from the original agency.
	4. (4) Income Tax for compensation is borne by each employee.
	5. (5) The amount of compensation for employees of the Commission shall be determined through Commission Regulations.
	6. (6) The number of employees and expenditure requirements of the Commission's employees shall be determined not to exceed the employee's expenditure ceiling in the State Budget (APBN) allocated to the Commission. Not yet answered the question of how competitive the KPK's salary is with other institutions.
	n 2 November 2015, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) signed Government egulation Number 82 of 2015 concerning the Second Amendment to

Government Regulation Number 29 of 2006 concerning Financial Rights, Protocol Position and Security Protection of the Head of the Corruption Eradication Commission

This PP mainly changes Article 3, that the KPK Chairperson covers the amount of income which includes Basic Salary, Position Allowance and Honorary Allowance every month. Based on the PP, the basic salary of the KPK chairman and permanent deputy chairman was Rp. 5.04 million and Rp. 4.62 million respectively. Meanwhile, allowances have increased. The head office allowance rose from Rp.15.12 million to Rp24.82 million, and for the vice chairman rose from Rp.12.47 million to Rp20.48 million. The honorary allowance for the chairman rose from Rp1.46 million to Rp2.39 million, and for the vice chairman rose from Rp1.30 million to Rp.2.13 million.

Article 4 of the PP also confirms that in addition to the income as intended, the KPK leadership is given a Housing Allowance Facility, transportation allowances, health and life insurance and old-age benefits.

It was stated, the housing allowance for the chairman rose from Rp. 23.00 million to Rp. 37.75 million, and the allowance for the vice chairman rose from Rp. 21.28 million to Rp. 34.90 million.

The chairman's transportation allowances rose from Rp. 18 million to Rp. 29.54 million, and for the times the chairman rose from Rp. 16.65 million to Rp. 27.33 million. Meanwhile, health and life insurance benefits for the KPK chairman and vice chairman rose from Rp.2.20 million to Rp.16.33 million. The old age allowance for the Chair of the KPK was set to increase from Rp5.41 million to Rp8.06 and for the Deputy Chairperson it rose to Rp.6.81 million from Rp.4.59 million.

In the PP article 4 paragraph 2 states, the amount of housing allowances and transportation allowances as referred to is given directly in cash to the

14. Staff	Patronage and	Limited	Meritocratic and	concerned. Health and life insurance benefits are paid to insurance providers and pension funds determined by the Secretary General of the KPK or designated officials. Whereas the provision of Old Age Allowances for KPK leaders is a substitute for pension rights as state officials. Sources: Politikus PDIP tanya sistem gaji KPK: DPR tak pernah naik gaji (Detik, 2018) (https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4240442/politikus-pdip-tanya-sistem-gaji-kpk-dpr-tak-pernah-naik-gaji) Naik jadi Rp. 24 juta, ini daftar tunjangan baru pimpinan KPK (Liputan 6, 2015) (https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/2387383/naik-jadi-rp-24-juta-ini-daftar-tunjangan-baru-pimpinan-kpk) Selection of KPK employees is regulated in PP 103 of 2012 concerning
selection	non-transparent procedures and practices	meritocratic and/or transparent procedures and practices	transparent procedures and practices	Amendments to PP 63 of 2005 concerning KPK HR Management. This regulation regulates the selection process of KPK employees based on competency / expertise and carried out in an open, transparent and fair manner. But now the KPK has difficulty filling in several positions, especially strategic positions such as the Deputy Deputy and even the Secretary General. The KPK HR Team said that the graduation standard at the KPK was admittedly indeed very high, so that on several occasions it was quite difficult to find the right figure. The head of the KPK HR bureau — which was also just elected last March — said that currently the talent pool management is being carried out, in order to encourage the best talents who already have enough experience to register. Sources: PP 103 Tahun 2012 tentang Perubahan atas PP 63 Tahun 2005 tentang Manajemen SDM KPK

				Eks penyidik dari Polri kritik KPK (Tempo, 2019) https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1201968/97-eks-penyidik-dari-polri-kritik-kpk-begini-sikap-mabes Sudah bertemu, apa hasil dialog pimpinan penyidik KPK soal petisi? (IDN Times, 2019) (https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/santi-dewi/apa-hasil-pertemuan-penyidik-pimpinan-deputi-penindakan-dikembalikan-mabes-polri) Proses seleksi deputi penindakan KPK dikritik (Kabar 24, 2018) (https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20180327/16/754710/proses-seleksi-deputi-penindakan-kpk-dikritik-) KPK seleksi 19 calon penyidik baru dari Polri (Tirto id, 2019) (https://tirto.id/kpk-seleksi-19-calon-penyidik-baru-dari-polri-dnA5)
15. Investigation & prosecution expertise	Lacking expertise in many areas	Lacking expertise in some areas	High level of expertise	In the KPK's performance reports, it was also found that the level of suspects' determination declined in the last two years, from 100% in 2017 to 71% in 2018. With the increasing dimensions of corruption crimes and the use of technology, KPK investigators are required to adapt to needs. Losing several times the KPK in several pretrial also became an indicator. In addition, 18 major cases that have not been resolved need to be addressed. In this case, identification of employee skills needs to be done. Sources: Daftar Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan

16. Prevention & education expertise	Lacking expertise in many areas	Lacking expertise in some areas	High level of expertise	In the KPK's Korsupgah report as of 8 February 2019, the level of achievement of the National Korsupgah Action Plan was only 58% in 8 intervention areas in 542 Local Government entities. Of the 8 intervention areas, the ASN management component (45%) and optimization of regional income (38%) were found to be the lowest. Although there has been a fundamental change in the Korsupgah mechanism where there is integration with the law enforcement sector, in fact the KPK has not gotten maximum results. In addition, the mandate of the KPK in improving compliance with LHKPN and reporting on gratuities needs to be improved. Sources:
				Daftar Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Perkembangan Korsupgah KPK https://korsupgah.kpk.go.id/beranda/korsupgah/2018
17. Staff training	Training is unimportant and neglected	Some trained personnel with limited training opportunities and/or the training offered is not relevant	Well-trained personnel with many relevant training opportunities	As per the data in the KPK annual report, the number of education and training activities is as follows: • Year 2015: 149 activities • Year 2016: not available • Year 2017: not available • Year 2018: not yet available Budgets for education and training activities are not available.

				Sources: Daftar Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Daftar Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja
18. Stability of staff	High turnover and resignation rate (more than 10% per year)	Moderate turnover and resignation rate (more than 5% to 10% per year)	Low turnover and resignation rate (0% to 5% per year)	https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja As per the data in the KPK's annual report, the composition of KPK's HR stopped as follows: • Year 2018: not yet available • Year 2017: 47 people / 1557 employees (0.03%) • Year 2016: not available / 1124 employees • Year 2015: 65 people / 1141 employees (0.05%) Sources: Daftar Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja
C. Accountab	oility and Integrity	(9 indicators)		

19. Annual reporting	ACA submits its annual report to parliament but it is not available to the public and/or it is made publicly available but it is very short on substantive detail	The ACA submits its annual report to parliament and it is made publicly available but the report is somewhat limited in the level of information it provides	Comprehensive information on ACA is provided in annual report which is submitted to parliament and easily accessible to the public	The KPK has provided a comprehensive annual report on its website: https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-tahunan. But there are two important issues: • There are several sections in the annual report format which are not available annually. This made it difficult for the public to compare the progress of the KPK's performance. For example, data on stopping / transferred employees is only available in the 2015 and 2017 annual reports, the rest are not. Other examples, data on prevention activities, and their integration with enforcement work are also not consistently being published • Until this report is made (April 2019), the annual report and financial statements of the KPK for 2018 are not yet available to the public Source:
	T. A.O.A. I			Daftar Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan
20. Responsive ness to information requests	The ACA does not have any access to information policies or mechanisms in place to respond to public requests for information and does not respond to such	The ACA has some mechanisms in place to respond to public requests for information (including on ACA decisions and how these decisions were made), but it is usually a difficult,	The ACA has a comprehensive access to information policies and processes in place and responds to public requests for information in a timely manner	The KPK has a system and procedures for Public Information Services. To implement the provisions of Article 13 paragraph (1) letter a of Law Number 14 of 2008 concerning Public Information Openness, the Head of the Corruption Eradication Commission appoints the Head of the Public Relations Bureau as Information and Documentation Management Officer (through the Decision of the Corruption Eradication Commission Number KEP-742 / 01/06/2017). In accordance with KPK Regulation No. 742/01/06/2017, KPK appoints structural officials and the formation of an organizational structure for public information services. In 2017, the Public Relations Bureau successfully completed the contact center blueprint. The preparation of this blueprint aims to become a reference framework for implementing public service standards in various fields such as: Public Information Services, gratification reporting services, LHKPN reporting services and public complaints services. To improve

	requests in practice	cumbersome and/or lengthy process.		service quality, the PIKP Section determines a Service Level Agreement (SLA) for the deadline for giving responses / services at the request of public information to be 5 (five) working days.
				Information request settlement trend:
				2017: 1799 information requests (completion rate of 99.75%)
				2016: 2990 information requests (99% completion rate)
				2015: 2360 information requests (100% completion rate)
				Sources:
				Prosedur Pelayanan Informasi https://www.kpk.go.id/id/layanan-publik/informasi-publik/prosedur-pelayanan/prosedur-pelayanan-informasi
				Laporan pelayanan informasi publik https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-pelayanan-informasi-publik
21. External oversight mechanisms	The ACA is accountable to Executive without any oversight committee	The ACA is accountable to (an) oversight committee(s) with Members of Parliament	The ACA has a comprehensive set of oversight mechanisms in place including (an) effective	The KPK compiles a report on the accountability of its performance as the organization's responsibility to stakeholders for carrying out the tasks and functions carried out. This report provides an overview of the accountability of the Corruption Eradication Commission in an effort to meet every work target and use of the resources used by the organization.
		and/or senior civil servants as members but the committee is not very effective and/or there are few	oversight committee(s) with active participation by Members of Parliament, senior civil	The methodology for preparing accountability reports is based on the Regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of Indonesia Number 53 of 2014 concerning Technical Guidelines for Performance Agreements, Performance Reporting, and Procedures for Reviewing Government Agency Performance Reports. Whereas the basis for preparing this report is the 2015-2019 KPK Strategic Plan which presents an

	additional oversight mechanisms in place	servants and prominent citizens	analysis between the targets and realization of the KPI (Key Performance Indicator) which is the focus of the KPK's work in 2017. LAKIP was compiled based on Presidential Instruction Number 7 of 1999 which mandated every government agency / state institution funded by the state budget to submit the said report. This report details the organizational responsibility and responsibility for using resources to carry out the organization's mission. The oversight mechanism is also carried out by the House of Representatives by holding a Meeting with Opinions as stipulated in the Republic of Indonesia's House of Representatives Regulation Number 1 of 2014 concerning Rules of Procedure. Source:
22. Internal review weak or non-existent internal monitoring and review mechanisms in place	The ACA has some internal monitoring and review mechanisms in place, but with important gaps	The ACA has a comprehensive set of internal monitoring and review mechanisms in place	Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK 2018 https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja In carrying out internal supervision work, the KPK has a deputy public complaint and internal supervision (Deputy PIPM) which is directly under the leadership which is also regulated in the 2011-2023 KPK Roadmap and the 2015-2019 KPK Strategic Plan. This mechanism is also regulated in KPK Regulation No. 6 of 2012 concerning Organizing the Internal Control System within the KPK. According to the Director of PIPM, in carrying out internal review and supervision work, the KPK adheres to the principle of three lines of defense, where the priority of problem solving is carried out at the smallest level (between staff and between sections); if it cannot be completed, then enter the PIPM. PIPM then formulates an analysis and recommendations to then be submitted to the KPK leadership to be decided. However, it was confirmed by several KPK employees, the system and mechanism of supervision at the KPK at this time still had to be improved. For

				example, many employees affected by ethical violations are not subject to appropriate sanctions (Inspector General Aris Budiman, and incidents of red books).
				Sources:
				Laporan Utama Koran Tempo, 4 Mei 2019 "Desakan Pengusutan Kasus Pelanggaran Etik Petinggi KPK Menguat"
				https://koran.tempo.co/read/442123/desakan-pengusutan-kasus-pelanggaran-etik-petinggi-kpk-menguat
				Laporan Utama Koran Tempo, 10 April 2019 "Penyidik dan Penyelidik Resah" https://koran.tempo.co/read/441496/penyidik-dan-penyelidik-resah
				Roadmap dan Renstra KPK
				https://www.kpk.go.id/id/tentang-kpk/roadmap-dan-rencana-strategis
				Peraturan KPK No. 6 Tahun 2012 tentang Penyelenggaran Sistem Pengendalian Internal di Lingkungan KPK.
				Diminta bentuk lembaga pengawas, KPK: sudah dilakukan (Tempo, 2017)
				(https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1060760/diminta-bentuk-lembaga-pengawas-kpk-sudah-dilakukan/full&view=ok)
				Deputi Pencegahan bantah lakukan pelanggaran kode etik (Tempo, 2019) (https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1201894/deputi-pencegahan-bantah-lakukan-pelanggaran-kode-etik-kpk/full&view=ok)
23. Adherence	Low level of confidence as	Moderate level of confidence	High level of confidence as	The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) continues to be the most trusted state institution by the public rather than other state institutions such as the

to due process	reflected in survey finding (below 50%) and views of ACA senior personnel, CSO leaders, journalists and, if possible, persons with direct contact with ACA	as reflected in survey finding (50%-75%) and views of ACA senior personnel, CSO leaders, journalists and, if possible, persons with direct contact with ACA	reflected in survey finding (above 75%) and views of ACA senior personnel, CSO leaders, journalists and, if possible, persons with direct contact with ACA	National Police to the DPR. Under the KPK, the President is considered an institution that is trusted by the community. The KPK received trust from 85 percent and the president won the trust of 84 percent of respondents. But in the past few months, several conflicts within the KPK have evaporated to the public. On March 29, 2019, 84 KPK investigators and 30 investigators sent a letter of petition entitled "Stop All Forms of Efforts to Hamper Case Handling" to the KPK leadership in relation to the five causes of delays in handling corruption cases at the KPK. All are from internal employees, there are no investigators from the police and prosecutors. These obstacles are considered to hinder the task of eradicating kroupsi, such as higher case development, corporate crime, and money laundering. Until April 12, petition supporters increased to nearly 500 people who extended to other Deputies, such as the Deputy for Prevention. Sources: Laporan Utama Koran Tempo, 10 April 2019 "Penyidik dan Penyelidik Resah" https://koran.tempo.co/read/441496/penyidik-dan-penyelidik-resah Survei ICW: KPK dan Presiden lembaga paling dipercaya (CNN Indonesia, 2018) https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20181211070221-20-352621/survei-lsi-icw-kpk-dan-presiden-lembaga-paling-dipercaya KPK minta maaf dan akui gagal karena data kasus Newmint bocor (Merdeka, 2018) https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/kpk-minta-maaf-dan-akui-gagal-data-kasus-pewmont-vang-seret-top-bocor html
24.	Low proportion	Moderate	High proportion	data-kasus-newmont-yang-seret-tgb-bocor.html In the complaints handling process, the KPK has processed and selected data
Willingness of complainant	of complainants are confident to identify	proportion of complainants are confident to identify	of complainants are confident to identify themselves	based on the identity of the reporter. The identity of the reporter is guaranteed confidentiality and security. In addition to through letters, direct visits, telephone, fax and SMS, the public can also submit reports of suspected TPK online, namely through the KPK Whistleblower's System (KWS).

s to identify themselves	themselves (less than 25%)	themselves (25- 50%)	(more than 50%)	Through this facility, the confidentiality of the reporter is guaranteed from the possibility of disclosure of identity to the public. In addition, through this facility the reporter can also actively play a role and monitor the progress of reports submitted by opening a secret communication box without the need to worry about his identity being known to others. If the protection of confidentiality is still felt lacking, the KPK can also provide physical security in accordance with the reporter's request.
				Presidential Spokesman Johan Budi ensures the security guarantee in question. This former spokesman for the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) said the identity of the reporter would be protected because it was regulated in article 12 of PP 43/2018. If it is not guaranteed, then law enforcement is deemed to violate regulations.
				Source:
				Daftar Pengaduan Masyarakat https://www.kpk.go.id/id/layanan-publik/pengaduan-masyarakat
25. Complaints handling	Complaints against ACA personnel are ignored and/or not investigated without any explanation	Complaints against ACA personnel are investigated by its internal control unit	Complaints against ACA personnel are investigated by another public agency to avoid conflict of interest	KPK has KPK Regulation No. 6 of 2012 concerning Organizing the Internal Control System within the KPK. All internal complaints handling processes are carried out by the Deputy for Internal Control and Public Complaints. Source: Peraturan KPK No. 6 Tahun 2012 tentang Penyelenggaran Sistem Pengendalian Internal di Lingkungan KPK

26. Outcomes of complaints	Complaints involving ACA personnel are ignored and not investigated at all	Some valid complaints against ACA personnel result in punishment or other remedies	All valid complaints against ACA personnel result in punishment or other remedies and are publicized in its annual report.	In the case of alleged serious violations suspected by the perpetrators of the officers in the Corruption Eradication Section, the KPK was not fully followed up. Case handling by the Internal Supervisor is also allegedly not transparent. An example is in the destruction of evidence in the form of a financial notebook owned by Basuki Hariman, a convicted person in a bribery case of the former judge of the Constitutional Court Patrialis Akbar. Adjunct Commissioner Roland Ronaldy and Commissioner Harun as KPK investigators then only returned to the police because they were involved in this case, and were not subject to the article had prevented the investigation. Whereas in the annual report, violations of the code of ethics are not included. According to informants from journalists, data requests related to ethical violations were also often not given. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Utama Koran Tempo, 10 April 2019 "Penyidik dan Penyelidik Resah" https://koran.tempo.co/read/441496/penyidik-dan-penyelidik-resah
27. Internal integrity mechanisms	ACA does not have a code of conduct or internal disciplinary procedures, or these are very weak/not applied in practice	The ACA has a code of conduct and internal disciplinary procedures, but these are not comprehensive and/or applied inconsistently	The ACA has a comprehensive code of conduct and disciplinary procedures which are applied fairly and consistently	The mechanism to maintain the condition of the internal integrity of the KPK is regulated in KPK Regulation No. 7 of 2013 concerning Personal Basic Values, Code of Ethics, and KPK Code of Conduct and KPK Regulation No. 6 of 2004 concerning the Code of Ethics for KPK Leaders. Sources: Peraturan KPK No. 7 Tahun 2013 tentang Nilai-nilai Dasar Pribadi, Kode Etik Pedoman Perilaku KPK dan Peraturan KPK No. 6 Tahun 2004 tentang Kode Etik Pimpinan KPK

D. Detection,	Investigation	and Prosecution	(9 indicators)
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28.	ACA is
Accessibility	inaccessible as
to	reflected in low
complainant	proportion of
s/ informants	corruption
3/ 1111011111111113	complaints
	received
	relative to
	population and
	perceived level
	of corruption
	(on average
	less than 1
	complaint per
	20,000 citizens
	per year)
	per year,

ACA is ACA is highly accessible as accessible as reflected in the reflected in the moderate high proportion proportion of of corruption corruption complaints complaints received received relative to relative to population and population and perceived level perceived level of corruption of corruption (on average (on average more that 1 between 1 complaint per complaint per 10,000 citizens 10,000 and 1 per year) complaint per 20,000 citizens per year)

The trend in public reports shows that in the past four years, the KPK received an average of 6,421 community reports. If seen from the comparison of the total population of Indonesia (minus the number of children), the KPK receives around 3.4 reports per 10,000 residents. To maximize access to corruption reporting, the KPK formed the KWS Application, the online corruption reporting portal (https://kws.kpk.go.id).

Number of complaints from corruption received by the KPK:

Year 2018: 6,468 reports Year 2017: 6,000 reports Year 2016: 7,252 reports Year 2015: 5,965 reports

Every success in handling cases handled by the KPK is inseparable from the participation of the community in providing complaints. Therefore, in accommodating and facilitating the process of public complaints, the KPK built various complaints media. The role of the community in combating corruption has been regulated in Government Regulation No. 71 of 2000 concerning Procedures for Implementing Community Participation and Awarding in the Prevention and Eradication of Corruption Crimes.

Sources:

Daftar Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan

Daftar Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK 2018 https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja

Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 43 Tahun 2018 tentang Tata Cara Pelaksanaan Peran Serta Masyarakat dan Pemberian Penghargaan dalam Pencegahan dan

29. Responsive ness to corruption complaints	ACA is not responsive as reflected in the low proportion of relevant corruption complaints/infor mation investigated during past 3-5 years (less than 33%)	ACA is responsive as reflected in the moderate proportion of relevant corruption complaints/infor mation investigated during past 3-5 years (33%-66%)	ACA is highly responsive as reflected in the high proportion of relevant corruption complaints/infor mation investigated during past 3-5 years (more than 66%)	Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Jumlah penduduk Indonesia capai 265 juta jiwa (Katadata, 2018) (https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2018/05/18/2018-jumlah-penduduk-indonesia-mencapai-265-juta-jiwa) Profil Anak Indonesia (Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak, 2018) (https://www.kemenpppa.go.id/lib/uploads/list/74d38-buku-pai-2018.pdf) According to the KPK performance accountability report, the level of completion of the TPK report is as follows: • Year 2018: 89,67% • Year 2017: 85,42% • Year 2016: 96% Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK 2018 https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja Statistik Pengaduan Masyarakat KPK 2018 https://www.kpk.go.id/id/statistik/pengaduan-masyarakat
30. Proactive investigation	Low proportion of corruption investigations initiated by ACA (less than 5% of	Moderate proportion of corruption investigations initiated by ACA	High proportion of corruption investigations initiated by ACA (more than 10% of all investigations)	The success rate of KPK prosecution management was contributed to by one of the capture operations which each year experienced an increase. • Year 2018: 30 OTT / 164 cases of lid = 18% (a total of 108 suspects) • Year 2017: 20 OTT / 123 cases of lid = 16% (a total of 72 suspects)

	all	(5-10% of all		• Year 2016: 17 OTT / 96 cases of lid = 17% (a total of 56 suspects)
	investigations)	investigations)		The average number of OTT uses per total case in the last three years is 17%.
				Sources: Statistik tindak pidana korupsi (Anticorruption Clearing House, 2019) https://acch.kpk.go.id/id/statistik/tindak-pidana-korupsi KPK catat OTT terbesar (Katadata, 2018) (https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2017/12/27/2017-kpk-catat-operasi-tangkap-tangan-terbesar) KPK sebut jumlah OTT selama 2018 terbanyak sepanjang sejarah (CNN
				Indonesia, 2018) (https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20181219133402-12-354858/kpk-sebut-jumlah-ott-selama-2018-terbanyak-sepanjang-sejarah)
32. Efficiency & professionali sm	Inefficient and unprofessional investigation of corruption cases	Efficient and professional investigation of corruption cases	Highly efficient and professional investigation of corruption cases	The number of cases that entered the prosecution stage has increased each year, which are 76 (2016), 103 (2017) and 151 (2018) respectively. This is certainly in line with the increasing public complaints and OTT activities. The number of cases determined by the court also experienced an upward trend each year, which respectively were 71 (2016), 84 (2017), and 104 (2018). Cassette The KPK's action said that the case handling process was not efficient. This is reflected in expensive case handling costs, but the return on assets is small. This can also be seen from the many large unresolved corruption cases. Until 2019 there were 18 corruption cases.
				In the context of professionalism, the KPK is often criticized. Several parliamentarians on several occasions criticized the KPK which tended to act in violation of the management of information relating to cases it handled. The

				leaked inspection report (BAP) that should have been protected, but the KPK actually often conveyed the information, giving rise to the excesses of judicial opinion against the names mentioned. The KPK also acts outside the KUHAP rules as the person being questioned cannot be accompanied by a lawyer. The violation of the mention of those who litigated in the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), both their status as investigators, witnesses, and those who had become suspects, were sent to the public, which contradicted the principle of presumption of innocence. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja KPK biaya besar, setoran kurang (Warta Ekonomi, 2018) https://www.wartaekonomi.co.id/read151785/kpk-biaya-besar-setoran-kurang.html)
32. Prosecution rate	Below 50%	Between 50% to 75%	Above 75%	From the information on the KPK's performance report for 2016-2018, it was found that the percentage of cases that went up to the investigation was 24.27% and the percentage of cases that rose to prosecution was 55.44% % Of investigations being investigated: Year 2018: 25.64% Year 2017: 24.07% Year 2016: 29.10%

Average: 24.27% % Of Investigations that are Prosecuting: Year 2018: 55.47% Year 2017: 56.59% Year 2016: 54.28% Average: 55.44% This data can be found in the Law Enforcement Index which is used to measure the success rate of KPK law enforcement. The weight of the KPK IPH differs from the weighting in the National IPH in consideration of the peculiarities of the KPK which do not have the authority to issue SP3 (although investigations may be 'stopped' by law, for example a suspect dies). In addition to the percentage of cases that have reached the level of prosecution, it is also necessary to look at the consistency of prosecution by KPK prosecutors. Some cases of regional heads, about state losses, demands relating to state losses, compared to two cases are quite large, the case of Suwarna Abdul Fatah, former Governor of East Kalimantan and the case of Arwin AS, former district head of Siak, the state losses up to 301 M 4 years with a state loss that is mentioned by the court of 300 billion in just 4 years. The prosecutor in this case was deemed inaccurate in making a claim, in the mitigation section it was stated that they had never been convicted. This can be seen in several cases such as Billy Sindoro and Edy Saputra Suradja who are recidivists, but the demands are actually maximized, because they are bribes and the article on the Corruption Law is a maximum of 5 years Sources:

				Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja Penerapan sistem penuntutan tunggal korupsi belum konsisten (Media indonesia, 2017) https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/219714-penerapan-sistem-penuntutan-tunggal-kasus-korupsi-belum-konsisten FGD Penilaian Kinerja KPK, Kamis 21 Maret 2019
33. Conviction rate	Below 50%	Between 50% to 75%	Above 75%	In accordance with the KPK's performance accountability report, the decision rate is proven to be more than 75%, with details as follows: • Year 2018: 79.10% • Year 2017: 100% • Year 2016: 63.06% • Average 80.66% ICW released a 2018 verdict that saw the verdict for corruptors still relatively mild. Based on a total of 1,162 defendants out of a total of 1,053 defendants, ICW said, there was no significant increase in punishing corruptors at an average value. The overall verdict as a whole is an increase, but not as significant as we expected, as friends can see for themselves in 2016, the average decision in 2017 is not even different. ICW noted that the verdict in the District Court was on average 2 years 3 months, a high court average of 2 years 8 months, while the Supreme Court was 5 years 9 months. If it is carried out on average in all three courts, the average Corruption

				sentence for corruptors in 2018 is around 2 years 5 months. The average 2018 corrupt verdict itself only rose 3 months compared to 2017. In 2017 the average corruption sentence was 2 years 2 months with details of 2 years 1 month at the district court level, 2 years 2 months at the high court level, and 5 years at the MA level. In 2016 the average corruption sentence was 2 years 2 months with details of 1 year 11 months in the district court, 2 years 6 months at the high court level, and 4 years 1 month at the MA level. Even though there is an increase, the verdict is still considered low.
				Sources:
				Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan
				Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja
				Tren Korupsi 2018 (Tirto id, 2018) https://tirto.id/respons-kpk-soal-rilis-icw-tentang-vonis-tren-korupsi-2018-dnjG.
34. Investigation of influential persons	No or very few investigations of influential persons for corruption (less	Some investigations of influential persons for corruption	Considerable number of investigations of influential persons for	In its annual report, the KPK looks independent in investigating and arresting influential people, such as the Regional Head, members of the Republic of Indonesia Parliament, DPRD, and even starting to enter important corporate figures.
	than 5)	(between 5 and 30)	corruption (more than 30)	As many as 911 state officials and private employees who have been prosecuted by the Corruption Eradication Commission as a result of committing corruption in the 2014-2018 period. In addition, there are 4 corporations that have been determined to commit corruption. For information from January to September 2018, there were 174 state and private officials arrested by the
				Corruption Eradication Commission and 3 corporations determined to be involved in corruption cases. There are 85 members of the DPR / DPRD who

are victims of this year's Anti Race Commission. The large number of people's representatives who were caught in corruption cases related to the determination of 41 members of Malang Regency DPRD who were arrested by the KPK due to RAPBD bribery cases.

Based on data from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), 103 members of the DPR and DPRD were caught in corruption cases throughout 2018. This number is the highest compared to other officials / private sector as shown in the graph below. Even 41 members of Malang City DPRD were arrested by KPK for committing corruption in congregation in 2018. The representatives of Malang City people received bribes in the 2015 APBD discussion.

For information, people's representatives who were caught in corruption cases throughout 2004-2018 amounted to 247 people, the most compared to others. As for 2018 officials / private sector caught by the KPK reached 260 people.

The case of regional heads handled in 2008-2018, there are 104 cases involving regional heads until the end of 2018. If viewed from the year of repression, the most is in 2018. In 2014 there were also up to 14 cases. In 2018 there were 29 cases, the others were evenly divided every year. Based on distribution, almost in all provinces are evenly distributed, in almost all provinces there are from Aceh to Papua.

But of the 104 regional heads arrested by the KPK only 32 people were deprived of their political rights. Political rights of regional heads that have not been revoked by 53 people, the remaining 18 people are still not verdicts. The KPK needs to consider that all political rights of regional heads affected by corruption cases be revoked so that the political mechanism is clean. The KPK also needs to create the right indicators in demanding revocation of political rights, because 60% of the positions of regional heads are related to political affairs. This is important as a form of justice in the case handling process.


				Sources:
				Laporan Tahunan KPK <u>https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan</u>
				Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja
				Statistik TPK berdasarkan profesi/jabatan (Anticorruption Clearing House, 2019) https://acch.kpk.go.id/id/statistik/tindak-pidana-korupsi/tpk-berdasarkan-profesi-jabatan
				KPK selamatkan uang negara RP. 15 Triliun (Katadata, 2018) https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2018/11/21/2014-2018-kpk-selamatkan-uang-negara-rp-15-triliun
				Wakil rakyat dan pejabat terbanyak terjera kasus korupsi 2018 (Katadata, 2018) https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2019/03/15/wakil-rakyat-pejabat-terbanyak-terjerat-kasus-korupsi-2018
				Anggota DPRD terjerat kasus korupsi melonjak 5 kali lipat (Katadata, 2018) https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2019/03/16/2018-anggota-dprdprd-terjerat-kasus-korupsi-melonjak-5-kali-lipat
35. Restitution & asset recovery	Inactive role by ACA	Moderately active role by ACA	Very active role by ACA	In the annual report, the KPK always lists details of asset recovery, asset tracking and auctions. During 2014-2018, the KPK managed to save Rp 1.49 trillion in state funds and a number of assets have also been confiscated for government interests.
				The largest state refund from the KPK was recorded in 2016 with a value reaching Rp 532 billion, followed by 2018 amounting to 394 billion and in 2017 amounting to 237 billion. During this period, the KPK has carried out an inkracht law against 362 corruption convicts. In the KPK's performance report, it is stated

				that the realization of asset recovery from 2016-2019 can be said to be very satisfactory, reaching 100.34%, 97.10%, 94.03% respectively. The perceived asset recovery work needs to be maximized. In 2017-2018, of the total state losses that reached Rp. 12.1 T, the KPK is only able to return Rp. 2.1 T. The use of the TPPU article which is still minimal (only 3 cases) proves the need for the KPK to shift the paradigm that prioritizes the recovery of state finances. The ability of KPK investigators and prosecutors to use TPPU articles needs to be strengthened. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja
				KPK selamatkan uang negara RP. 15 Triliun (Katadata, 2018) https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2018/11/21/2014-2018-kpk-selamatkan-uang-negara-rp-15-triliun
36. Perception of performance	Low level of effectiveness as reflected in survey finding (below 50%) and views of CSO leaders, anti-corruption experts, journalists and persons with direct contact	Moderate level of effectiveness as reflected in survey finding (50%-75%) and views of CSO leaders, anti- corruption experts, journalists and persons with direct contact	High level of effectiveness as reflected in survey finding (above 75%) and views of CSO leaders, anti-corruption experts, journalists and persons with direct contact	The KPK developed the Public Participation Index, which is a measure of outcomes for various forms of educational activities, socialization and anticorruption campaigns carried out by various units in the KPK, specifically units within the Deputy for Prevention. Initially the KPK in collaboration with MSI and CSI conducted this public opinion survey. But in 2018, the KPK collaborated with BPS to study and formulate its own parameters and methodology for measuring this index. Sources:

E. Preventio	with ACA, if possible	with ACA, if possible	with ACA, if possible	Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja
37. Allocated budget	Below 2.5% of ACA's operating expenditure	Between 2.5% and 5% of ACA's operating expenditure	Above 5% of ACA's operating expenditure	According to the KPK report, the average budget allocation for the Deputy Prevention is more than 5%. • Year 2017: Rp. 67,065,807,000 (allocation of 8% from Rp. 849,593,138,000) • Year 2016: Rp. 104,149,376,000 (allocation of 10.5% from Rp. 991,887,988,000) • Year 2015: Rp. 42,931,115,000 (allocation of 4.8% from Rp. 898,908,900,000) It should be noted, the budget in 2015 was compiled for the 2011-2015 KPK leadership period. If it is seen there are differences in institutional orientation, where the 2015-2019 KPK leadership period allocates more budget for prevention, compared to prosecution - although the difference is not significant. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan

				Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja
38. Strategic planning	There is no or a weak plan for prevention, education and outreach activities	The plan for prevention, education and outreach is comprehensive but not implemented fully	The plan for prevention, education and outreach is comprehensive and fully implemented	Substantially, the planning of KPK prevention strategies can be said to be good, especially because it has been able to refer to Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018 concerning National Strategy PK. PK with the Ministry has designed the Corruption Prevention Action Year 2019-2020 which consists of 11 actions. However, in the past four years, many prevention mandates have not been maximized, such as the level of compliance with LKHPN and reporting of gratuities. In addition, the KPK is considered not maximally reaching the diversity of target groups, especially minority and marginalized groups. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja
39. Anti- corruption learning and development	ACA initiated few or no corruption prevention initiatives	Some corruption prevention initiatives (average of 1-4 per year)	Many corruption prevention initiatives (average of 5 or more per year)	Based on the annual report from 2015-2017, the KPK details activities related to training and education. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja

40. Organization al reviews	Few or no reviews were conducted (relative to no. of organisations in jurisdiction)	A substantial number of reviews were conducted (relative to no. of organisations in jurisdiction)	Many reviews were conducted (relative to no. of organisations in jurisdiction)	Based on the annual report from 2015-2017, the KPK supervises and monitors several institutions / organizations through a scheme of coordination and preventive supervision. The main efforts that need to be improved are support in law enforcement institutions namely the National Police and the Attorney General's Office. Relations that were built through the SPDP and the MoU were felt to be not optimal, and in fact contradicted the broad coordination and supervision authority of the KPK. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja Perkembangan Korsupgah KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja Perkembangan Korsupgah KPK https://korsupgah.kpk.go.id/beranda/korsupgah/2018
41. Prevention recommend ations	Not at all	Sometimes (up to 50% of investigation reports contain concrete prevention recommendations)	Frequently (more than 50% of investigation reports contain concrete prevention recommendatio ns)	In article 8 paragraph (1) of Law Number 30 of 2002, it is explained that in carrying out the supervisory duties as referred to in Article 6 letter b, the Corruption Eradication Commission has the authority to supervise, research or review institutions that carry out their duties and authorities relating to eradication of acts corruption, and agencies that carry out public services. In paragraph (2) an additional explanation is given that in carrying out the authority as referred to in paragraph (1), the Corruption Eradication Commission has the authority to take over the investigation or prosecution of the perpetrators of corruption committed by the police or prosecutor's office. In carrying out monitor duties as referred to in Article 6 letter e, the Corruption Eradication Commission is authorized:



42. Research on corruption risks	Little or no discernible independent research carried out by the ACA	Some degree of research to develop risk assessments and sectoral corruption profiles	Extensive use of research, to develop risk assessments and sectoral corruption profiles	In carrying out monitor duties as referred to in Article 6 letter e, the Corruption Eradication Commission is authorized: • conduct an assessment of the administrative management system in all state and government institutions; • advise the leaders of state institutions and the government to make changes if based on the results of the assessment, the administration management system has the potential for corruption; • report to the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the People's Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Supreme Audit Agency, if the suggestion of the Corruption Eradication Commission regarding the proposed changes is not heeded. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja
43. Disseminatio n and campaigns	Does not disseminate corruption prevention information or rely on campaigns	Limited dissemination of corruption prevention information and reliance on campaigns	Extensive dissemination of corruption prevention and reliance on campaigns	KPK can be said to have made many innovations to provide anti-corruption related public education through several target groups. For example, the KPK uses educational educational tools in the form of a Courageous Friends Zone in the Taman Pintar Yogyakarta area to bring anti-corruption issues to children, which was launched on May 4, 2015. In addition, since its launch in 2014, KanalKPK TV has routinely produced Fairy Tales, a program that packs moral messages through wise stories. The KPK

also provides material in a book format for children. Considering the tendency of children in pictorial material compared to books filled with writing, a comic strip "Sahabat Pemberani" was launched which was the development of an animated film version of the same title. The KPK together with SPAK (Women's Voice of Anti-Corruption) also produces board games so that the anti-corruption messages are easier to understand such as the Nine Anti-Corruption (Semai) games, Put-Put LK, Anti-Corruption Arisan, and Matchmaking Games. (Majo).

The KPK also held a program "Teacher Supercamp: Anti-Corruption Writing Teachers" in order to increase the capacity of educators in compiling anti-corruption education materials and enriching the content or literature on anti-corruption education that can be utilized and applied in learning in schools. The KPK made a new breakthrough by inaugurating the P-II Anti-Corruption Extension Agency (LSP). The anti-corruption instructor training was held at the end of November 2017 with the Indonesian National Work Competency Standards (SKKNI). With this standard, the certificate holder has the right to conduct anti-corruption counseling. Printing anti-corruption instructors is one of the agenda of the Anti-Corruption Learning Center (ACLC) or the KPK Anti-Corruption Learning Center. ACLC acts as a center of excellence, a learning center, and a coordinator for pool of trainers.

For groups of women and young people, the KPK has initiated the Saya Perempuan Anti Korupsi (SPAK) movement. Through this movement, women are placed as a central figure in the prevention of corruption, both in their roles as mothers, wives, and professionals working in the community. By the end of 2018, the movement had produced 1,300 SPAK agents in 34 provinces, which provided anti-corruption outreach to more than 500 thousand people throughout Indonesia, from diverse backgrounds, ranging from housewives, activists to PKK, civil servants, teachers, figures community and religion, to students. In order to encourage the participation of young people, the KPK held Anti-Corruption Youth Camp and various events of an activity nature. From this activity, the KPK encouraged young people to make social changes after participating in the activity.

44. Online communicati on	ACA does not have a website and does not rely on social media to spread corruption prevention information	Limited use of its website and social media to spread corruption prevention information	Extensive use of its website and social media to spread corruption prevention information	Activities that target various target groups are certainly very good where anticorruption knowledge and capacity continues to increase. However, these activities should not only be programmatic, and do not have long-term planning. In addition, the substance of human rights and gender needs to be strengthened so that these groups can have sensitivity to these issues. The KPK also needs to encourage the focus of education on disability groups and indigenous groups. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja Based on the annual report from 2015-2017, the KPK details activities related to online communication. In the public service information report, the KPK has also provided extensive information platforms to the public. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-lakuntabilitas-kinerja Laporan Pelayanan Informasi Publik https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-informasi-publik
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F. Cooperation and External Relations (6 indicators)
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Confidence in Government support to the ACA

45.

confidence as reflected in survey finding (below 50%) and views of ACA senior personnel, CSO leaders, anti-corruption experts and journalists

Low level of

Moderate level
of confidence
as reflected in
survey finding
(50%-75%) and
views of ACA
senior
personnel, CSO
leaders, anticorruption
experts and
journalists

High level of confidence as reflected in survey finding (above 75%) and views of ACA senior personnel, CSO leaders, anticorruption experts and journalists

Government support for the KPK can be seen from various initiatives to strengthen the legal framework. This can be seen from the various KPK MoUs with various other government institutions such as the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In addition, the ratification of Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018 concerning the National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption is also one of the government's strong support for strengthening the role and institutions of the KPK in preventing corruption.

However, the government's commitment to the KPK had drawn criticism when Jokowi was deemed not strict in upholding the law of watering hard cases experienced by KPK investigators, Novel Baswedan. Jokowi up to now still does not want to form an Independent Fact Finding Search Team, and is only waiting for the results of the TGPF formed by the National Police.

Sources:

Nota Kesepahaman KPK dengan Kemenkumham https://www.kemenkumham.go.id/attachments/article/1193/MOU%20KEMENKUMHAN%20DAN%20KPK.pdf;

http://indonews.id/artikel/14832/Kemenkumham-Gandeng-KPK-Bentuk-Tim-Pencegahan-Suap-di-Lapas/),

Nota Kesepahaman KPK dengan Kemendagri

(https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/17/09/18/owhcv0354-kemendagri-dan-kpk-sepakat-penguatan-pengawasan-pemerintahan),

				Pembentukan Timnas Stranas PK (https://stranaspk.kpk.go.id/id/profil/tentang-stranas-pk) sebagai tindak lanjut Perpres 54 Tahun 2018 tentang Strategi Nasional Pencegahan Korupsi KPK tagih Jokowi soal kasus Novel Baswedan (CNN Indonesia, 2018) https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190413124444-12-385950/pegawai-kpk-tagih-janji-jokowi-soal-kasus-novel-baswedan
46. Cooperation with other integrity agencies	Conflict and/or lack of cooperation between ACAs or between ACA and other integrity agencies	Limited cooperation between ACAs or between ACA and other integrity agencies	High degree of cooperation between ACAs or between ACA and other integrity agencies	KPK in carrying out the implementation of the tasks of coordination, supervision and monitoring of corruption eradication both in the field of prosecution and prevention. If referring to Article 6 of Law 30 of 2002, it is explained that the KPK in carrying out its coordination duties as referred to in Article 6 letter a, the Corruption Eradication Commission is authorized: • coordinating investigations, investigations and prosecution of criminal acts of corruption; • establish a reporting system in eradicating corruption; • request information about activities to eradicate corruption in the relevant agencies; • carry out hearings or meetings with agencies authorized to eradicate criminal acts of corruption; • request reports from relevant agencies regarding the prevention of corruption Whereas in Article 8 paragraph (1) it is explained that in carrying out the supervision tasks as referred to in Article 6 letter b, the Corruption Eradication Commission has the authority to conduct supervision, research, or review of agencies that carry out their duties and authorities relating to the eradication of criminal acts of corruption, and agencies who in carrying out public services. In paragraph (2) an additional explanation is given that in carrying out the authority

as referred to in paragraph (1), the Corruption Eradication Commission has the authority to take over the investigation or prosecution of the perpetrators of corruption committed by the police or prosecutor's office.

In 2017, the KPK signed a cooperation agreement with law enforcement agencies that handled corruption cases, namely the National Police and the Attorney General's Office. This agreement was criticized because it was considered illegal, and did not need to be done because the positions of the three agencies were clearly stipulated in the law. The important thing that the public is waiting for is information about the extent to which this collaboration has been carried out.

Collaboration between law enforcement institutions can also be seen through other parameters such as SPDP reporting from the Police and the Prosecutor's Office, which on average reaches 921 SPDP per year. In addition, due to limited human resources, in the follow-up process of complaints, the KPK also cooperated with other institutions such as the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP), the Supervisory Body (Bawas), and the Judicial Commission.

Another thing that has become a criticism is that the communication pattern of KPK with other institutions needs to be improved. As law enforcers, the KPK only has to say the legal findings that are already available, and not submit matters that do not have permanent legal force.

Sources:

Nota Kesepahaman antara KPK, Kejaksaan RI, dan Polri tentang Kerjasama dalam Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi tahun 2017

				https://www.kpk.go.id/images/pdf/sipres/Mou%20KPK-Kejaksaan-Polri%201.pdf
				Statistik Korsup KPK, Polri dan Kejaksaan https://www.kpk.go.id/id/statistik/koordinasi-supervisi
47. Cooperation with non- government organization s	Conflict and/or lack of cooperation between ACA and other organizations	Limited cooperation between ACA and other organizations	High degree of cooperation between ACA and other organizations including CSOs and private companies	In general, the KPK is open to various kinds of input and criticism from non-governmental organizations. Not infrequently, in the process of preparing activities, it is also often involved. Many joint initiatives are carried out through the National Strategy PK. The KPK was also open to input from the leadership evaluation of the Agus Rahardjo era, where it was recorded that once received a meeting, and once gave a response note on the evaluation of civil society groups. In the private sector, the KPK also develops Profit and KAD to collaborate with business actors. In the field of cooperation with the University, the KPK needs to maximize it again. In several proceedings at the Corruption Court, the KPK acknowledged the difficulty of finding expert witnesses from the University. KPK needs to use a new strategy in this matter. Sources: KPK mengaku kesulitan cari saksi ahli dari perguruan tinggi (Tribun News, 2018) (http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2018/04/19/kpk-mengaku-kesulitan-carisaksi-ahli-dari-perguruan-tinggi-ini-sebabnya) Koalisi sipil desak KPK usut pelanggaran etik Deputi Penindakan (Tempo, 2019) https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1201618/koalisi-sipil-desak-kpk-usutpelanggaran-etik-deputi-penindakan/full&view=ok

48. International networks	ACA does not participate in any network	Active with ACA participating in 1 or 2 networks	Very active with ACA participating in 3 or more networks	Based on the annual report from 2015-2017, the KPK details activities related to international cooperation. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja Perkuat komitmen internasional, KPK hadiri pertemuan IACA (KPK, 2018) https://www.kpk.go.id/id/berita/berita-kpk/581-perkuat-komitmen-internasional-kpk-hadiri-pertemuan-iaca)
49. Cooperation with other countries	No cooperation between ACA and ACAs and/or law enforcement agencies in other countries	Limited cooperation in some areas with one or two ACAs and/or law enforcement agencies in other countries	High degree of cooperation with joint projects and technical assistance with several ACAs and/or law enforcement agencies in other countries	Based on the annual report from 2015-2017, the KPK detailed activities related to strengthening cooperation with other countries' anti-corruption institutions. Sources: Laporan Tahunan KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan/laporan-tahunan Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja KPK https://www.kpk.go.id/id/publikasi/laporan-akuntabilitas-kinerja Perbaharuan kerjavsama dengan MACC Malaysia (https://hukum.rmol.co/read/2018/11/05/364870/KPK-Indonesia-Dan-Malaysia-LanjutkanIt;i-gt;Joint-Investigation-It;/i-gt;-) Perjanjian kerja sama dengan ACRC Korea (https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/1050850-perpanjang-mou-kpk-dan-lembaga-antirasuah-korsel-tukar-teknologi) Perjanjian kerja sama dengan ICAC Mauritius (https://www.kpk.go.id/id/berita/berita-kpk/254-kpk-icac-mauritius-kerjasama-perangi-korupsi) Perjanjian kerja sama dengan CPIB Singapura (https://www.beritasatu.com/hukum/375747-kpk-jalin-kerjasama-dengan-lembaga-antikorupsi-singapura.html)
50. Accessibility to	The ACA does not have strategies,	The ACA has strategies, targets and	The ACA has strategies, targets and	The KPK has several outreach programs to certain groups, such as women's groups through the SPAK program and a group of young people through the Youth Camp program. But besides that, the KPK does not yet have a specific

marginalized groups	targets and benchmarks in place to enable it to monitor its responsiveness	benchmarks in place to enable it to monitor its responsiveness to marginalized	place to enable it to monitor its responsiveness to marginalized of people with disabilities and indigenous groups. Sources: Hak masyarakat adat talang mamak dapat dukungan dari KPK (Go.	Sources: Hak masyarakat adat talang mamak dapat dukungan dari KPK (GoRiau, 2019)
	to marginalized groups (including women and minority groups).	groups, but it does not actively monitor these differences.	groups, which it actively monitors.	https://www.goriau.com/berita/baca/hak-masyarakat-adat-talang-mamak-dapat-dukungan-dari-kpk.html Masyarakat adat temui KPK bahas soal potensi SDA dikorup (Detik, 2018) https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3981400/masyarakat-adat-temui-kpk-bahas-soal-potensi-sda-dikorup

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The final results of the assessment indicate the performance of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) gets a percentage of 80 percent. KPK has a large modality that can be seen from the supporting environmental factors that are very supportive, both internally and externally. The internal supporting factors of the KPK accounted for 85.71%, where indicators that needed to be prioritized for performance improvement were indicators related to human resource management.




Table 19: Assessment Results - Enabling Factors vs KPK Performance

In addition to strengthening supporting environmental factors, the KPK needs to continue to maintain its performance in a comprehensive and integrated enforcement strategy, together with a focus on solving major political corruption and corporate corruption cases. In the aspect of prevention, good practices of the KPK in regional Korsupgah need to be carried out continuously. Maintaining an organizational pattern with a merit system and developing an education center need to be maintained.

Whereas 78.13% of the external supporting factors of the KPK are still considered to be an obstacle to the work of KPK, especially those related to formal legal authority in accelerating operational and budgetary authority. Thus, looking at the results of the six dimensions of assessment, future institutional strengthening of the KPK needs to be evaluated by looking at internal and external supporting factors that focus on improving human resource management.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Independence and Status Dimension

- 1) KPK needs to encourage DPR RI to accelerate the discussion of revisions to Law No. 31 of 1999 concerning the Eradication of Corruption Crimes. The acceleration of discussion of the Corruption UU is expected to be able to optimize sufficient instruments for the National Police, KPK, Attorney General's Office, and Courts to apprehend corruptors. This effort also followed up on UNODC's evaluation regarding the many provisions of corruption that have not been accommodated in the Corruption UU, such as the provision of trade in influence, enriching illicit enrichment, bribery in the private sector, bribery foreign public office, return of assets, and provisions on state losses.
- 2) KPK needs to continue to recruit independent investigators on a regular basis as needed. KPK can expressly use its operational authority in carrying out the functions of appointing and dismissing employees who focus on long-term human resource investment.

B. Financial and Human Resources Dimension

- 3) KPK along with the Government and DPR RI need to conduct a comprehensive study of the projected increase in the carrying capacity of KPK budget by 0.10% of the total government budget. Simultaneously, KPK needs to design a more systematic budget plan by responding to the current corruption risk situation to increase the rate of return on state wealth.
- 4) KPK needs to more fully evaluate the level of budget absorption and increase the quality of budget absorption itself. In particular, KPK needs to review the extent to which the effectiveness of case handling funding mechanisms that have been using the ceiling system.
- 5) KPK needs to prepare a blueprint for human resources comprehensively in response to the wider dimensions of corruption crimes. The blueprint can be based on a change management approach, and behavioral change management. In the field of enforcement, the KPK needs to focus on improving managerial capabilities and planning for the Head of Task Force (Kasatgas), case administration capabilities, ability to use Money Laundering (TPPU) law, corruption detection capabilities that have dimensions of transnational crime, private corruption tracking capabilities, and asset recovery capability. In the field of prevention, KPK needs to focus on improving the ability to plan more comprehensive outreach strategies, especially towards minority groups, public communication capabilities, the ability to manage coordination of preventive supervision, and the ability to detect corruption risks.
- 6) KPK needs to accelerate the finalization of the study of opportunities for the expansion of KPK's regional offices in 9 regions. This study is important to answer at least related to authority, review mechanisms, funding sources, and recruitment systems. This is important so that the plans for establishing KPK in the regions have the same capabilities as the central KPK and are not an arena for compromising local elites
- 7) KPK needs to examine the opportunities for the establishment of a bureau-level structure that carries out the security function for employees. The formation of structures at the bureau level is considered important given the emergence of security risks across the entire KPK staff. This bureau will focus on reforming the security system for KPK employees as a whole through risk mapping and analyzing, evaluating security officers, and designing operational standard procedures (SOPs) that focus on situational crime prevention engineering.

C. Accountability and Integrity Dimension

- 8) KPK needs to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the internal control system under the Deputy for Internal Control and Public Complaints (PIPM). This effort is crucial considering the increasingly complex risk of KPK human resource management. KPK leaders and Deputy PIPM also need to address and seriously follow up on various alleged ethical violations that occur, especially those involving actors who occupy strategic positions. Ethical enforcement within KPK must be firm and the results of the examination must be revealed to the public.
- 9) KPK needs to immediately resolve the turmoil in the Deputy for Enforcement both at the vertical (deputy-investigator) and horizontal (investigator-investigator) level. KPK leaders needs to expressly expose the alleged inhibition of deliberate handling of cases by the Deputy for Enforcement. This problem will hinder the process of case handling if it is not immediately resolved.
- 10) The KPK leaders needs to be more transparent and participatory in the process of resolving internal problems in accordance with KPK Regulation No. 6 of 2012 concerning the Implementation of the Internal Control System within KPK. The KPK leaders as the final decision maker needs to be firm in giving sanctions if there are proven guilty employees.

D. Detection, Investigation and Prosecution Dimension

- 11) KPK needs to improve efficiency and professionalism in case handling. KPK investigators need to improve their capacity in cases proving and administrating. KPK needs to re-identify solutions from cases with expensive case handling costs, but the return on assets is small. In the context of law enforcement administration, KPK needs to evaluate various information leakage incidents and negligence in preparing letters to support the course of the case which often have a negative impact on the trial process.
- 12) KPK needs to remain focused on efforts to deal with large corruption cases involving highprofile actors. KPK needs to compile a list, scale, and challenges of resolving past major corruption cases so that there will be no arrears in the future. KPK is also seen as important for making prosecution guidelines to avoid disparity in prosecutions.
- 13) KPK needs to ensure the use of UU No. 8 of 2010 regarding Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering (TPPU) more optimally. The lack of entanglement of cases with the use of this UU has an impact on the minimum rate of return and recovery of assets and state finances. KPK needs to focus on this aspect, rather than continuing to criminalize someone / group.

E. Prevention, Education and Outreach Dimension

- 14) KPK needs to be more maximal in carrying out the functions of coordination and supervision of the National Police and the Attorney General's Office. KPK still needs to encourage Ministries / Agencies to take steps to improve the system and bureaucracy, especially at the Regional Government level.
- 15) KPK needs to consider the adoption of a behavioral insight in order to strengthen corruption prevention strategies more precisely. The approach to improve governance needs to be strengthened by an approach that looks at human behavior. The success of identifying these supporting factors will facilitate KPK's work in developing a comprehensive planning strategy for education, prevention and outreach activities for various target groups. Programs that have been running like SPAK and Youth Camp need to be evaluated for their effectiveness.

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16) KPK as the Coordinator of the National Corruption Prevention Team needs to increase public awareness about the National Strategy for Preventing Corruption. The increasing mandate and coverage of KPK through Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018 needs to be followed by efforts to invite the public to be actively involved in efforts to prevent corruption in each sector. Socialization efforts need to be integrated with actors in the region.

F. Cooperation and External Relations Dimension

- 17) KPK needs to form a trigger mechanism strategy in more participatory law enforcement. This necessity is also urgent given the many corruption cases that have taken place at the Indonesian National Police and the Attorney General's Office. KPK needs to help efforts in bureaucratic reform in the two agencies. Given the limitations of human resources, in the follow-up process of the complaint KPK also needs to maximize the cooperation with related institutions such as the Government Internal Supervision Apparatus (APIP), the Supreme Court Supervisory Board (Bawas), and the Judicial Commission.
- 18) KPK needs to involve stakeholders in evaluating the 2015-2019 Strategic Plan and planning for the Strategic Plan 201-2023. Participatory corruption eradication work needs to be encouraged by KPK. Institutions with interests whether public institutions and nongovernment institutions need to be involved in the strategic process. KPK needs to specifically make a cooperation agreement with the University regarding expert resources for the trial.
- 19) KPK needs to open a more inclusive space for the involvement of efforts to prevent corruption in marginalized groups. KPK needs to design data interventions and sorting for marginalized groups, such as groups of people with disabilities and indigenous groups.
- 20) KPK needs to immediately draw up a Standard Operating Procedure for public communication. This is important to keep the emergence of multi-interpretive statements—which are often counterproductive to the work of the KPK as law enforcers.

ANNEX 1: INTERVIEWEES

Persons interviewed during assessment of ACA:

	Position	Organization
1	KPK Commissioner	Corruption Eradication Commission
2	KPK Advisor	Corruption Eradication Commission
3	Deputy of Information and Data	Corruption Eradication Commission
4	Deputy for Internal Oversight and Public Complaints	Corruption Eradication Commission
5	Head of Human Resources Bureau	
6	Head of Secretariat for Enforcement	Corruption Eradication Commission
7	Chairperson of Employee Container	Corruption Eradication Commission
8	Staff / Employees	Corruption Eradication Commission
9	Director of Law and Regulation	BAPPENAS
10	Inspector General	Ministry of Internal Affairs
11	Head of Deputy II for Study and Management of Priority Programs	Presidential Staff Office
12	Member of Parliament Commission III	Republic of Indonesia Parliament

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

Peo Persons engaged during consultation on assessment findings ss:

No	Position	Organization
1	Expert in Anti-Corruption	Board of Transparency International Indonesia
2	Expert in Criminal Law	University of Indonesia
3	Expert in Criminology Expert in Change Management	University of Indonesia Rumah Perubahan
5	Expert in Corruption Sociology	University of Indonesia
6	Secretary General	Transparency International Indonesia
7	Coordinator of the Legal and Judicial Monitoring Division	Indonesia Corruption Watch
8 9	Director of Publication KPK leaders from 2007-2009	Center for Law and Policy Studies
10	Journalist	Kompas

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Peraturan MA No. 13 Tahun 2006 tentang Tata Cara Penanganan Tindak Pidana Korporasi

Peraturan KPK No. 3 Tahun 2018, tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja KPK

PP 103 Tahun 2012 tentang Perubahan atas PP 63 Tahun 2005 tentang Manajemen SDM KPK

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